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I. INTRODUCTION
Many judges,1 members of Congress, 2 and commentators 3 have
1. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Remarks of the ChiefJusticeon Reforming Diversity Jurisdictionand Civil RICO, 21 ST. MAvs L.J. 5, 9 (1989)(urging reform of
civil RICO because "miost of the civil suits filed under the statute have nothing
to do with organized crime.... They are garden-variety fraud cases of the type
traditionally litigated in state courts."). See also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
741 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984)(protesting that "[gliven the general purpose of
the RICO legislation, the uses to which private civil RICO has been put have
been extraordinary, if not outrageous"), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985); PMC, Inc. v.
Ferro Corp., 131 F.R.D. 184, 187 (C.D. Cal. 1990)(announcing that "this court is
legitimately concerned about the misuse of civil RICO and the increasingly familiar phenomenon of expanding a straightforward breach of contract into a claim of
promissory fraud. A plaintiff then asserts two or more mailings in furtherance of
promissory fraud and, presto, claims a civil RICO violation. Distressingly, this
type of pleading inflation has become all too common."). See generally David B.
Sentelle, Civil RICO: The Judges' Perspective, and Some Notes on Practicefor
North CarolinaLawyers, 12 CAMPBELL L. REv. 145 (1990).
2. See, e.g., HousE CoNm. ON THE JumrciRY, RICO A nENDmENTS ACT OF 1991, H.R.
REP. No. 312, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1991)(indicating that RICO should be
used in "civil suits [that] would supplement governmental criminal action and
attack real criminal conduct, not... garden-variety contract disputes written up
to sound like crimes" and proposing to "remove[ ] the availability of civil RICO
from ordinary business transactions"); id. at 28 (declaring that "the Committee
intends to eliminate the practice prevalent today of turning ordinary commercial
disputes into civil RICO claims"); Oversight on Civil RICO Suits Brought Under
18 U.S.C. 1964(c): Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1985) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings](testimony of former
Sen. Roman L. Hruska of Nebraska, who introduced the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, that "I was deeply disturbed and distressed, because it is quite
apparent that in the past several years we have seen a distortion and an unintended application of RICO provisions in ways that have produced harmful results."); id. at 9 (former Senator Hruska explaining that "it was not my intention
that the civil sanctions contained in [the RICO statute] serve as a vehicle to engage in the type and extent of use to which many efforts are directed"); id. at 338
(statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch of Utah that "this law is being used by some very
resourceful lawyers all over the country to embarrass legitimate business enterprises into settlements that they would not otherwise make"); 123 CONG. REc.
H9371 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986)(remarks of Rep. Frederick C. Boucher of Virginia
that "the federalization of thousands of mere commercial disputes... threatened
to swamp a [flederal judiciary that was never designed to handle these types of
cases"). See also Interview with Roman L. Hruska, Of Counsel for Kutak, Rock
and Campbell, in Omaha (Feb. 9, 1987), quoted in Robert L. Sivick, Note, Civil
RICO-What Hath Congress Wrought? Superior' Oil Company v. Fulmer, 20
CREIGHTON L. REv. 1225, 1228 (1987)(explaining that "I feel confident that had
[Congress] realized [or] had they been told, 'wait a minute! Seventy percent of
these cases will be against stock brokers, against accountants, against lawyers
and businessmen'... I doubt very much that the Congress would have passed the
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bemoaned the fact that attorneys frequently add causes of action
under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations6
Act (RICO)4 to "up the ante"5 in otherwise ordinary civil actions.

3.

4.

5.
6.

bill.").
Even before RICO was enacted, some congressmen recognized that litigants
could abuse the statute. For example, in a dissent to the House Judiciary Committee's report on the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Representatives
John Conyers, Jr., Abner Mikva, and William F. Ryan warned: "[The RICO bill]
runs amuck It embodies poor draftsmanship, and it employs penalties and investigative procedures which are both abusive and pregnant with potential
abuse." HOUSE Comm.ON THE JuDIcIARY, REPORT ON THE ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL AcT OF 1970, H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4081 [hereinafter 1970 HousE REPORT]. They concluded that
'[RICO] should not be adopted. It both fails to do effectively what it sets out to do
and succeeds in doing far too much what it should not do." Id. at 4084.
See, e.g., articles cited infra note 6. See also Dan A. Naranjo & Edward L. Pina,
Civil RICO: Overview on the Eve of the 200th Anniversary of the FederalJudiciary, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 23, 57 (1989)(lamenting that "[tihe expansive uses of
RICO in the civil arena continue to have devastating results").
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1984 & Supp. 1996). RICO's civil remedies are
contained in § 1964, which provides in part that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue
therefor in any appropriate United States district court...." Id. § 1964(c)(West
Supp. 1996).
See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing civil RICO's treble damages and attorney's fees provision and the stigmatizing effect of civil RICO
claims).
See, e.g., Beauford v. Helmsley, 843 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1988)(apartment-building
tenants sued developer and others under civil RICO in connection with conversion of building to condominiums), cert.denied, 493 U.S. 992 (1989); Montesano v.
Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1987)(boat owners sued secured lender and repossession company under civil RICO after they repossessed
his boat); Moeller v. Zaccaria, 831 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)(homeowners
sued builder's employees under civil RICO in connection with an addition to the
home); U.S. Concord, Inc. v. Harris Graphics Corp., 757 F. Supp. 1053 (N.D. Cal.
1991)(civil RICO suit filed over sale of allegedly defective printing press); Miller
v. Moffat County State Bank, 678 F. Supp. 247 (D. Colo. 1988)(customer sued
bank under civil RICO over allegedly fraudulent interest overcharges); Abernathy v. Erikson, 657 F. Supp. 504 (N.D. Ill. 1987)(ex-wife sued former husband
under civil RICO for allegedly defrauding her of an interest in real property);
Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Mass. 1986)(female carpenter's apprentice sued union officials under civil RICO for alleged sexual harassment and
discrimination); King v. Lasher, 572 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)(estate beneficiaries sued executrix and trustee under civil RICO concerning distribution of
deceased's assets); American Soc'y of Contemporary Medicine, Surgery & Ophthalmology v. Murray Communications, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Ill. 1982)(Society was sued under civil RICO for an alleged breach of contract arising over the
publication rights of two medical journals).
Of course, civil RICO has also been alleged in some fairly bizarre cases. See,
e.g., McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842 (3d Cir. 1996)(dismissing civil
RICO action brought by hospital patients who sued hospitals and photocopying
services retained by the hospitals, after patients were charged excessively high
prices for copies of certain medical records), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W.
3017 (June 28, 1996)(No. 95-2087); Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadel-
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Less discussed and well known, however, is that attorneys also add
phia, 945 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1991)(owner of adult dance club sued city under civil
RICO after he was denied business licenses), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 984 (1992);
Eveland v. Director of Central Intelligence Agency, 843 F.2d 46 (1st Cir.
1988)(plaintiff sued director under civil RICO to challenge U.S. foreign policy in
the Middle East); Katzman v. Victoria's Secret, 167 F.R.D. 649 (S.D.N.Y.
1996)(recipient of mail order catalogue sued company under civil RICO, claiming
that a male with a higher income level received a catalogue with a discount offer
worth $15 more than the one in her catalogue), recounted in Amy Stevens, Look
What's UnderneathVictoria'sSecret Lawsuit, PALM BEACH PoST,May 5, 1996, at
7A and in Street Talk, USA TODAY, June 27, 1996, at 3B (indicating that court
dismissed the case because the defendant failed to show the defendant committed
any fraud or had a fraudulent intent); Medallion TV Enters. v. SelecTV of Cal.,
627 F. Supp. 1290 (C.D. Cal. 1986)(partner sued other partner under civil RICO
to recover losses sustained from lower-than-anticipated sales of broadcast rights
to heavyweight boxing match between Muhammed Ali and Trevor Berbick), affd,
833 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 917 (1989); Morrison v.
Syntex Labs., Inc., 101 F.R.D. 743 (D.D.C. 1984)(manufacturer of infant milk
formula was sued under civil RICO for alleged fraudulent advertising); Congregation Beth Yitzhok v. Briskman, 566 F. Supp. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)(Chassidic Jewish congregation sued certain congregation members under civil RICO in dispute
concerning proper succession to the "Skolyer Rebbe," the congregation's top leadership position); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp.
1125 (D. Mass. 1982)(ex-church member sued church elders under civil RICO for
alleged theft of her garbage); Hannah v. NufHart Hair Clinics Inc., No. 95-4493
(N.Y. Common Pleas filed Jan. 6, 1996)(men who underwent hair transplant surgery sued company operator under civil RICO when the results of the surgery
were, in their opinion, worse than baldness), recounted in Jon Schmitz, Men
ChargeHair Clinic with Racketeering,PITTSBURGH PosT-GAzzrrE,

Jan. 14, 1996,

at Gi.
For the outcome of many cases listed above (and other similar cases), see G.
Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths that BolsterEfforts
to Rewrite RICO and the VariousProposalsfor Reform: "Mother of God-Is this
the End of RICO?," 43 VAND. L. REv.851, 1021-48 (1990). For descriptions of
additional cases-both ordinary and bizarre-in which violation of civil RICO
has been alleged, see Susan Getzendanner, Judicial "Pruning"of "GardenVariety Fraud"Civil RICO Cases Does Not Work: It's Time for Congress to Act, 43
VAND. L. REv. 673, 679-80 (1990); Philip A. Lacovara & Geoffrey F. Aronow, The
Legal Shakedown of LegitimateBusiness People: The Runaway Provisions ofPrivate Civil RICO, 21 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1, 2-3, 10-18 (1985-86); Petra J. Rodrigues,

Note, The Civil RCO Racket: FightingBack with FederalRule of Civil Procedure
11, 64 ST. Joms L. Rv.931, 937-38 & nn.26-33 (1990). In her article, Ms.
Getzendanner observed:
The majority of civil RICO cases involve commonplace commercial controversies, the facts of which reveal an ordinary business relationship
gone sour. These mercantile melees are recharacterized by resourceful
attorneys to conform with the requirements of RICO.... Thus transmogrified, the ordinary state law fraud or contract action becomes a
"racketeering" case, threatening treble damages, costs, and attorney's
fees.
Susan Getzendanner, Judicial "Pruning"of "GardenVariety Fraud"Civil RICO
Cases Does Not Work: It's Time for Congress to Act, 43 VA-D. L. REv. 673, 679-80
(1990).
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civil RICO7 claims to forum shop;8 to circumvent the stricter venue
and jurisdictional rules that would otherwise apply to their clients'
"garden variety"9 claims;1O and to corral defendants into an inconvenient jurisdiction with which they may have no contacts.'
The RICO section used for these purposes is 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b).
Although § 1965(b) is the statute's nationwide service-of-process provision, courts also use it to establish nationwide venue and personal
jurisdiction over RICO defendants.12 Section 1965(b) allows a plaintiff to sue defendants in a foreign forum "when the ends of justice [so]
7. As used in this Article, the term "civil RICO" refers to private causes of action
under 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1984 & Supp 1996). In other words, "civil
RICO" refers to the use of the civil remedies under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964.
8. See Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum
Shopping and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 769, 776-77 (1995)(remarking that "as suggested by the old adage about
the 'home-field advantage,' the location of the forum adjudicating a dispute is
critically important. Litigators are well aware of the careful maneuvering over
where a lawsuit will proceed and believe-rightly or wrongly-that the answer to
the 'where' question may drastically impact the ultimate outcome of the case."
(footnote omitted)); Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARv.L. REv. 1677,
1678 (1990)(explaining that "[a]mong the considerations that may motivate a forum shopper are the convenience or expense of litigation in the forum, the inconvenience to one's adversary, the probable or expected sympathies of a potential
jury pool, the nature and availability of appellate review, judicial calendars and
backlogs, local rules,... and virtually any other interjurisdictional difference").
Some attorneys also add RICO counts to obtain a federal forum. See Bruns v.
Ledbetter, 583 F. Supp. 1050, 1055 (S.D. Cal. 1984)(stating that if civil RICO
were given its broadest possible meaning, it "would literally make a federal case
out of nearly every instance of business fraud"). This "federalization" problem
falls outside the scope of this Article, but has been addressed by others. See, e.g.,
Jed S. Rakoff, The Federalizationof Commercial Torts Under RICO, ALI-ABA
COURSE MATERIALS J., Feb. 1986, at 7.
9. A good definition of a "garden variety" claim is one that, absent civil RICO, is
remediable under state common-law theories-such as misrepresentation or
breach of contract-or other federal statutes. See Diane L. Virzera, Redirecting
the Debate on "GardenVariety"Abuses of Civil RICO: Suitability Rule Violations
and the Case for Treble Damages, 26 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 341, 342 n.6
(1993). Accord SKADDEN, ARPS, MEAGHER & FLOM, GumE TO RICO ...A PRAcTICAL GUIDE FOR THE CORPORATE COUNSELOR 27-28 (John C. Fricano ed. 1986)
[hereinafter SKADDEN, ARPs] (explaining that "[t~he expression 'garden-variety
fraud' as used in RICO cases refers to 'fraudulent' conduct in the marketplace
that, without reliance upon RICO, is regularly subjected to regulation pursuant
to statutory schemes or common law doctrines").
10. Cf Paul H. Rubin & Robert Zwirb, The Economics of Civil RICO, 20 U.C. DAvIS
L. REv.883, 889 (1987)(stating that "if RICO were applied more generally, plaintiffs could get around the stricter or less generous legal standards (including
standing, culpability, causation, reliance, materiality) of statutes covering the
underlying predicate acts").
11. See SKADDEN, ARPs,supra note 9, at 12 (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 1965 "can mini-

mize the question of the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant"). See
also infra section III(B)(2)(discussing the "contacts" issue).
12. See infra section III(B).
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require."13 As two commentators astutely observed, § 1965(b)
permit[s] any district court, when "the ends ofjustice require," to summon any
nonresident person-no matter where located-to appear as a defendant in a
pending action. This provision, which can effectively compel an individual who
lives in Arizona to defend an action pending in Maine if "the ends of justice
require," is a rare expansion of traditionalconcepts of venue andjurisdiction;
its outer parameters have never been meaningfully tested against the standards that ordinarily apply to the exercise of a federal court's personal
jurisdiction.14

Because of the "ends of justice" standard, civil RICO has a very long
reach-a reach that can drag a defendant from one end of the country
to the other.
The "ends of justice" standard can wreak havoc on defendants and
courts regardless of how well a RICO claim is pleaded. The standard
causes problems in well-founded RICO cases because courts have not
developed a systematic test to evaluate when § 1965(b) should be used
to exercise personal jurisdiction or venue,1 5 how the various subsections of § 1965 relate,' 6 or what the phrase "ends of justice" actually
means.17 The "ends ofjustice" standard causes even more problems in
poorly-pleaded "garden variety" cases,'-8 because it sometimes becomes the sole reason certain defendants must appear in the foreign
forum.19

Judicial confusion about when and how to apply § 1965(b) has encouraged some plaintiffs to add questionable RICO claims to draw
20
multiple defendants into a forum in which some have no contacts.
To make matters worse, when a defendant attempts to eliminate the
RICO claim through an early motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction2l or for improper venue, 2 2 courts typically refuse to examine whether the plaintiff has stated a valid RICO claim. 2 3 Instead,
13. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965(b)(West 1994). For the fill text of § 1965(b), see text accompanying infra note 87.
14. PAUL A. BATISTA & MARK S. RHODES, CrViL RICO PRACTICE MANuAL § 2.6 (1995
Cum. Supp. No. 1)(citation omitted and emphasis added). Accord Laura Ginger,
Business' Civil RICO Liability Goes Unchecked:No PreviousConvictionRequired,
24 Am. Bus. L.J. 179, 187 (1986)(observing that "liberalized venue and jurisdictional provisions allow civil RICO actions to be sustained in far more districts
than would diversity of citizenship business cases"); Drew A. Campbell, Comment, Civil RICO Actions in Commercial Litigation:Racketeer or Businessman?,
36 Sw. L.J. 925, 937 (1982)(characterizing § 1965(b) as "the most liberal and potentially far-reaching of RICO's procedural devices").
15. See infra section IV.B.
16. See infra section III.
17. See infra section IV.
18. See supra note 9 (defining "garden variety" in the civil RICO context).
19. See, e.g., Getzendanner, supra note 6, at 674.
20. See infra sections III & IV.
21. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
22. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 12(b)(3).
23. Pleading defects are typically included in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
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they ignore the allegations and ask only whether all the defendants

could be joined in one forum. 24 The result of this incomplete examina-

tion is that defendants may be stranded in a foreign forum based only
would render the
on a deficient RICO claim, which, if dismissed,
25
court's jurisdiction and venue improper.
Systematic and comprehensive tests for analyzing venue and personal jurisdiction under civil RICO must be formulated and applied.
New boundaries must be drawn. For years, litigants have manipulated § 1965 in ways Congress never envisioned nor intended. They
have twisted the statute's language and legislative history to gain procedural advantages that might be outcome determinative. In addition, federal courts are split and confused about how venue and
26
personal jurisdiction should be analyzed in the civil RICO context.
Indeed, the two United States Courts of Appeals that have addressed
the issue used completely different factors to reach conflicting results.27 The federal district courts are even more splintered in their
28

approaches.
After addressing civil RICO's legislative history2 9 and § 1965's
statutory framework,30 this Article describes different methods courts
currently use to analyze venue and personal jurisdiction under 18
32
U.S.C. § 1965.31 Next, this Article proposes separate jurisdictional
and venue3 3 tests for courts to apply when § 1965(b) is invoked in civil
RICO cases. These tests are designed to protect defendants' due process rights, give credence to the actual language of § 1965(b), adhere
to legislative intent, bring some degree of uniformity and consistency
to jurisdictional determinations under civil RICO, and discourage attorneys from adding RICO claims merely to gain a jurisdictional advantage. If applied, the tests should solve the major problems
currently associated with venue and personal jurisdiction under civil
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See 5A CHARLEs A.WRIGHT
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357 (1990 & Supp.
1996) [hereinafter WRIGIr & MILLER].
See infra section III.B.2.a.
See, e.g., Charles River Data Sys., Inc. v. Oracle Complex Sys. Corp., 788 F. Supp.
54, 57 (D. Mass. 1991)(holding that if a RICO claim is dismissed, venue questions
"must be decided by the rules which apply to all diversity cases").
See infra sections III & IV.
Compare Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988) with Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv.,
Inc., 788 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1986).
These conflicts are addressed throughout the Article, but are highlighted in infra
sections III and IV.B.
See infra section II.
See infra section III.
See infra section IV.B.
See infra section IV.C.1.b. See also infra App. 1.
See infra section IV.C.2. See also infra App. 2.
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RICO. The Article concludes with some practical advice for attorneys
34
representing plaintiffs and defendants in civil RICO actions.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL RICO
At 10:14 a.m. on October 15, 1970 3 S-a dark and cloudy day in
Washington, D.C.36-President Richard M. Nixon signed37 the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,38 which Congress had approved three
days earlier.39 President Nixon told those gathered to witness the
law enforcement "to
signing that the new law would allow federal
40
launch a total war against organized crime."
Title IX of the Act4l was named "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations"--commonly known as RICO.42 Under RICO, a de34. See infra section V.
35. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THPRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RICHARD NIXON 846-47

(1970) [hereinafter PUBLIC PAPERS].
36. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMs, THE LAW OF Cirm RICO § 1.1, at 1 & n.1 (1991)(citing
Washington Post, Oct. 15, 1970, at B4; id. Oct. 16, at D4).
37. 116 CONG. Ec. 37264 (1970).

38. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
39. 116 CONG. REC. 36296 (1970). See also 1970 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, re-

printed in 1970 U.S.C.CA.N. 4007, 4007 (indicating that the House of Representatives passed the law on October 7, 1970, and the Senate passed it on October 12,
1970).
40. PUBLIC PAPERS, supranote 35, at 846. See also ABRAms, supranote 36, § 1.1, at 2.
41. RICO is one of eleven titles of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922. The other titles reflect the statute's criminal-law enforcement orientation. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6006 (1994)(Title II; use immunity); id. § 3503 (Title VI; pretrial depositions in criminal cases); id. § 3504
(Title VII; limiting motions to suppress); id. §§ 3575-3578 (Title X; increasing
sentences for dangerous special offenders).
42. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922. See 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996). The idea of RICO dates to at
least 1967, when the Katzenbach Commission called for Congress to "make a fifllscale commitment to destroy the power of organized crime groups." PRESIDENT'S
COAMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIM IN A FREE SOCIETY 200 (1967), cited in ABRAS, supra note 36,

§ 1.4, at 24 n.1. For additional legislative history, see 1970 HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4012 (listing important dates in the
legislative process); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Intl, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1005
(C.D. Cal. 1982)(detailing the efforts of the 90th and 91st Congresses to implement the Katzenbach Commission's recommendations); ABRAms, supra note 36,
§ 1.4, at 24-34; American Bar Association, Section on Corporation, Banking and
Business Law, Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force ch. 4 (1985) [hereinafter ABA Ad Hoc Report]; G. Robert Blakey, The RCO Civil FraudAction in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 249-80 (1982)
[hereinafter Blakey, Civil FraudAction]; G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings,
RacketeerInfluenced and CorruptOrganizations(RICO):Basic Concepts--Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEsN'. L.Q. 1009, 1014-21 (1980); Craig M. Bradley,
Racketeers, Congress,and the Courts:An Analysis of RICO, 65 IowA L. REv. 837,
838-44 (1980). See also Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalizationof
Crime, 22 Am. Canf. L. rEv. 213 (1984)(tracing federal anti-racketeering legisla-
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fendant could be held liable 43 if the government or a private plaintiff
established that the defendant, through a series of predicate acts,4 4
received income from a pattern 45 of racketeering activity,46 acquired

control of an enterprise 4 7 through a pattern of racketeering activity,
operated an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, or
conspired to engage in racketeering activity.48
Although RICO contained both civil and criminal remedies, President Nixon never mentioned the civil remedies 49 and the press mentioned them only in passing.5 0 Instead, the focus was almost solely on
fighting organized crime.51 Even when RICO's civil remedies were

referenced, the discussion almost always revolved around how those
remedies would advance the government's war against organized
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

50.

tion to the Colonial era).
See infra note 74 (discussing damages).
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1) (West 1994 & Supp. 1996).
See id. § 1961(5)(defining "pattern").
See id. § 1961(1)(defining "racketeering activity"); id. § 1961(5)(defining "pattern
of racketeering activity"). Collecting an unlawful debt can also be the basis of a
RICO claim. See id. §§ 1961(6) & 1962.
See id. § 1961(4)(defining "enterprise").
See 18 U.S.CA. § 1962 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996). For a more complete explanation of the essential elements of a RICO action, see AB-AMs, supranote 36, chs. 35.
See PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 35, at 847 (focusing on bombing and mobsters,
and declaring that "[tihis is a warning by signing this bill: We are going to give
tools to the men in the Justice Department and the men in the FBI and we shall
see to it that those who engage in... terroristic acts are brought to justice.").
See, e.g., Marjorie Hunter, Curbs on Crime and Drug Abuse Gain in Congress,
N.Y. TndEs, Oct. 8, 1970, at 1 (not mentioning civil remedies); Nixon Finally Gets
the Crime Bill He Wanted, N.Y. Tnos, Oct. 18, 1970, § IV, at 9; (mentioning that
the civil section was "tacked on... to attack the Mafia with the civil law remedies
that have been developed to cope with antitrust conspiracies"); Nixon Signs Bill
to Combat Crime, N.Y. TmiEs, Oct. 16, 1970, at 18 (same); Review and Outlook:
Crime and Punishment, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1970, at A18 (same).

51. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969)(stating that the legislation's main objective was "the eradication of organized crime in the United States
... by providing... new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime"); 116 CONG. REC. H35214 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1970)(remarks of Rep. Charles E. Bennett of Florida that: "Reducing the amount of crime
in the United States is a domestic problem which the Government should give
No. 1 priority to in 1970 and 1971.... We are all very concerned with the rising
crime rate, particularly the continued domination by organized crime, and I believe the Federal Government should be given all the necessary and proper tools
to combat this threat to our citizens."); id. at H35216 (remarks by Rep. Harold D.
Donohue of Massachusetts that "[the bill's] purpose [is] to seek the irredication of
organized crime in the United States"); id. at H35206 (remarks of Rep. Donald D.
Clancy of Ohio that "one way to effectively combat crime, particularly organized
crime as well as violence in the streets, is to enact the measure before us today").
The Senate RICO bill did not contain a civil RICO provision when first introduced, when the Senate Judiciary Committee added the fraud predicates, or
when the Senate initially passed the bill. See ABRAMs, supranote 36, § 1.6; GREGCRY JOSEPH, CIViL RICO: A DEFINITIVE GumE § 2 (1992).
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crime.5 2
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, RICO's civil remedies went
virtually unnoticed and unused.53 By 1972, only one civil RICO decision had been reported; by 1980, only nine decisions had been reported.54 It took fifteen years for a civil RICO case to reach the United
52. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 30 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H.R. Comm. on the
Judiciary,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (statement of Sen. John L. McClellan of Arkansas that RICO "adapts the full range of procedures used in other civil cases to
the organized crime context"); id. at 170-71 (Justice Department comments applauding the addition of civil remedies to assist in the war against organized
crime); id. at 520 (comment by Rep. Sam Steiger of Arizona that the civil remedies "promise to be far more effective than any existing authority as a means of
protecting legitimate businessmen from the ruthless and oppressive methods
used by organized crime"); 116 CONG. REc. H35201 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1970)(remarks of Rep. Richard H. Poff of Virginia that "[RICO] mobilizes both the criminal and civil mechanisms of the Sherman Act and other antitrust statutes
against the barons of organized crime"). But see G. Robert Blakey, Foreward:
DebunkingRICO's Myriad Myths, 64 ST. Jon's L. REv. 701, 704 (1990)(explaining that because 18 U.S.C. § 1962 states what is unlawful, as opposed to what is
criminal, RICO is not and was never intended to be primarily a criminal statute).
In his article, Professor Blakey also cites congressional debate about civil remedies. Id. at 704 n.24 (citing 116 CONG. Rc. 602 (1970)(statement of Sen. Hruska
that "the principal value of this legislation may well be found to exist in its civil
provisions") and 115 CONG. Rc. 6993 (1969)(statement of Sen. Hruska that "the
criminal provisions are intended primarily as an adjunct to the civil provisions
which I consider as the more important feature of the bill")). Blakey, however,
has taken these quotes out of context. Senator Hruska, at 115 CONG. REc. 6993,
also stated "the bill also creates civil remedies for the honest businessman who
has been damaged by unfair competition from the racketeer businessman." Further, at 116 CONG. IEC. 602, Sen. Hruska emphasized that "I believe that the
combination of criminal and civil penalties in this title offers an extraordinary
potential for striking a mortal blow against the property interests of organized
crime." A fair reading of Sen. Hruska's complete statements thus supports those
who claim that the civil remedies were directed at organized crime.
53. See ABraMs, supra note 36, § 1.1, at 2 & n.6. See also id. at 5 & nn.18-20 (suggesting that civil RICO went virtually unnoticed for nearly a decade after its passage because RICO "is codified in Title 18 of the United States Code (the Crimes
and Criminal Procedure title), whose pages plaintiffs' lawyers ordinarily do not
consult in search of private remedies").
54. See ABA Ad Hoe Report, supra note 42, at 55. See alsoAmerican Bar Association,
Criminal Justice Section, A Comprehensive Perspective on Civil and Criminal
RICO Legislation and Litigation 7 n.17 (1985)[hereinafter Civil and Criminal
RICO] (noting that even criminal RICO was "1]argely ignored from 1970 to
1975"). Cf United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981)(declaring that
RICO's "major purpose ... is to address the infiltration of legitimate business by
organized crime"); Larry E. Parrish, RICO Civil Remedies:An UntappedResource
for Insurers, 49 INs. CouNs. J. 337, 337 (1982)(explaining- "The purpose of this
article is to inform attorneys representing insurers that there is a civil remedy
which has survived for over eleven years and the potential of which has remained
virtually unnoticed by the insurance industry... While it is hardly a remedy for
the exclusive use of insurers, the insurance industry stands to gain more economically from the proper use of private party civil [RICO] remedies than any other
segment of the business community.").
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States Supreme Court.55 By that time, however, attorneys had
learned the statute's power and "RICO [had] evolv[ed] ... into some6
thing quite different from the original conception of its enactors."5
By 1983, "the trickle of private civil RICO lawsuits became a deluge."5 7 Soon after the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,58 the proverbial floodgates appeared to open
and private attorneys began filing nearly 1000 civil RICO actions a
year.5 9 The statute grabbed the attention-and imagination-of
judges, 60 scholars, 6 ' attorneys, 62 and bar associations, 6 3 who viewed
55. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985)(Sedima is described infra

56.
57.
58.

59.

60.

note 58). See also ABRAMs, supra note 36, § 1.1, at 5 & n.20 (indicating that by
1978, only two reported opinions had considered civil RICO and that by early
1981, only 13 had considered civil RICO); Blakey, Civil FraudAction, supra note
42, at 280 (writing in 1982 that "[o]nly a handful of civil actions have been
brought under RICO").
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985).
Jed S. Rakoff, "Sedima" Supreme or RICO Resuscitated,N.Y. L.J., July 11, 1985,
at 1, 17.
473 U.S. 479 (1985). In Sedima, a Belgian corporation entered a joint venture
agreement with Imrex, its American supplier, to provide electronic components to
a Belgian firm. Id. at 483. Under the agreement, Sedima and Imrex were to split
the net proceeds. Id. at 484. Although Imrex filled about $8 million in orders,
Sedima believed that Imrex was presenting inflated bills, thus cheating Sedima
out of a portion of its proceeds by collecting for nonexistent expenses. Id. Sedima
sued Imrex in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, alleging causes of action for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty,
unjust enrichment, conversion, and requesting a constructive trust. Id. Sedima
also sued under the civil RICO statute based on predicate acts of mail and wire
fraud. Id. The district court dismissed the RICO count for failure to state a claim
because the complaint did not allege that Sedima's alleged injuries were a direct
result of "a violation of section 1962." Id. A divided Second Circuit affirmed the
dismissal on grounds that the proper injury was not alleged and that the complaint did not allege that the defendant had been criminally convicted of the
predicate acts. Id. at 484-85. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case for further proceedings by holding that (1) a criminal conviction is not a
prerequisite for a civil RICO claim, id. at 488-93, and (2) a plaintiff is not required to establish that the alleged injury resulted from the predicate acts themselves; instead, when a plaintiff alleges each element of a § 1962 violation, "the
compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently
related to constitute a pattern." Id. at 497.
See William J. Hughes, RICO Reform: How Much Is Needed?, 43 VA'D. L. REv.
639, 644 (1990). See also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 485-86
(1985)(noting that "[tihe decision below was one episode in a recent proliferation
of civil RICO litigation within the Second Circuit and in other Courts of Appeals"
(footnotes omitted)). But see Blakey & Perry, supra note 6, at 869-75 (attempting
to dispel the "litigation floodgate" argument).
See, e.g., Wolin v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 890, 891 (N.D. Ill.
1986)(observing that "RICO's lure of treble damages and attorneys' fees draws
litigants and lawyers ... like lemmings to the sea"); Parnes v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 23 (N.D. Ill. 1982)(explaining- "Clearly the difficulties
of drafting [have] caused RICO to sweep up far more than its originally intended
compass. Litigators, never at a loss for ingenuity, naturally [find] the prospect of
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the civil remedies with both admiration and trepidation.64 However,
treble damages ... very inviting for garden-variety fraud claims.").
61. See, e.g., Barry Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. Rlv. 291, 304 (1983)(indicating
that civil RICO "could federalize all torts involving business transactions"). See
also Blakey & Gettings, supra note 42. The Blakey and Gettings article has been
credited with unleashing the flood of civil RICO cases. Aasi ms, supra note 36,
§ 1.1, at 5-6 (partially attributing increased use of civil RICO to federal prosecutors-who had become familiar with criminal RICO-moving into private practice). Cf James D. Gordon, How Not to Succeed in Law School, 100 YALE L.J.
1679, 1697 (1991)(indicating humorously that an "honest" list of law-school
courses might include: "RICO: Learn how to use this powerful anti-extortion law
to extort large settlements out of honest business people."); William Safire,
What's Wrong with RICO; It Has Become a Legal Monstrosity,L.A. DAmY J., Feb.
1, 1989, at 6 (calling civil RICO the "Litigator's Enrichment Clause").
62. See, e.g., Oversight Hearings, supra note 2, at 224 (statement by the general
counsel for Colt Industries, Inc.-whose client was sued under civil RICO-that
"[c]ivil causes of action under RICO are only limited by the imagination of the
plaintiffs' attorneys. I can assure you that my imagination has conjured up civil
RICO actions that have not been pleaded as yet. In light of the current state of
affairs, for example, almost any contractual situation involving communication
via telephone or the mails-and we are talking about essentially every contractis fair game for a RICO claim."); CivIL RICO PRACTICE: CAUSES OF ACTION § 1.7
(Harold Brown ed. 1991)[hereinafter CIvm RICO PRACTICE] (suggesting that
"[l]awyers may themselves be exposed to personal liability when they fail to pursue RICO's expansive remedies including treble damages and allowance for attorneys' fees"); W. Mark Cotham & Rhett G. Campbell, Civil Actions Under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 3 Rv. LrIG. 223, 223
(1983)(indicating that the "sudden concern and fascination with a federal statute
designed to fight organized crime has not been born out of moral indignation with
a centuries old problem" but because "it is possible, according to the statute's
language, to use RICO in everyday commercial litigation"); David G. Duggan,
Pleading a RICO Claim, 34 TUAL LAw. Gums 536, 547 (1991)(concluding that
"[tihe point is this: [olnce you've got your injury, enterprise, pattern and person
identified, file the complaint[; w]ith the law.., in a state of disarray, you have
little to lose and threefold your clients' damages plus your fees to gain"). Cf
OversightHearings,supra note 2, at 293 (citing a Los Angeles Times article that
quoted an attorney who stated that he "was looking for a way to develop business" and he "studied RICO and saw the potential for lots of civil litigation").
63. See The Authority to Bring Private Treble-Damage Suits Under "RICO"Should
Be Reformed, reprintedin Oversight Hearings,supra note 2, at 291 (appendix to
statement of Ray J. Groves, Chairman, American Institute of Public Accountants)(observing- "Numerous how-to-do-it courses are being offered nationwide to
acquaint lawyers with RICO's possibilities. For example, the ABA already has
held four 'continuing legal education! National Institutes on RICO.... With ominous accuracy the ABA titled the first three of these sessions, 'RICO: The Ultimate Weapon in Business and Commercial Litigation.'... The popularity of the
presentations is great; the mailing for the February 1984 course pointed out that
the two earlier meetings were sold out, with over 600 lawyers in
attendance....").
64. Compare Russell Mokhiber, Dealing with Racketeers in Executive Suites: Triple
Damages, N.Y. Tnzs, Sept. 14, 1985, at 23, (praising civil RICO as "one of the
most efficient antifraud and anticorporate crime laws on the books") with David
H. Berg & Philip D. Zelikow, The RICO Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968: The

Business Client as Racketeer,45 Tx. B.J. 159, 160 (1982)(analogizing civil RICO
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in light of the statute's powerful strategic advantages, 6 5 the question
clearly became whether "any self-respecting plaintiffs' lawyer [would]
omit a RICO charge these days?"66
Today, RICO claims are routinely added to many civil lawsuits6 7

and are directed at a host of nonracketeer defendants, including usually legitimate categories of businesspersons, 68 such as bankers,69
to the oppressive Soviet Criminal Code).

65. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (describing those advantages).
66. Papagiannis v. Pontikis, 108 F.R.D. 177, 179 n.1 (N.D. Ill.
1985). Accord Donald
J. Moran, Pleadinga Civil RICO Action Under Section 1962(c): ConflictingPrece-

dent and the Practitioner'sDilemma, 57 TEmp.L.Q. 731, 735 (1984)(indicating
that any attorney risks committing malpractice by omitting civil RICO from a
fraud case).
67. Like basic black and fashion, some lawyers think civil RICO is a good choice for
any lawsuit. See supra note 6 (listing a wide variety of cases in which a civil
RICO claim was included). RICO claims have also been filed or suggested in the
following areas: credit reporting errors, see David Rameden, When the Database
Is Wrong... Do ConsumersHave any Effective Remedies Against CreditReporting Agencies or InformationProviders?,100 CoM. L.J. 390 (1995); environmental
law, see Elizabeth E. Mack, Another Weapon: The RICO Statute and the Prosecution of EnvironmentalOffenses, 45 Sw. L.J. 1145 (1991); Brendan P. Rielly, Note,
Using RICO to Fight Environmental Crime: The Case for Listing Violations of

RCRA as Predicate Offenses for RICO, 70 NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 651 (1994);
franchise law, see Charles S. Modell & Frederick K. Hauser III, Franchisor'sUse
of RICO: The Best Defense Might Be a Good Offense, FRACmSE L.J., Summer
1993, at 1; insurance law, see Parrish, supra note 54, at 337; labor relations, see
Virginia M. Morgan, Civil RICO: The Legal Galaxy's Black Hole, 22 AKRON L.
REv.107 (1988); Victoria G.T. Bassetti, Note, Weeding RICO Out of Garden Variety Labor Disputes, 92 COLUM L. REv. 103 (1992); landlord-tenant relations, see
Richard C. Reuben, Justices Allow Use of RICO to Sue Slumlords, L-A. DAIy J.,
Oct. 13, 1993, at 1; patents and trademarks, see Steven Fasman, The ProperApplication of Civil RICO to Patent Fraud,1988 IrzLL. PROP. L. REV. 125.
68. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 n.16 (1985)(noting that:
"The ABA task force found that of the 270 known RICO cases at the trial court
level, 40% involves securities fraud, 37% involved common law fraud in a commercial or business setting and only 9% [comprised] 'allegations of criminal activity of a type associated with professional criminals'"); id. at 526 (Powell, J.,
dissenting)(raising his concern that "RICO has been interpreted so broadly that it
has been used more often against respected businesses with no ties to organized
crime, than against the mobsters who were clearly the intended target of the
statute"); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 487 (2d Cir. 1984)(expressing dismay that civil RICO claims were being lodged against legitimate businesses), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985); Thomas F. Harrison, Look Who's Using RICO,
75 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1989, at 56 (writing that "[riecent case law under RICO has
expanded the statute in striking new directions that would have seemed absurd
only a few years ago. Increasingly, law firms themselves are becoming targets,
and accounting firms and insurance companies are not far behind. And RICO is
upsetting the rules of the game in the areas of labor and employment law, bankruptcy, and even pensions."); Lacovara & Aronow, supranote 6, at 2-3; Comment,
Tax Fraudand Civil RICO: Implicationsfor Business and Governmental Entities,
21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1233, 1237 n.17 (1988)(listing many legitimate businesses
sued under the RICO statute). Cf Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
499 (1985)(explaining that Congress intended RICO to apply to both "legitimate"
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lawyers, 70 accountants, 7 1 insurers, 72 and manufacturers. 73 RICO
and "illegitimate" enterprises, because "legitimate" enterprises "enjoy neither an
inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences");
G. Robert Blakey, Key to Fight CorporateFraud,Lj. DAILY J., Jan. 10, 1986, at 4
(reminding critics that legitimate businesses-including Allstate Insurance Co.,
IBM, Standard Oil of Indiana, and State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.-have also
initiated civil RICO suits).
69. See, e.g., Thornton v. First State Bank, 4 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1993)(customer unsuccessfully sued bank under RICO, alleging that bank had promised not to use
loan proceeds for offset against past due balances, but later did so); Jackson v.
Bank of Haw., 902 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1990)(bank was sued for "hard bargaining"
during loan workout negotiations); Michaels Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A.,
848 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1988)(bank customers sued several banking groups and
individual bank employees for allegedly overcharging interest on commercial,
prime-rate based loans); Cory v. Standard Fed. Sav. Bank, [1987-1988 Transfer
Binder] RICO Bus. Disputes Guide (CCH) T 6902 (4th Cir. 1988)(depositor sued
bank under civil RICO alleging that bank fraudulently underpaid interest on his
account); Morosani v. First Natl Bank, 703 F.2d 1220 (11th Cir. 1983)(customer
sued bank under civil RICO alleging that the prime rate used in computing the
interest on a loan was not the bankes true prime rate). See generally BATISTA &
RHODES, supra note 14, § 4.12 (describing civil RICO claims concerning bank
lending practices); ABA Ad Hoc Report, supra note 42, at 36-37 n.41 (listing civil
RICO actions filed against banks and financial institutions); Philip L. Guarino,
The Use of RICO Against Financial Institutions, 45 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP.
301, 305-06 & nn.49-61 (1991)(describing many other cases in which banks and
financial institutions have been sued for alleged RICO violations); Lacovara &
Aronow, supra note 6, at 15 n.94 (listing banks sued under civil RICO); Edward
Mannino, Less Corn and More Hell: The Applicationof RICO to FinancialInstitutions, 35 Viri. L. Rnv. 883, 886 & nn.16-23 (1990).
70. See, e.g., McDonald v. Schencker, 18 F.3d 491 (7th Cir. 1994)(client unsuccessfully sued attorneys for alleged overbilling and failure to return money in an escrow account); Nolte v. Pearson, 994 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1993)(investors sued
attorneys who prepared an opinion letter after IRS disallowed certain investment
tax credits); Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763, 765 (7th Cir. 1992)(divorce lawyer sued
under civil RICO by former client who contended the lawyer "defrauded her into
having sexual relations with him in lieu of payment for his services"); Hartz v.
Friedman, 919 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1990)(cients attempted to transform a legal
malpractice case into a civil RICO case by alleging use of mails and wires). See
generally ABA Ad Hoc Report, supra note 42, at 38-39 n.41 (listing civil RICO
actions filed against attorneys); Lacovara & Aronow, supra note 6, at 15 n.94
(listing law firms sued under civil RICO).
71. See, e.g., University of Md. v. Peat, Marwick, Main & Co., 996 F.2d 1534 (3d Cir.
1993)(policyholders of insolvent insurer sued accounting firm under civil RICO
for allegedly conducting materially deficient audits); Davis v. Coopers & Lybrand,
787 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Ill. 1992)(investors in commodity pool limited partnerships sued many defendants, including the partnerships' accountants, for allegedly diverting pool funds). See generallyABA Ad Hoc Report,supra note 42, at 38
n.41 (listing civil RICO actions filed against accounting firms); Lacovara & Aronow, supra note 6, at 15 n.94 (listing national accounting firms sued under civil
RICO).
The threat to accountants, auditors, and others similarly situated may have
been lessened by the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young,
507 U.S. 170 (1993). RICO § 1962(c) makes it unlawful "for any person employed
by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
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claims are added to civil actions to take advantage of the statute's procedural and strategic advantages, including its treble damages and
75
attorney's fees provision, 74 its in terrorem and stigmatizing effect,

interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). After the respondent's predecessor, the accounting firm
of Arthur Young and Co., engaged in certain activities relating to the valuation of
a gasohol plant on the annual audit and financial statements of a farming cooperative, the cooperative filed for bankruptcy and the trustee sued the firm under
civil RICO. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 172-75 (1993). In Reves, the
Court addressed "whether one must participate in the operation or management
of the enterprise itself to be subject to liability under this provision." Id. at 172.
Affirming the lower courts' rulings in favor of the firm, the Court adopted the
"operation or management test," which states that, to be liable under civil RICO,
the individual or organization must have "participate[d] in the operation or management of the enterprise itself." Id. at 185. For more complete treatment of
Reves and its impact, see Stuart L. Bass, Supreme Court Limits RICO Liability
for Accountants and Other Outside Professionals,98 CoM. L.J. 452 (1993); Bryan
T. Camp, Dual Constructionof RICO: The Road Not Taken in Reves, 51 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 61 (1994); Michael Vitello, More Noise from the Tower of Babel:Making "Sense"out of Reves v. Ernst & Young, 56 Omo ST. L.J. 1363 (1995); Catherine M. Clarkin, Note, The Eliminationof ProfessionalLiability UnderRICO, 43
CATH. U. L. REV. 1025 (1994); Jeffrey N. Shapiro, Comment, Attorney Liability
Under RICO § 1962(c) After Reves v. Ernst & Young, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 1153
(1994).
72. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Acceleration Life Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1992)(insureds sued over non-payment of credit disability insurance benefits); Bennett v.
Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982)(retirement community residents sued insurance company and others for financial mismanagement that allegedly jeopardized the "life care" they had been promised), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983);
Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich.
1983)(insurance company sued under civil RICO following disallowance of insurance claim). See generallyABA Ad Hoc Report, supra note 42, at 37 n.40 (listing
civil RICO actions filed against insurers); Lacovara & Aronow, supra note 6, at 16
n.94 (listing insurance companies sued under civil RICO).
73. See generally Richard A. Salomon & Jonathan S. Quinn, Civil RICO in Manufacturing, in CivaL RICO PRAcTiCE, supra note 62, ch. 4; ABA Ad Hoc Report, supra
note 42, at 37-38 n.41 (listing civil RICO actions fied against manufacturing and
commercial companies); Lacovara & Aronow, supra note 6, at 16 n.94 (listing
manufacturing companies sued under civil RICO).
74. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (West Supp. 1996)(providing in part that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this
chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee" (emphasis added)). See also Tellis v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 805 F.2d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 1986)(observing that "[tihe
treble damages provision . . . is the most significant aspect of civil RICO");
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 486 (2d Cir. 1984)(noting that "[tihe
fact that successful RICO plaintiffs may obtain treble damages and attorneys'
fees provides, of course, additional incentives to plaintiffs to categorize their actions as RICO claims"), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985); Saine v. A.I.A., Inc., 582 F.
Supp. 1299, 1306 n.5 (D. Colo. 1984)(imposing Rule 11 sanctions in a civil RICO
case because "[a] RICO defendant.., needs to be protected from unscrupulous
claimants lured by the prospect of treble damages"); Jonathan Turley, The RICO
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Lottery and the Gains MultiplicationApproach:An Alternative Measure of Damages under Civil RICO, 33 VnL. L. REv. 239, 242-45 (1988); David Manogue,
Comment, Liabilityfor GeneralBusiness Fraud:Putting a ContractOut on RICO
Treble Damages, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 481, 492-97 (1984).
Congressional attempts to eliminate or limit the treble damages provisions
have failed. For example, in 1986, Rep. Conyers introduced House Bill 5391,
which would have eliminated treble damages in civil suits. H.R. 5391, 99th
Cong., 2d aess. (1986). Although the bill was approved by the Criminal Justice
Subcommittee, it never became law. See 1985-86 Cong. Index (CCH) 35,100
(tracing the history of H.R. 5391). In 1989, Senators DeConcini, Hatch, Heflin,
and Symms introduced Senate Bill 438, which would have limited recovery of
treble damages to suits in which the plaintiff was a governmental entity; other
plaintiffs would be limited to recovery of actual damages and costs, or in some
egregious cases, twice actual damages. S. 438, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-9 (1989).
Accord H.R. 1046, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-10 (1989)(House version of S. 438).
Neither Senate Bill 438 nor House Bill 1046 was ever enacted. See 1989-90 Cong.
Index (CCH) 21,009-10 (concerning S. 438); id. at 35,015 (concerning H.R. 1046).
75. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 506 (1985)(Marshall, J.,
dissenting)(remarking that RICO is wrongfully used for "extortive purposes"); id.
at 504 (explaining that a RICO defendant faces "tremendous financial exposure
in addition to the threat of being labeled a 'racketeer," and that, as a result,
many RICO defendants settle rather than face the embarrassment of social
stigma); UNR Indus., Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 623 F. Supp. 1319, 1331 (N.D.
Ill. 1985)(commenting that "[t]o delay as long as [the plaintiff] did to assert a
RICO injury suggests that either [the plaintiff] did not suffer that kind of serious
injury or that the charge is made because of the in terrorem effect of any treble
damage or racketeering claim"); Katzen v. Continental Ill. Natl Bank & Trust
Co., No. 80-C-1378 (N.D. IM. Aug. 14, 1980)(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts
file)(finding it "[n]eedless to say every defendant is offended by the notion that he
or it would fall within the scope of the private remedies fashioned by the Congress to control organized crime"). Cf Oversight Hearings,supra note 2, at 335
(testimony of Robert H. Hodges, Jr. on behalf of the American Bankers Association that "the defamatory effect ... of being labeled a 'racketeer' in itself is a
strong incentive for banks and other industries, legitimate industries, to settle
rather than go to court in these cases"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 574 (1942)(observing that "[a]rgument is unnecessary to demonstrate that
the [term] 'damn racketeer'... [is] likely to provoke the average person to retaliation"); United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1988)(explaining that a limited partnership, whose primary business was investing in securities and
commodities arbitrage, was sued under RICO and then forced into bankruptcy
before the case could proceed to trial); Nancy Blodgett, Revamping RICO: Congress Gets into the Act, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1985, at 32 (quoting the chair of the ABA
RICO Cases Committee, who suggested that the Act be renamed the "Criminal
Enterprises and Corruption of Enterprises Act" and complained that "[tihe term
'racketeer' raises undesirable connotations; [i]t conjures up images of B-grade
movie gangsters"); Business Is Picking up an Anticrime Weapon, Bus. WK-, Feb.
20, 1984, at 85 (noting that "[1]awyers say the number of court awards under
RICO is not an accurate measure of the problem because few cases go to trial[;
t]he mere threat of a headline suggesting a connection with organized crime
often induces a settlement"). But see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
492 (1985)(White, J.)(stating that "[als for stigma, a civil RICO proceeding leaves
no greater stain than do a number of other civil proceedings"); Haroco, Inc. v.
American Natl Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 399 n.16 (7th Cir. 1984)(remarking that "[bly adding to the settlement value of... valid claims in certain
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and-particularly in actions involving multiple defendants-its broad
venue and jurisdictional provisions. 76
Although some courts have77 and still do78 react hostilely to civil
cases clearly involving criminal conduct, RICO may arguably promote more complete satisfaction of plaintiffs' claims without facilitating indefensible windfalls"),
affd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985). See generally Paul A. Batista, The Uses and Misuses of
RICO in Civil Litigation:A Guide for Plaintiffs and Defendants, 8 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 181 (1983); Mark E. Duval, A Trial Lawyer's Guide:Everything You Always
Wanted to Know About RICO Before Your Case Was Dismissed, 12 WM. MrrCHELL
L. REv. 291, 311 (1986)(commenting that a RICO action is considered a "powerful
weapon in terms of both monetary and reputational damage"); Edward I. O'Brien,
RICO's Assault on Legitimate Business, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 25, 1986, at 2
(describing the negative effects of civil RICO on legitimate businesses); Rubin &
Zwirb, supra note 10, at 892-94 (discussing the stigma associated with being sued
under civil RICO).
76. See, e.g., Turley, supra note 74, at 242-43 & n.22 (referring to the "generous"
service provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b)); Malcolm B. Wittenberg & Kit L. Knudsen,
RICO Increasingly Used in Infringement Cases:Advantages Include Broader Jurisdiction, Greater Ease of Service, NAT'L L.J., May 17, 1993, at S6 (indicating
that civil RICO allegations are becoming more common in trademark infringement cases because of several advantages, including "that RICO authorizes nationwide service of process, which courts have recognized as authority for general
jurisdiction over any plaintiff with sufficient contacts anywhere in the country");
Joe M. Cox, Comment, Business and CommercialApplications of Civil RICO, 25
LAND & WATER L. REV. 207, 226 n.169 (1990)("[c]onsidering the broad venue of
the statute and the state of the law, forum shopping is definitely in order for the
plaintiff considering a RICO claim").
77. See generally Michael A. Bertz, Pursuinga Business FraudRICO Claim, 21 CAL.
W. L. REV. 246 (1985); Kenneth F. McCallion & James W. Johnson, Judiciary
Devises New Theories in Effort to Dismiss Civil Suits, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 12, 1990, at
22; Moran, supra note 66, at 734 (noting that "[i]f a RICO cause of action is asserted together with common law counts against an otherwise legitimate business for conduct involving garden-variety commercial fraud, the practitioner
risks incurring judicial hostility" and detailing ways in which courts have attempted to limit RICO claims); Rubin & Zwirb, supra note 10; Sentelle, supra
note 1, at 148-50 (indicating that judges do not like civil RICO actions); Cynthia
L. Malaun, Comment, Putting a Halt to JudicialLimitations on Civil RICO, 52
U.M.K.C. L. REv. 56 (1983).
78. This animosity is manifested by the fact that many United States district courts
have local rules or standing orders that require plaintiffs to file "RICO case statements" early in the action. See, e.g., S.D. CAL. LocAL R. 11.1; S.D. GA. LocAL R. 9;

N.D.N.Y. LocAL R. 9.2; E.D. WAsH. LocAL R. 8; Irwin v. Hawk, 40 F.3d 347 (11th
Cir. 1994)(appeal from the Southern District of Georgia), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
112 (1995); Jones v. County of Los Angeles, No. 93-55638, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
33549 (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 1994)(appeal from the Central District of California);
Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580 (5th Cir.
1992)(appeal from the Western District of Texas); Boogarerts v. Bank of Bradley,
961 F.2d 765 (8th Cir. 1992)(appeal from the Western District of Arkansas); Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 901 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1990)(appeal from the Eastern
District of Texas); Sheridan v. Jaffe, No. 94 Civ. 9344, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8809 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1996); S. Kane & Son Profit Sharing Trust v. Marine
Midland Bank, No. 95-7058, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8023 (E.D. Pa. June 12,
1996); Grove v. Gilman Secs., Inc., No. 95-C-1606, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6307
(N.D. Ill. May 8, 1996); Harvey v. Harvey, No. 3:95cv253, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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RICO claims, following the savings and loan debacle 79 and other recent scandals,SO cries for complete repeal of civil RICO have dwindled.81 Civil RICO, therefore, is here to stay.8 2 Consequently, courts
9138 (D. Conn. Mar. 25, 1996); Dejager Constr., Inc. v. Schleininger, No. 1:94-CV239, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4510 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 13, 1996); Manning v. Stigger,
919 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Ky. 1996); May v. United States Chamber of Commerce,
No. C-95-4148, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3136 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 1996). These
RICO case statements typically require plaintiffs to provide specific factual information about the basis for the RICO claim, including details concerning the alleged misconduct, the identities of the alleged wrongdoers and the alleged
victims, the injury to each alleged victim, a detailed description of the pattern of
racketeering activity, a description of the enterprise, whether the pattern of racketeering activity is separate from the enterprise, the benefits the alleged enterprise receives from the racketeering activity, the effect of the enterprise on
interstate commerce, the causal relationship between the racketeering activity
and the injury, and other information. See, e.g., E.D. WASH LocAL R. 8. See also
Kernus v. Morrison, No. 94-3179, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4769, at *36 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 16, 1996)(reprinting questions to be answered in RICO case statement in the
app.). If the RICO case statement is incomplete or insufficient, the court may
dismiss the RICO claim. See, e.g., Irwin v. Hawk, 40 F.3d 347, 347 (11th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 112 (1995); Kramer v. Bachan Aero. Corp., 912 F.2d
151, 153 n.3 (6th Cir. 1990).
79. See H.R. REP. 312, supra note 2, at 2 (indicating that civil RICO can be an effective tool "against the most serious kinds of fraud, such as that in many of the
savings and loan and bank fraud cases"). See also OversightHearings,supra note
2, at 209-17 (statement of Daniel W. Persinger, Deputy General Counsel for the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, concerning the FDIC's use of civil RICO
actions against failed financial institutions); BATISTA & RHODES, supra note 14,
§ 1.1 (remarking that "[inthe wake of the savings-and-loan industry fiasco in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, various agencies and representatives of the federal
government ... have seen in the civil racketeering statute a last, best hope for
attempting to repair an irreparable debacle"). See also Barbara Franklin, Two
Bills Aim to Reduce Number of Civil Claims, N.Y. L.J., May 16, 1991, at 5, 5
(quoting the director of a consumer group: "Financial institutions in this country
are toppling under the weight of fraud. Civil RICO is an ideal tool in these
cases."); Stephen Labaton, House Panel Backs Easing of RICO Law, N.Y. TtMEs,
May 3, 1991, at D8 (quoting the same director: "We're in the middle of one financial debacle after another, and civil RICO is the strongest financial remedy
available.").
80. See Mary Jane Fisher, NAC Blasts Attempt to Restrict RICO Lawsuits, Nat'l UnderwriterCo. Prop.& Cas.IEmployee Benefits Ed., May 6, 1991, at 6 (quoting the
president of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners as saying that
"[tihe civil provisions of RICO are the single most potent weapon in [insurance
regulators'] arsenal against conspiracies to pillage insurance companies and their
policyholders").
81. See, e.g., John S. Siffert, Recent Developments in RICO Litigation, STANARD &
PooR's Ray. SEcs. & Co oDrrmEs REG., Aug. 1995, at 139 (noting that "[tioday,
courts no longer routinely look to undercut RICO's extensive reach, but from time
to time decisions continue to evidence a hesitation to embrace its full force"). The
most recent amendment to RICO was enacted in 1995. The amendment was limited to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) and provided that "no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of
securities to establish a violation of section 1962." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (West
Supp. 1996). In other words, civil RICO no longer applies to private securities
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should (1) be wary about how plaintiffs use the statute, especially
when multiple defendants-over whom the court might otherwise lack
personal jurisdiction or venue-are sued,83 and (2) adopt tests that
can be consistently applied when determining when to invoke and how
to interpret the broad language of § 1965(b), civil RICO's venue and
jurisdictional provision. 84
III.

STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND FRAMEWORK

Title 18 U.S.C. § 1965 was enacted as part of RICO in 197085 and
has never been amended.S6 Section 1965 contains civil RICO's venue,
jurisdictional, and service-of-process provisions:
(a) Any civil action or proceeding under this chapter against any person may
be instituted in the district court of the United States for any district in which
such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.
(b) In any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any district court of the
United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice require that other
parties residing in any other district be brought before the court, the court
may cause such parties to be summoned, and process for that purpose may be
served in any judicial district of the United States by the marshal thereof.
(d) All other process in any action or proceeding under this chapter may be
served on any person in any judicial district 8in7 which such person resides, is
found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.

82.
83.

84.
85.
86.
87.

actions. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1995). Other recent
amendments have actually expanded RICO's scope. See, e.g., Criminal Law and
Procedure Technical Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 50(a), 100
Stat. 3605 (expanding the definition of racketeering activity by adding new predicate acts, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a)(b) (1994)); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-570, tit. I, § 1365(b), 100 Stat. 3207-3235 (codified as 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1)(B) (1994)); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, tit. VII,
§ 7054, 102 Stat. 4402 (1988)(codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1994)); Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73,
tit. IX, § 968, 103 Stat. 506 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1994)).
Civil RICO has withstood many constitutional challenges. See generallyABA Ad
Hoc Report, supra note 42, ch. 5.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 11. Cf. Naranjo & Pina, supra note 3, at 58 (recommending
that RICO be amended "to allow the awarding of treble attorney fees in cases
where the racketeering nexus has been determined to be frivolous and, as a result, the business' reputation has been injured" (emphasis added)); Civil and
CriminalRICO, supra note 54, at 126 & 129-30 (minority of ABA committee advocating for a "special RICO sanction" in frivolously-fied cases, which sanction
would consist of "treble actual expenses, including attorneys' fees"). See generally
Rodrigues, supra note 6, at 943-51 (describing how Rule 11 can be used to curb
frivolous RICO claims).
See infra section IV.C (proposing venue and jurisdictional tests).
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, Title IX, § 901(a), 84 Stat.
944.
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965 (West 1994).
18 U.S.C.A. § 1965(a), (b), & (d) (West 1994). Subsection (c) concerns subpoenas
served by the United States:
In any civil or criminal action or proceeding instituted by the United
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Courts have not uniformly applied these subsections. Some courts
and commentators consider subsections (a) and (b) to be only venue
provisions,8 8 while others consider subsections (a) and (b) to be both
venue and jurisdictional provisions. 8 9 Still others consider subsection
(a) to be a venue provision and subsection (b) to be a venue and jurisdictional provision.90 Some sources consider subsections (b) and (d) to
be merely service-of-process provisions,91 while others consider those
subsections to be jurisdictional provisions as well.9 2 To paraphrase
States under this chapter in the district court of the United States for
any judicial district, subpenas issued by such court to compel the attendance of witnesses may be served in any other judicial district, except that
in any civil action or proceeding no such subpena shall be issued for service upon any individual who resides in another district at a place more
than one hundred miles from the place at which such court is held without approval given by a judge of such court upon a showing of good
cause.
18 U.S.C.A_ § 1965(c) (West 1994).
88. See, e.g., Abeloff v. Barth, 119 F.R.D. 315, 329 (D. Mass. 1988)(explaining that
§ 1965(d) is the jurisdictional provision and § 1965(a) and (b) are merely venue
statutes). The following courts have described § 1965(b) as a venue provision in
cases when venue would not otherwise be proper for a particular defendant, but
is proper for other RICO defendants in the same case: American Trade Partners,
L.P. v. A-1 Int'l Importing Enters., Ltd., 755 F. Supp. 1292, 1303 n.15 (E.D. Pa.
1990)(stating that the defendant "contended that before this court exercised its
jurisdictional power over him, I first must have found that the 'ends of justice'
required it. [He] relied on... section 1965(b) for support for this unavailing
argument. . . . [He] has confused personal jurisdiction with venue. Section
1965(b) is a venue provision that only comes into play if the court first finds that
jurisdiction is proper under section 1965(a) and (d). . . ."); Goldwater v. Alston &

89.

90.

91.

92.

Bird, 664 F. Supp. 403, 408 (S.D. IMI.1986); Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc. v. Charles
Schmitt & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1040, 1055-56 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Miller Brewing
Co. v. Landau, 616 F. Supp. 1285, 1290-91 (E.D. Wis. 1985); Soltex Polymer Corp.
v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1453, 1459 & n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), affd 832
F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1987).
See Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987)(holding
that § 1965(a) is really a jurisdictional statute and stating that "§ 1965(b) creates
personal jurisdiction by authorizing service[; slervice of process is how a court
gets jurisdiction over the person"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988).
See, e.g., Anchor Glass Container Corp. v. Stand Energy Corp., 711 F. Supp. 325,
330 (S.D. Miss. 1989)(explaining that § 1965(b) is a venue and jurisdictional statute); United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, 695
F. Supp. 1426, 1431 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)(explaining that "[alithough the House and
Senate Reports on RICO characterize § 1965(b) as a nationwide service of process
provision,. . . those sources do not state that § 1965(b) is only a service of process/
personal jurisdiction provision and not a venue provision").
1970 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4034
(indicating that "[slubsection (b) provides nationwide service of process on parties"). But see Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1087-88 (D. Del.
1984)(stating that although "[tihe legislative history of Section 1965 can be read
to suggest that subsection (b) is only a service of process provision[,] I find it
difficult to read its text to be this limited").
See, e.g., cases cited infra section III.B (concerning subsection (b)) and infra section II.C (concerning subsection (d)).
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one federal district court: "IT]he precise meaning of [§ 1965] is far
from clear and what case law there is construing the provision is not
uniform."93
The keys to begin unraveling this statutory tangle include the
plain language of § 1965, the statute's legislative history, and basic
civil procedure concepts. As will be detailed below, subsection (a) is
merely a venue provision.94 Neither the language of nor legislative
history explaining subsection (a) can be used to transform it into a
jurisdictional provision. 95 Subsection (b)-because it permits nationwide service of process-is a service-of-process provision, a jurisdictional provision, and-because of language in the legislative
history 96-a venue provision. 9 7 Subsection (d) is merely a service-ofprocess provision for process other than a summons. 98 To read subsection (d) in any other way would render subsection (b) superfluous. 9 9
A.

Section 1965(a)

Congress intended § 1965(a) to serve as a venue statute.OO Because subsection (a) does not address personal jurisdiction or service
of process, its use must not be expanded beyond the venue context.10 1
Section 1965(a) provides a four-part test to determine whether
venue in a particular forum is proper in a RICO case.' 0 2 Under this
93. Abeloff v. Barth, 119 F.R.D. 315, 325 (D. Mass. 1988)(commenting on § 1965(a)
specifically).
94. See infra section IIIA.
95. A federal statute that expressly permits nationwide service-of-process can be
used to establish personal jurisdiction. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying
text. Because subsection (a) does not concern nationwide service-or any type of
service-it should not be read as a jurisdictional provision.
96. See infra notes 102 & 108.
97. See infra section III.B.1.
98. See infra section III.C.
99. See text accompanying infra note 175. See also infra note 144 (discussing rules of
statutory construction).
100. 1970 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4034.
101. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text (discussing how a service-of-process provision can be used to establish personal jurisdiction).
102. The language of § 1965(a) was taken virtually verbatim from the Clayton Act's
two venue provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994)(providing for venue in any federal district "inwhich the defendant resides or is found or has an agent"); id. § 22
(providing, in antitrust actions against corporations, for venue in any district in
which the corporate defendant "is an inhabitant [or] in any district wherein it
may be found or transacts business"). Accord Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473
U.S. 479, 489 (1985)(stating that "[t~he clearest current in [RICO's] history is the
reliance on the Clayton Act model"). See also Bulk Oil (USA), Inc. v. Sun Oil
Trading Co., 584 F. Supp. 36, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)(relying on prior interpretations
of the antitrust venue provision to analyze whether venue was proper under
§ 1965(a)); King v. Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120, 122 (N.D. Cal. 1972)(same). See generally DAVID B. SmitH & TERRANcE REED, CIvIa RICO $ 6.01 (1996).
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test, venue is proper if the RICO defendant (1) resides in the forum,10 3
(2) is found in the forum,1 0 4 (3) has an agent in the forum,1 0 5 or (4)
transacts his affairs106 in the forum.107
103. See Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1134
(D. Mass. 1982)(relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) to determine a corporation's residency for venue over a RICO claim). See also Berry v. New York State Dep't of
Correctional Servs., 808 F. Supp. 1106, 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)(explaining that the
"residence" of a public official means his official, not actual, residence); Wood v.
Barnette, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 936, 939 (E.D. Va. 1986)(holding that a corporation's
residence can be determined from its place of incorporation). See generally SmrrH
& REED, supra note 102, § 6.01[b] (explaining that counsel should refer to 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c) to analyze the residence issue).
104. "The term 'is found' has been construed to mean presence and continuous local
activity." Shuman v. Computer Assocs. Intl, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 114, 116 (E.D. Pa.
1991). See also Ancel v. Rexford Rand Corp., Civ. No. 3:93-CV-2379-H, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13977 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 1994); Now Plastics, Inc. v. HPT Plastics,
Inc., 1990 WL 301521, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1990); Wichita Fed. Say. & Loan v.
Landmark Group, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 321, 328 (D. Kan. 1987). For a corporate
defendant in a civil RICO action "to be found" in the forum means that it "must
be present in the district by its officers and agents carrying on the business of the
corporation." DeMoss v. First Artists Prod. Co., Ltd., 571 F. Supp. 409, 411 (N.D.
Ohio 1983), appeal dismissed, 734 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1984). Accord Payne v. Marketing Showcase, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 656, 659 (N.D. Ill. 1985). See generally SrsrTH
& REED, supra note 102, S 6.01[c].
105. "[To establish venue based on the activities of an agent in a district, the agent
must be carrying on the business of the principal." Welch Foods, Inc. v. Packer,
No. 93-CV-0811E(F), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16974 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 1994).
One of the most heated debates concerning the language "has an agent" is
whether the actions of alleged co-conspirators within the forum may be attributed to co-conspirators outside the forum to find proper venue under the RICO
statute. Some courts have said yes. See, e.g., Dooley v. United Technologies
Corp., 786 F. Supp. 65, 79, 81 (D.D.C. 1992); American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A1 Int'l Importing Enters., Ltd., 757 F. Supp. 545, 556 & n.16 (E.D. Pa. 1991)(holding that one RICO defendant's co-conspirators "engaged in significant forum-related activity which can be attributed to [the defendant] for venue purposes
under the RICO statute"); American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Int'l Importing,
755 F. Supp. 1292, 1304 (E.D. Pa. 1990)(explaining. "The co-conspirator theory is
equally, if not more, appropriate in the RICO context than in securities fraud
litigation. Section 1965(a) provides that venue may be found in the district where
the defendant 'has an agent.' The co-conspirator theory is based on agency theory. It is said that each co-conspirator acts as the agent for the others and any coconspirator's act in a district is attributable to the other co-conspirators."). Other
courts have rejected the co-conspirator theory in RICO cases. See, e.g., Payne v.
Marketing Showcase, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Eaby v. Richmond,
561 F. Supp. 131, 140 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1983)(explaining. "Clearly, venue must be
properly laid as to each defendant. The mere fact that some alleged co-conspirators may have engaged in conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy within this
district, does not properly establish venue as to all other co-conspirators. Indeed,
this so-called 'conspiratorial theory' of venue has been firmly rejected." (emphasis
added)); Sportmart, Inc. v. Frisch, 537 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. 111. 1982). See generally SA=TH & REED, supra note 102, T 6.01[d].
106. 'The term 'transacts his affairs' was drawn from section 12 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22." Obee v. Teleshare, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 913, 916 (E.D.
Mich. 1989). "Transacts his affairs" has been construed to require a level of regu-
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The legislative historylO8 and many cases indicate that § 1965(a)

was intended to liberalize the general venue provisions and to afford
plaintiffs a broad choice of forum.109 Section 1965(a), therefore, suplar, substantial, and continuous activity within the forum to establish venue.
Anchor Glass Container Corp. v. Stand Energy Corp., 711 F. Supp. 325, 329 (S.D.
Miss. 1989). Accord Caldwell v. Palmetto State Savs. Bank, 811 F.2d 916, 918
(5th Cir. 1987); Obee v. Teleshare, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 913, 916 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
Dody v. Brown, 659 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Mo. 1987); Miller Brewing Co. v. Landau,
616 F. Supp. 1285, 1288 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
Courts are split on whether the phrase "transacts his affairs" in § 1965(a) refers only to the personal contacts of a defendant, or whether contacts made by a
defendant on behalf of an employer may also be considered. Some courts have
held that the phrase "transacts his affairs" refers only to the personal affairs of
the defendant, not affairs he may have transacted on behalf of his employer.
Anchor Glass Container Corp. v. Stand Energy Corp., 711 F. Supp. 325, 329 (S.D.
Miss. 1989). Accord Shuman v. Computer Assocs. Intl, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 114,
116 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Medoil Corp. v. Clark, 753 F. Supp. 592, 599 (W.D.N.C.
1990); Payne v. Marketing Showcase, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 656, 659 (N.D. Ill. 1985);
Bulk Oil (U.SA.), Inc. v. Sun Oil Trading Co., 584 F. Supp. 36, 39 (S.D.N.Y.
1983). Other courts have rejected this position and held that the phrase "transacts his affairs" "does not mean that venue of an individual defendant is restricted to a district in which the individual defendant conducts his personal
affairs." Abeloff v. Barth, 119 F.R.D. 315, 328 (D. Mass. 1988). Accord Phoenix
Home Life Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 857 F. Supp. 7, 10 (W.D.N.Y. 1994)(questioning the Payne/Bulk Oil position and indicating that the Payne/Bulk Oil position
would not apply in a case in which "each of the individual defendants is conducting activities of their own partnership as a partner thereof); American
Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Intl Importing Enters., Ltd., 755 F. Supp. 1292, 1304
n.17 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Rolls Royce Motors, Inc. v. Charles Schmitt & Co., 657 F.
Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., 590 F. Supp.
1453 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)(reasoning that the fiduciary shield doctrine is solely a creation of state law and should not apply to venue determinations under § 1965),
affd, 832 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1987). See generally SmITH & REED, supra note 102,
1 6.01[e].
107. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965(a) (West 1994).
108. 1970 HousE REPORT No. 1549, supra note 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4007, 4034 (noting that § 1965 "contains broad provisions regarding venue and
process, which are modeled on present antitrust legislation"). See also 116 CONG.
REC. H35196 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1970)(remarks of Rep. Emanuel Celler that "provision is made for nationwide venue and service of process").
109. See Anchor Glass Container Corp. v. Stand Energy Corp., 711 F. Supp. 325, 327
n.7 (S.D. Miss. 1989)(indicating that the special RICO venue provision "liberalizes" those found in § 1391(b)); Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452
F. Supp. 1278, 1280-81 (D. Del. 1978)(concluding that "[gliven the language and
legislative history of Section 1965,. . . its provisions were not intended to be exclusive, but rather, were intended to liberalize the already existent venue provisions found in Title 28"); BATISTA & RHODES, supranote 14, § 2.6 (explaining that,

in seeking venue, the plaintiffs "general objective ... is to secure the broadest
possible venue" while "defendants typically seek the narrowest range of
venue.... Civil RICO... serves the plaintiffs objectives.... ."). Cf. Cotham &
Campbell, supra note 62, at 249 (explaining that "[tihe tremendous variations in
state venue provisions make it impossible to generalize about the advantages
that RICO's venue provisions offer. Since state venue provisions may often require that a suit be brought in the county where defendant is domiciled, RICO
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plementsllO 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b),131 the general civil venue provision
may uniquely permit suits in a district where defendant is merely 'found,' has an
agent, or transacts its affairs." (footnotes omitted)). But see Medoil Corp. v.
Clark, 753 F. Supp. 592, 598-99 (W.D.N.C. 1990)(discussing the "transacts his
affairs" prong of § 1965(a) and stating that "[bjecause venue can also be established through the use of § 1391, the Court believes that the proper statutory
construction requiresthat the statute be interpreted narrowly"(emphasis added)).
See also King v. Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Cal. 1972)(relying on the differences between the Clayton Act venue provisions and § 1965(a) to construe the
language in § 1965(a) narrowly).
110. See, e.g., Eastman v. Initial Inv., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 336, 338 (E.D. Pa. 1993)(noting that "[t]he RICO statute has its own venue provision, which is supplementary
to the general venue statute"); Monarch Normandy Square Partners v. Normandy Square Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 817 F. Supp. 899, 904 (D. Kan.
1993)(concluding that "[tihe venue provisions of RICO supplement the provisions
of § 1391(b)"). Some courts have stated the test differently; they have stated that
§ 1391(b) supplements § 1965(a). See, e.g., Juliano v. Kane, 701 F. Supp. 492,493
(D.N.J. 1988)(stating that "[tihe venue provisions of § 1391(b) supplement the
venue provisions of RICO"); Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 139 (E.D. Pa.
1983)(explaining that the language in § 1965(a) is "precatory; it describes the districts in which suit 'may', rather than 'must' be brought"; therefore, § 1391(b)
supplements "RICO's more specific venue provision"). Courts adopting this latter
position tend to analyze whether venue is established under § 1965(a) before addressing whether venue is proper under § 1391(b). Courts adopting the former
position tend to analyze § 1391(b) before turning to § 1965(a). In reality, the order in which courts analyze § 1391(b) and § 1965(a) should not matter; the tests
are-for all practical purposes-alternatives. See, e.g., Welch Foods, Inc. v.
Packer, No. 93-CV-0811E(F), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16974, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Nov.
23, 1994)(indicating that § 1965(a) "provides an alternative to section 1391(b)");
Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 786 F. Supp. 65, 80 n.15 (D.D.C. 1992)(calling § 1965(a) and § 1391(b) alternative sources of venue); Magic Toyota, Inc. v.
Southeast Toyota Distribs., Inc., 784 F. Supp. 306, 319 (D.S.C. 1992)(calling
§ 1965(a) "an alternative source" of venue that is "supplemental to those found in
§ 1391"); So-Comm, Inc. v. Reynolds, 607 F. Supp. 663, 665 (N.D. Ill. 1985)(indicating that venue in a civil RICO case can be predicated on either § 1391(b) or
§ 1965(a)).
111. Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(b), as amended in 1995, provides:
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of
citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in
(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part
of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a
judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(b)(West Supp. 1996).
If the defendant is a corporation, § 1391(c) may be applied. Section 1391(c)
provides that "[a] corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business." 28 U.S.CA.
§ 1391(c) (West Supp. 1996). Accord Shulton, Inc. v. Optel Corp., No. CIV.A 852925, 1986 WL 15617, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 1986). Section 1391(d) may be applied if the defendant is an alien. 28 U.S.CA. § 1391(d) (West Supp. 1996). Accord Bulk Oil (USA), Inc. v. Sun Oil Trading Co., 584 F. Supp. 36, 39 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). Further, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1392(a), which provides that in a "civil
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that applies to federal-question cases.1 1 2 Accordingly, venue in a civil
RICO case may be established if the plaintiff meets any test articulated in either § 1391(b) or § 1965(a). The plaintiff need not meet the
tests in both statutes. 3- In a single-defendant RICO action, when the
plaintiff meets one test in either § 1391(b)114 or § 1965(a), the venue
analysis typically ends.115 In a case involving multiple defendants, if

112.

113.

114.

115.

action, not of a local nature, against defendants residing in different districts in
the same State, may be brought in any of such districts," supplements § 1391(b)
and may be used in a RICO case. See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Munnis, No.
89-2690, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13352, at *3 & n.1 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 1989). However, "[tihe more liberal venue provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(a) are not available in a RICO suit even where jurisdiction over the parties exists by virtue of
diversity of citizenship ... because section 1391(a) is limited to actions 'wherein
jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship.'" Id. at *2 n.1.
Subsection (b) of§ 1391 applies to RICO actions because RICO, a federal statute,
provides the court with federal-question jurisdiction. Therefore, a civil RICO action is "[a] civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of
citizenship." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(b) (West Supp. 1996). See Jones v. City of Buffalo, 901 F. Supp. 19, 22 (D.D.C. 1995)(explaining that § 1391(b) defines when
venue is proper for "civil suits in which jurisdiction is not based on diversity of
citizenship"); Monarch Normandy Square Partners v. Normandy Square Assocs.
Ltd. Partnership, 817 F. Supp. 899, 903 n.3 (D. Kan. 1993)(determining that
"§ 1391(a) is inapplicable to this case because jurisdiction is not founded only on
diversity of citizenship [because t]he plaintiffs' inclusion of a RICO claim gives
this court federal question subject matter jurisdiction").
See, e.g., Ancel v. Rexford Rand Corp., No. 3:93-CV-2379-H, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13977, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 1994)(indicating that venue in the civil
RICO case could be established under either § 1965(a) or § 1391(b)); Dooley v.
United Technologies Corp., 786 F. Supp. 65, 80 n.15 (D.D.C. 1992)(explaining
that § 1965 is an alternative ground that need not be determined if § 1391 is
met); General Envtl. Science Corp. v. Horsfall, 753 F. Supp. 664, 674 (N.D. Ohio
1990)(noting that "due to the court's holding that venue is proper under
§ 1391(b), it is not necessary to examine the propriety of venue under § 1965(a)");
Todaro v. Orbit Int'l Travel, Ltd., No. 85-CIV-9953 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7,
1986)(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file)(concluding that "[i]f venue for a RICO
claim can be established under § 1391(b), it is unnecessary to address the application of § 1965(a)"). Cf Clement v. Pehar, 575 F. Supp. 436, 439, 443 (N.D. Ga.
1983)(remarking first that the plaintiffs RICO claim "must satisfy the independent venue requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a)" but later indicating that "18
U.S.C. § 1965(a) was not intended to be exclusive" and "where venue is improper
under § 1965(a), the court should inquire whether the action can be maintained
under the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)").
The primary advantage in using § 1391(b) is that it permits venue to be established "where the claim arose." See, e.g., DeMoss v. First Artists Prod. Co., 571 F.
Supp. 409, 411 (N.D. Ohio 1983), appeal dismissed, 734 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1984).
Section 1965(a) does not contain such a provision. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965(a) (West
1994 & Supp. 1996).
See, e.g., Gurnicz v. Guindon, No. 90-3796, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112, at *8 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 2, 1991); M.F. Fletcher & Assocs., Inc. v. Caramanica, 708 F. Supp. 1263,
1265 (M.D. Fla. 1989); S.D. Warren Co. v. Engelman, No. 87-8339, 1988 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10474, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 1988). The venue analysis will also
end if a plaintiff fails all tests in § 1391 and § 1965(a). See, e.g., Ashland Oil Co.
v. Arnett, No. 84-C-1324, 1984 WL 874 (N.D. 111. Aug. 20, 1984). Cf Monarch
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the plaintiff fails to establish venue over any defendant under
§ 1965(a), the analysis also ends.316 However, if venue in a multipledefendant case has been established over at least one defendant under
§ 1391(b) or § 1965(a), the venue analysis should shift to § 1965(b).317
Normandy Square Partners v. Normandy Square Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 817
F. Supp. 899, 904 (D. Kan. 1993)(proceeding to a § 1965(b) analysis when plaintiffs failed to advance "any reasoned argument that venue is proper under 18
U.S.C. § 1965(a)").
Of course, the defendant may still request that venue be transferred under 28
U.S.C. § 1404 or the doctrine of forum non conveniens, both of which can be applied in civil RICO actions. See, e.g., Transunion Corp. v. Pepsico, Inc., 811 F.2d
127, 130 (2d Cir. 1987)(concluding that "[a] review of the legislative history...
discloses no mandate that the doctrine of forum non conveniens should not apply"); Berry v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 808 F. Supp. 1106,
1111 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)(holding that "the doctrine of forum non conveniens applies
to RICO actions"); Project 74 Allentown, Inc. v. Frost, 770 F. Supp. 207, 209
(S.D.N.Y. 1991)(holding that forum non conveniens applies); DeMoss v. First Artists Prod. Co., 571 F. Supp. 409, 412 (N.D. Ohio 1983)(transferring a civil RICO
case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404 and 1406), appeal dismissed, 734 F.2d 14 (6th Cir.
1984). Further, venue in RICO actions may be challenged when the action also
concerns an agreement with a forum-selection clause). See, e.g., Nova Ribbon
Prods., Inc. v. Lincoln Ribbon, Inc., No. 89-4340, 1992 WL 211544, at **7-10 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 24, 1992)(enforcing a broadly-written forum-selection clause in a RICO
case). Although these topics fall outside the purview of this Article, they are discussed in Snmr & REED, supra note 102, 1 6.02[61 (discussing forum non conveniens) & 1 6.02[71 (discussing forum selection and choice of law clauses). Cf
Population Planning Assocs., Inc. v. Life Essentials, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 342, 345
(S.D.N.Y. 1989)(indicating that the RICO case could be transferred under
§ 1406(a) even when the court found venue to be improper under § 1391 and
§ 1965(a)). Contra General Envtl. Science Corp. v. Horsfall, 753 F. Supp. 664,
667 (N.D. Ohio 1990)(finding that the RICO claim fell outside the contractual
forum-selection clause); Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., 672 F. Supp. 977,
979 (E.D. Mich. 1987)(same), affd, 838 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1988).
116. See, e.g., Project 74 Allentown, Inc. v. Frost, 770 F. Supp. 207, 209 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); Michelson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 709 F. Supp.
1279, 1286 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Juliano v. Kane, 701 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1988); Sunray Enter., Inc. v. David C. Bouza & Assocs., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1453 (E.D.N.Y.
1984), affid, 832 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1987); Clement v. Pehar, 575 F. Supp. 436
(N.D. Ga. 1983).
117. See, e.g., Eastman v. Initial Inv., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 336, 338 (E.D. Pa. 1993)(emphasizing that the "ends of justice" provision in § 1965(b) will not be used when
venue is proper as to every defendant in another district under § 1391(b));
Southmark Prime Plus, L.P. v. Falzone, 768 F. Supp. 487, 489-91 (D. Del.
1991)(instructing "In a RICO action, venue may be proper with respect to a particular defendant even though the venue provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) and 28
U.S.C. § 1391 do not apply to that defendant. If venue is proper in a district
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1391 as to one or more defendants,
venue will also be proper with respect to defendants not covered by these venue
provisions if, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b), the 'interests ofjustice' dictate that
these other defendants be brought before the same court.... [I]f there is a district where venue is proper as to every RICO defendant, without resort to
§ 1965(b), under normal circumstances, a court in a different district will not fur-
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B. Section 1965(b)
1. Venue under § 1965(b)
Section 1965(b) is "a venue provision of last resort."11s Section
1965(b) was enacted to enable a plaintiff to bring before a single court,
in a single trial, all members of an alleged nationwide RICO conspiracy.119 Section 1965(b) can be used only in multi-defendant cases
ther the ends of justice if it exercises its discretion under § 1965(b) to bring the
same litigants into a district where venue would not otherwise have been proper.
On the other hand, if no district is a proper venue as to all defendants without
resort to § 1965(b), and at least one defendant is subject to venue in the district
pursuant to § 1965(a) or § 1391, then the interests of justice weigh heavily in
favor of the court bringing the other defendants before it under § 1965(b)." (citations omitted)); Farmer's Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278,
1282 n.8 (D. Del. 1978)(explaining that "section 1965(b) provides that the district
court may summon other parties over whom there would not otherwise be venue
in the district if 'it is shown that the ends of justice [so] require. .

. .'").

But see

Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987)(explaining
that § 1965(b) is a jurisdictional provision and § 1965(a) is a venue provision),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988). In Lisak, the Seventh Circuit ruled that
although an Illinois district court would have personal jurisdiction over a Florida
RICO defendant under the nationwide service of process provision, that court
probably would not have venue. Id. at 671. The facts in Lisak made venue inapplicable under 28 U.S.C. § 1348, and doubtful under section 1965(a). The Seventh Circuit stated that even if venue existed under section 1965(a) with respect
to two defendants, the ends of justice may not require other defendants to appear
when it was obvious that an Indiana district court would have jurisdiction over
all defendants. Id. at 672. Cf Bridge v. Invest Am., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 948, 951
n.4 (D.R.I. 1990)(holding that § 1965(b) does not, however, mandate the existence
of venue merely because personal jurisdiction is attainable).
A few courts seem to have ended the RICO venue analysis at least one step too
soon. In Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of California, Inc., 535 F. Supp.
1125 (D. Mass. 1982), for example, the court determined that venue under
§ 1965(a) was proper as to one defendant, but was not proper for another defendant. Id. at 1133. The court then concluded that venue as to the second defendant
was not proper under § 1391(b). Id. But instead of determining whether venue
over the second defendant might have been proper under § 1965(b), the court dismissed the RICO claim as to that defendant. Id. See also Smith v. Mark Twain
Bancshares, No. 84-4282-S (D. Kan. Aug. 11, 1986)(failing to address § 1965(b)).
118. Smrnm & REED, supra note 102, 1 6.01[4]. See also Bridge v. Invest Am., Inc., 748
F. Supp. 948, 951 (D.R.I. 1990)(indicating that "section 1965(b) is a special venue
provision, supplementing the basic RICO venue provision found in subsection (a)
of section 1965, as well as any other applicable venue provision"). The legislative
history expressly refers to § 1965(b) as a venue provision. See supra note 108.
119. Anchor Glass Container Corp. v. Stand Energy Corp., 711 F. Supp. 325, 330 (S.D.
Miss. 1989). See also Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d
535, 539 (9th Cir. 1986). Like § 1965(a), § 1965(b) is also based on an antitrust
venue provision. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5, provides:
Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding under
section 4 of this title may be pending, that the ends oflustice require that
other parties should be brought before the court, the court may cause
them to be summoned, whether they reside in the district in which the
court is held or not; and subpoenas to that end may be served in any
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when at least one defendant is subject to venue in the forum under
either § 1965(a) or § 1391(b).120 The key to § 1965(b) is that it can be
used only when the "ends ofjustice" so require.121 Unfortunately, the
courts either do not know, or cannot agree on, what that term
means.1 2 2 Thus, application of § 1965(b) as a venue
statute has been
123
haphazard and has yielded conflicting results.
2. Personaljurisdictionunder § 1965(b)
The plain language of § 1965(b) belies that it also can be used to
establish personal jurisdiction.1 24 Indeed, the word "jurisdiction" does

120.

121.
122.
123.
124.

juridical district.... (Emphasis added.)
Contra SsirrH & REED, supra note 102, T 6.01[4] (explaining that "the language of
section 1965(b) cannot be traced to an antitrust venue counterpart in sections 4
or 12 of the Clayton Act").
See Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir.
1986)(holding that "[flor nationwide service to be imposed under section 1965(b),
the court must have personal jurisdiction over at least one of the participants in
the alleged multidistrict conspiracy and the plaintiff must show that there is no
other district in which a court will have personal jurisdiction over all of the alleged co-conspirators"); Southmark Prime Plus, L.P. v. Falzone, 768 F. Supp. 487,
491 (D. Del. 1991)(reasoning that "ifthere is a district where venue is proper as
to every RICO defendant, without resort to § 1965(b), under normal circumstances, a court in a different district will not further the ends of justice if it
exercises its discretion under § 1965(b) to bring the same litigants into a district
where venue would otherwise not have been proper[; but]... if no district is a
proper district as to all defendants without resort to § 1965(b), and at least one
defendant is subject to venue in the district pursuant to § 1965(a) or § 1391, then
the interests of justice weigh heavily in favor of the court bringing the other defendants before it under § 1965(b)"); Medoil Corp. v. Clark, 753 F. Supp. 592, 599
(W.D.N.C. 1990); Bridge v. Invest Am., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 948, 953 (D.R.I.
1990)(stating that "[tlhe forum must also be the proper venue for at least one
defendant and there must not be any other district which would have venue over
all the defendants"); Abeloff v. Barth, 119 F.R.D. 315, 329 (D. Mass. 1988)(explaining that § 1965(b) "has been construed to be applicable only in a case in
which there is venue for the RICO claim for at least one defendant in the forum
but not as to others and there is no other district which would have venue of all
defendants named in the RICO count"); Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus.,
Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1453, 1459 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)(indicating that to invoke 1965(b),
venue must be proper to at least one other RICO defendant under 1965(a)), affd,
832 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1987); Clement v. Pehar, 575 F. Supp. 436, 443 n.5 (N.D.
Ga. 1983)(concluding that "[s]ince... venue is in fact improper as to all defendants under section 1965(a), subsection (b) is simply not applicable").
18 U.S.CA. § 1965(b) (West 1994); see infra sections III & IV.
See infra section 1V.B.
See infra section MY.C (describing the factors that courts consider under § 1965(b)
and proposing a § 1965(b) venue test).
For the text of § 1965(a) & (b), see supra text accompanying note 87. Subject
matter jurisdiction is not at issue because civil RICO-a federal statute-falls
within a federal court's federal-question subject matter jurisdiction. See 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (providing that "[tihe district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States").
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not appear in the subsection.125 Many courts, however, have used the
1 26
provision to establish personal jurisdiction over RICO defendants,
or have at least considered it when conducting a personal-jurisdiction
analysis.127 Subsection (b) can be invoked to establish personal juris8
diction because it expressly permits nationwide service of process.12
Courts are split, however, on whether and how the "ends of justice"
language affects a federal court's ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over a RICO defendant. Specifically, as with many other statutes
allowing nationwide service of process,' 2 9 courts are divided on
125. For the language of § 1965(b), see supra text accompanying note 87.
126. See, e.g., Northern Trust Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., No. 94-C-4045, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15730, at *9-11 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 1994); Mulhern v. West Coast
Video Enters., Inc., Nos. 90-C-0471 & 91-C-0711, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8275, at
*13-14 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1992); Ginsburg v. Faragalli, 776 F. Supp. 806, 808
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Intl Importing Enters.,
Ltd., 757 F. Supp. 545, 556 (E.D. Pa. 1991); American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1
Int'l Importing Enters., Ltd., 755 F. Supp. 1292, 1303 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Lentz v.
Woolley, No. 89-0805-JGD, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12651, at *14 (C.D. Cal. June
12, 1989); Matlok Fertilizer Co. v. Bost, No. 87-C-3946, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1995, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1989); Shulton, Inc. v. Optel Corp., No. 85-2925,
1986 WL 15617, at *10-12, *26 n.3 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 1986).
127. See, e.g., Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988); Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv.,
Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 537-38 (9th Cir. 1986); Magic Toyota, Inc. v. Southeast Toyota
Distrib., Inc., 784 F. Supp. 306, 311-12 (D.S.C. 1992); Steingold v. Harper, No.
3:91CV00012, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15768, at *10 (E.D. Va. Apr. 25, 1991); Staff
Builders of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Koschitzki, No. 88-6103, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9837, at *8-10 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 1989); Anchor Glass Container Corp. v. Stand
Energy Corp., 711 F. Supp. 325, 330-31 (S.D. Miss. 1989); Faircloth v. Jackie Fine
Arts, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 837, 841-42 (D.S.C. 1988), affd in part and rev'd in part
sub nom. Faircloth v. Finesad, 938 F.2d 513 (4th Cir. 1991).
128. See, e.g., Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987)(providing that "[s]ection 1965(a) deals with venue in RICO cases, but § 1965(b) creates personal jurisdiction by authorizing service"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007
(1988); Northern Trust Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., No. 94-C-4045, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15730, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 1994); R.C.M. Executive Gallery Corp. v.
ROLS Capital Co., No. 93 Civ. 8571 (LMM), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11252, at *7-8
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1954). See also Bridge v. Invest Am., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 948,
951 (D.R.I. 1990)(holding that "[slection 1965(b) does contain a provision for nationwide service of process, and thus authorizes personal jurisdiction as well as
venue").
129. Several other federal statutes contain a nationwide service of process provision
that courts might construe as personal jurisdiction provisions. See 9 U.S.C. § 9
(1994)(actions to confirm arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act);
15 U.S.C. § 5 (1994)(actions by the United States under the Sherman Act); 15
U.S.C. § 22 (1994)(actions against a corporation under the antitrust laws); 15
U.S.C. § 25 (1994)(actions by the United States under the Clayton Act); 15 U.S.C.
§ 49 (1994)(actions to enforce Federal Trade Commission subpoenas); 15 U.S.C.
§ 77v (1994)(actions under the Securities Act of 1933); 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv
(1994)(actions under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1994)(actions under the Securities Act of 1934); 15 U.S.C. § 79y (1994)(actions
under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43
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whether contact with the United States as a whole is sufficient,13 0 or
(1994)(actions under the Investment Company Act of 1940); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14
(1994)(actions under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(e)(1994)(actions under the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1397 (1994)(statutory interpleader actions); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408, 1409 (1994)(litigation connected to a bankruptcy case); 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1994)(actions under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994)(appeals of administrative orders under the All Writs Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1994)(actions to
assert rights in property when the defendant cannot be served within the state);
28 U.S.C. § 1692 (1994)(actions concerning land that lies in more than one district); 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1994)(actions against a corporation in a shareholders'
derivative suit); 28 U.S.C. § 2321 (1994)(actions under interstate commerce
laws); 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1994)(actions under the Federal Interpleader Act); 29
U.S.C. § 1451(d) (1994)(actions under ERISA); 33 U.S.C. § 921 (1994)(action
under the Longshoreman's Workers' Compensation Act); 40 U.S.C. § 270(b)
(1994)(actions by the United States on bonds for public works and buildings); 42
U.S.C. § 9613(e) (1994)(actions under CERCLA); 45 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994)(actions under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act); FED. R. BANXR. P.
7004(d)(bankruptcy actions). See generally 1 ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN
CIvm ACTIONS § 5.03 (2d ed. 1991)(discussing nationwide service-of-process
statutes).
Some of the listed statutes do not raise the same concerns as the RICO statute
because broad jurisdictional provisions are tempered by narrow venue provisions.
See Daniel N. Gregoire, Note, Fifth Amendment Due ProcessLimitations on Nationwide FederalJurisdiction,61 B.U. L. REv. 403, 409 n.36 (1981). For example,
9 U.S.C. § 9 provides for nationwide service of process in actions to confirm
awards under the Federal Arbitration Act, but limits venue to the district in
which the arbitration award was made. Id. Cf. Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Venue
and Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestion for Reform, 7 VAND. L.
REv. 608, 628-33 (1954)(proposing a broadened nationwide service of process
scheme that would include a liberal transfer provision). In the RICO statute,
§ 1965(b), which contains the broad "ends of justice" language, can be used as a
venue and jurisdictional provision. Thus, the statute does not contain a "venue
check" on its nationwide personal jurisdiction provisions.
130. See, e.g., Monarch Normandy Square Partners v. Normandy Square Assocs. Ltd.
Partnership, 817 F. Supp. 899, 902 (D. Kan. 1993); Obee v. Teleshare, Inc., 725 F.
Supp. 913, 915 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Perez-Rubio v. Wyckoff, 718 F. Supp. 217, 22830 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Anchor Glass Container Corp. v. Stand Energy Corp., 711 F.
Supp. 325, 330 n.10 (S.D. Miss. 1989); Matlok Fertilizer Co. v. Bost, No. 87-C3946, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1995, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1989); Hirt v. UM
Leasing Corp., 614 F. Supp. 1066, 1069 (D. Neb. 1985); Clement v. Pehar, 575 F.
Supp. 436, 438-39 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
At least one court has labelled the contacts issue an "open question." See
VMS/PCA Ltd. Partnership v. PCA Partners Ltd. Partnership, 727 F. Supp. 1167,
1173 n.6 (N.D. IMI.1989). The VMS/PCA court explained:
[The] application of the jurisdictional aspect of the RICO venue statute
raises an interesting question which we need not address in this opinion.
By exercising jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant under [1965(b)],
a court could conceivably run afoul of the requisites of due process....
We note that it remains an open question whether there are due process
limitations on the jurisdictional power of the federal courts, operating
under a federal jurisdictional statute, similar to the limits on the state
courts embodied in the minimum contacts doctrine.
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whether a RICO defendant must have contacts with the forum state or
district.131
a. National contacts approach
Courts that embrace the national contacts theory reason that, because RICO is a federal statute, the personal jurisdiction analysis
should focus solely on the defendant's contacts with the United States
as a whole.13 2 This analysis differs from the personal jurisdiction
analysis conducted by state courts or by federal courts sitting in diversity. Typically, a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant only if the defendant has certain "minimum contacts" with
the forum state.1 33 This minimum contacts approach derives from the
Due-Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.13 4 The same Fourteenth Amendment "minimum
contact" analysis is also applied when a federal court's subject-matter
131. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Varonos, 892 F.2d 1308, 1313 (7th Cir. 1990); Steingold v.

Harper, No. 3:91CV00012, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15768, at *10 (E.D. Va. Apr. 25,
1991); Radcliffe v. Founders Title Co., 720 F. Supp. 170, 172-74 (M.D. Ga. 1989);
Wichita Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Landmark Group, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 1182,
1193-94 (D. Kan. 1987).
132. See, e.g., Anchor Glass Container Corp. v. Stand Energy Corp., 711 F. Supp. 325,
330 n.10 (S.D. Miss. 1989)(explaining that "the due process clause of the fifth
amendment represents a limit on a federal court's power to acquire personal jurisdiction by way of nationwide service of process; however, the rule in this circuit, as in most circuits, is that in a federal question case in which nationwide
service is statutorily authorized, minimum contacts with the United States
rather than with a particular state will satisfy the due process prong of the personal jurisdiction test"). Many commentators have also argued that the Fifth
Amendment does not impose limits on federal jurisdiction beyond the requirement of minimum contacts with the United States. See, e.g., Thomas F. Green,
Jr., FederalJurisdictionIn Personam of Corporationsand Due Process, 14 VA'D.
L. REv. 967, 981 (1961); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Powerof Congress to Limit the
Jurisdictionof Federal Courts:An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. Rav. 1362,
1365 (1953). A few more recent articles, however, have called for federal courts to
place additional limits on personal jurisdiction or to employ an analysis closer to
that used in the Fourteenth Amendment context. See, e.g., Maryellen Fullerton,
ConstitutionalLimits on Nationwide PersonalJurisdictionin the FederalCourts,
79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1984); Robert A. Lusardi, NationwideService ofProcess:Due
Process Limitations on the Power of the Sovereign, 33 VIiL. L. Rav. 1 (1988);
Pamela J. Stephens, The Federal Court Across the Street: ConstitutionalLimits
on Federal Court Assertions of Personal Jurisdiction, 18 U. RICH. L. Rv. 697
(1984); Gregoire, Note, supra note 129, at 411-12.
133. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko
v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958);
International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For a detailed discussion
on the development of Fourteenth Amendment Due-Process limits on state
courts' exercise of personal jurisdiction, see Fullerton, supra note 132, at 7-14.
134. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part that "[n]o State shall...
deprive any personal of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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jurisdiction is founded on diversity.13 5 However, when faced with a
federal-question case, many courts have held that the Fifth Amendment's Due-Process Clause3 6 applies and requires only that the defendant have minimum contacts with the United States, not the
particular judicial district in which suit is filed.137 Stated differently,
courts adopting the national contacts approach believe that since federal courts were created by the federal government,1 38 the forum is
139
the entire nation.
"National contacts" courts reinforce their position by pointing to
federal statutes that authorize nationwide service of process. 14 0 As
135. See, e.g., Burke v. Woods, No. 95-6094, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 10222, at *5-6

136.
137.

138.
139.
140.

(10th Cir. May 3, 1996); Wilson v. Berlin, 20 F.3d 644, 646-47 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 322 (1994); Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 199
(3d Cir. 1993). The cited cases indicate that the Fourteenth Amendment DueProcess analysis typically occurs when the federal court analyzes whether it can
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant under a state long-arm statute.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Berlin, 20 F.3d 644, 646-47 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
322 (1994). See generally Gerald Abraham, ConstitutionalLimitations upon the
TerritorialReach of Federal Process, 8 VmL. L. REv. 520, 523-31 (1963)(suggesting that the Erie doctrine may limit Congress's power to give the federal
courts nationwide jurisdiction in diversity cases); Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 Tax. L. Ray. 1589, 1593-97 (1992)(discussing when federal courts must follow the Fourteenth Amendment Due-Process
clause).
The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part that "[ao person shall be ...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
See, e.g., United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960
F.2d 1080, 1085 (1st Cir. 1992); Hogue v. Milodon Eng'g, Inc., 736 F.2d 989, 991
(4th Cir. 1984). See also Omni Capital Intl, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S.
97, 103 (1987)(suggesting that the Fifth Amendment Due-Process Clause governs
in federal-question cases); Terry v. Raymond Intl, Inc., 658 F.2d 398, 401-02 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d
330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974).
See generally CASAD, supra note 129, § 5.01.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Fullerton, supra note 132, at 15.
For a federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must first be amenable to service of process in that jurisdiction under a statute or court rule. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff& Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104
(1987). See also United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp.,
960 F.2d 1080, 1985 (1st Cir. 1992)(explaining that "though personal jurisdiction
and service of process are distinguishable, they are inextricably intertwined,
since service of process constitutes the vehicle by which the court obtains jurisdiction"). Early on, a federal court's authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over
a defendant was, as a general rule, limited to persons found or residing within
the forum. See Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838). In 1925,
however, the Supreme Court indicated that Congress had the power to authorize
federal courts' process to extend throughout the United States. Robertson v.
Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925). In Robertson, however, the action
arose under the Transportation Act of 1920, which did not contain a nationwide
service of process provision. Id. Therefore, the Court concluded the traditional
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one court explained, "Where Congress has authorized nationwide service of process by federal courts under specific federal statutes, so long
as the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant is compatible with
due process, the service of process is sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of the federal court over the person of the defendant."141
Courts adhering to the national contacts approach in RICO cases
conduct the § 1965(b) personal jurisdictional analysis either (1) by disregarding any factor other than the defendant's contacts with the
United Statesl4 2 or (2) by considering only whether another RICO defendant is amenable to jurisdiction in the forum and whether an alternative forum exists in which all RICO defendants would be amenable
to process. 143 Courts that delve no deeper than a defendant's minirule-that a district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction was restricted to the
district in which the defendant lived or could be found-should be applied. Id. at
627. Today, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 contains the general rule for service of process in federal courts. See FED. RULE CIv. P. 4(e)(providing that
"[u]nless otherwise provided by federal law, service upon an individual ... may
be effected in any judicial district of the United States"); id. 4(h)(1)(providing that
"u]nless otherwise provided by federal law, service upon a domestic or foreign
corporation... shall be effected... in a judicial district of the United States in
the manner prescribed for individuals by subdivision (e)(1)). See also Omni Capital Intl, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 108 (1987)(explaining that when
no specific statutory provision authorizes nationwide service, federal courts must
follow Rule 4, which limits a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction to persons
who can be reached by the forum state's long-arm statute). In addition, many
federal statutes-including RICO-contain their own nationwide service of process provision. See supra note 129 (identifying the nationwide service provisions
of many federal statutes). But cf 4 WwGHT & MILLER, supranote 23, § 1067.1, at
329 (1987)(noting: "Nor does the recitation of Congress' supposed power to provide for nationwide service of process settle the issue. The relevant language in
the cases offered in support of this power is only dictum; none of the cases actually hold in favor of a burdensome exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction" (footnote omitted)).
141. Hogue v. Milodon Eng'g, Inc., 736 F.2d 989, 991 (4th Cir. 1984), quoted in Boon
Partners v. Advanced Fin. Concepts, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 392, 397 (E.D.N.C. 1996).
Accord Clement v. Pehar, 575 F. Supp. 436,438 (N.D. Ga. 1983)(explaining that a
federal district court's jurisdiction is "co-extensive with the boundaries of the
United States, [and] due process requires only that a defendant in a federal suit
have minimum contacts with the United States" (quoting F.T.C. v. Jim Walter
Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1981)). See generally CASAD, supra note 129,
§ 5.01.
142. See, e.g., Northern Trust Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., No. 94-C-4045, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15730, at *10-11 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 28, 1994); Mulhern v. West Coast
Video Enters., Inc., Nos. 90-C-0471 & 91-C-0711, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8275, at
*13-14 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1992); Ginsburg v. Faragalli, 776 F. Supp. 806, 808
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); Matlok Fertilizer Co. v. Bost, No. 87-C-3946, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1995, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 27, 1989).
143. See, e.g., Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 539 (9th
Cir. 1986); Staff Builders of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Koschitzki, No. 88-6103, 1989
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9837, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 1989); Lentz v. Woolley, No. 890805-JGD, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12651, at *14 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 1989); Anchor
Glass Container Corp. v. Stand Energy Corp., 711 F. Supp. 325, 330-31 (S.D.
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mum contacts with the United States effectively delete the "ends of
justice" language from § 1965(b). If Congress intended the courts to
do no more than determine whether a defendant has ties with the
United States-which, for United States citizens and residents is really no test at all-it would not have included the "ends of justice"
language in § 1965(b). Because this "national contacts" interpretation
of § 1965(b) renders part of the statute mere surplusage, it is blatantly
incorrect and must be rejected.144
The national contacts courts that also consider whether at least
one RICO defendant is properly before the court and whether another
district court can exercise personal jurisdiction over all RICO defendants at least recognize that § 1965 contains an "ends of justice" test.
However, those courts, which consider personal jurisdiction to be automatically established once service is effected, do not go far enough.
Their restrictive analysis does not address, much less solve, the real
problem.145 It does not help curb instances of plaintiffs adding deficient RICO claims to obtain what they perceive to be a more favorable
and convenient forum for themselves or a less favorable and convenient forum for the defendants. Nor does it solve the related problem
of forcing defendants in well-pleaded RICO claims to litigate in a faraway forum with which they have no contacts and in which they had
no expectation of being sued.146
Some national contacts courts believe that allowing a federal court
to exercise nationwide personal jurisdiction is of little consequence
since the defendants can always request a transfer of venue.147
Miss. 1989); Faircloth v. Jackde Fine Arts, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 837, 841-42 (D.S.C.
1988), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Faircloth v. Finesod, 938 F.2d 513
(4th Cir. 1991); Shulton, Inc. v. Optel Corp., No. 85-2925, 1986 WL 15617, at *4
(D.N.J. Sept. 29, 1986).
144. See 2A NomiAPN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAm STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (5th

ed. 1992)(explaining that "[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to
all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous... or insignificant"). See also id. § 46.05 (explaining that a statute must be construed as a
whole, which means that "when interpreting a statute all parts must be construed together without according undue importance to a single or isolated
portion").
145. See infra section IV.C.2.
146. As one court stated, this approach "which divorces due process from personal jurisdiction inquiries, affords plaintiffs inordinate flexibility and does not provide
enough due process protection for defendants." Willingway Hosp., Inc. v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio, 870 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (S.D. Ga. 1994). Accord 4
WIGur & MILLER, supra note 23, § 1067.1 (1987).
147. See, e.g., Matlok Fertilizer Co. v. Bost, No. 87-C-3946, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1995, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1989)(remarking that "[any fairness argument pursued by the defendants can be resolved by the venue provisions authorizing
transfer"). See generally Fullerton, supra note 132, at 35-38. As an aside, Australia authorized its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction on a nationwide basis
and relies on venue transfers to relieve problems of inconvenient forum selection.
See Russell J. Weintraub, An Objective Basis for Rejecting TransientJurisdiction,
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Although examining fairness and convenience in the venue context
may, as a practical matter, afford some defendants a degree of protection, adopting this approach in RICO cases is disconcerting. First,
while personal jurisdiction is typically cloaked with some degree of
constitutional protection, venue considerations are not, and can be
abolished by congressional action.148 Second, a popular method of obtaining venue over a RICO defendant is by way of § 1965(b), the same
section used to obtain personal jurisdiction over the RICO defendant.
If courts are willing to read the "ends ofjustice" out of the statute for a
constitutional personal jurisdiction analysis-or to severely restrict
the factors they will consider when engaging in an § 1965(b) "ends of
justice" analysis-they probably will be willing to do the same when
using § 1965(b) as a venue statute. Why would they read the same
words differently? Because § 1965(b) can be used as both a jurisdictional and venue statute, it is highly likely that some RICO defendants will be stranded in far-away forums.
In conclusion, the national contacts test, as currently applied by
courts, is too restrictive and should be modified to ensure fairness and
discourage plaintiffs
from filing RICO claims merely to gain a forum
9
advantage.14
b. Forum contacts approaches
A smaller group of courts rejects the national contacts approach in
favor of a state contacts approach15o or a district contacts ap22 RUTGERS L.J. 611, 626 (1991)(citing Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act,
1987, No. 24, AUsTL. AcTs P.).
148. See 15 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 23, § 3801 (1985). In addition, in a securi-

ties-law case in which the plaintiff attempted to collapse the jurisdictional consideration into the venue consideration, the court explained:
[Section 27 of the 1934 Exchange Act] includes a venue requirement
which serves as a statutory limitation upon extraterritorial service, akin
to the minimum contacts principle of InternationalShoe. Plaintiffs con-

tend that such an approach, which would require venue plus in personam jurisdiction, furnishes the applicable test here. Since venue and
in personam jurisdiction are historically and conceptually different notions (although both may be established by the same record facts), we
believe that looking to venue as a limitation on nationwide service of
process begs the difficult question of whether federal in personamjurisdiction alone is constrained by constitutional due process standards.
Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 203 n.24 (E.D.
Pa. 1974). For a detailed description of Oxford First,see infra notes 233-47 and
accompanying text.
149. See infra section IV.C (proposing a new RICO personal jurisdiction test); infra
App. 1.
150. See supra note 131 (identifying RICO cases that have rejected the national contacts test). For non-RICO courts that have rejected the national contacts test,
see, e.g., Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distrib. Party Ltd.,
647 F.2d 200, 203-07 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Chem Lab Prods., Inc. v. Stepanek, 554
F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1977); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137,
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proach.15 3 Although "forum contacts" courts typically recognize that
nationwide service provisions can lead to nationwide personal jurisdiction, they also recognize that the national contacts approach can
lead to unfair results, such as forcing individuals from one end of the
country to litigate in a far-away jurisdiction with which they have no
contacts and in which they never anticipated having to defend
1 52
themselves.
RICO courts adopting a forum contacts approach usually recognize
what other courts overlook-that nationwide service of process under
§ 1965(b) is not automatic, but is conditional-conditional on the
"ends of justice" requiring nationwide service.. 5 3 Courts in this group
are typically more willing to consider factors other than whether another RICO defendant is amenable to jurisdiction in the forum and
whether an alternative forum exists. In fact, they tend to conduct an
analysis closely akin to a Fourteenth Amendment "minimum contacts" analysis.154
In addition, forum contacts courts are usually quick to explain that
the court, not the plaintiff, possesses the discretion to effect nationwide service. 5 5 Therefore, a plaintiffs mere allegation that jurisdiction is proper under § 1965(b) is not enough to establish venue;
1143 n.2 (7th Cir. 1975); Fraley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 397 F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir.
1968); Stubbs v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 521, 526 (E.D. Ark.), affd, 744 F.2d
58 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); Bamford v. Hobbs, 569 F.

151.

152.
153.

154.
155.

Supp. 160, 164-67 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Medeco Sec. Locks, Inc. v. Fichet-Bauche, 568
F. Supp. 405, 409 (D. Va. 1983). See generally CAsAD, supra note 129, ch. 5; Fullerton, supra note 132, at 44-49.
See, e.g., Hartley v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 379 F.2d 354,
359 (3d Cir. 1967); Lone Star Package Car Co., v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 212
F.2d 147, 153-55 (5th Cir. 1954); Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp.
559, 567-68 (S.D. Iowa 1973). See generally Fullerton, supra note 132, at 49-51.
Because 26 federal judicial districts are statewide districts, the district contacts
approach is sometimes identical to the state contacts approach. Id. at 49 (also
explaining that "[tihe other twenty-four states are divided into sixty-three districts, with two to four districts per state"). Cf infra note 287 (describing a "regional contacts approach" proposed by one scholar).
See, e.g., Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 201
(E.D. Pa. 1974). See generally Fullerton, supra note 132.
Wolfe v. Langford, No. C-90-3500-D.J, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5581, at *10-11
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 1991), affd, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 12303 (9th Cir. May 25,
1994); Does v. Republic Health Corp., 669 F. Supp. 1511, 1517-18 (D. Nev.
1987)(emphasizing that "[n]ationwide service in RICO suits is not unlimited" and
that "filt is also necessary, for nationwide service of process, that the complaint
state a claim under civil RICO and that the ends of justice require nationwide
service").
See, e.g., Wichita Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Landmark Group, Inc., 674 F. Supp.
321 (D. Kan. 1987).
See Wolfe v. Langford, No. C-90-3500-DIJ, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5581, at *11
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 1991). See also Steingold v. Harper, No. 3:91CV00012, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15768, at *10 (E.D. Va. Apr. 25, 1991)(stressing that "the language of [§ 1965(b)] makes clear that it has limited application").
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instead, if personal jurisdiction is challenged by a RICO defendant,
the court must independently analyze whether the "ends of justice"
require that it exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. 156
Despite the fact that the forum contacts approach includes a fairness element not present in the national contacts approach, the forum
contacts approach by itself will not suffice in the civil RICO context for
two reasons. First, it too ignores the sufficiency of the allegations
pleaded to support the RICO claim. Thus, it does nothing to solve the
problem of plaintiffs filing deficient RICO claims to gain a forum advantage. Second, it ignores the nationwide service of process provision and the legislative intent that defendants alleged to have
participated in nationwide conspiracies should be tried in a single
court, in a single trial. Therefore, even the forum contacts approach
must be modified to ensure fairness and discourage plaintiffs from filing RICO claims merely to gain a forum advantage.'57
C. Section 1965(d)
Many federal courts have used § 1965(d)-which is not limited by
"ends of justice" language-to establish personal jurisdiction over
RICO defendants.158 They use § 1965(d)159 in this way because it too
156. Procedurally, the plaintiff should include a reference to § 1965(b) in its jurisdictional statement and should consider alleging facts showing why the court should
exercise personal jurisdiction over the RICO defendants. The court, in response
to a jurisdictional challenge, or on its own initiative, will then conduct an "ends of
justice" analysis. If the court determines that personal jurisdiction is proper
under § 1965(b), then service under § 1965(b) will be deemed adequate nunc pro
tunc. See Shulton, Inc. v. Optel Corp., No. 85-2925, 1996 WL 15617, at *4-5, *26
n.3 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 1986); Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 590 F.
Supp. 1453, 1459 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 832 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1987).
157. See infra section IV.C (proposing a new RICO personal jurisdiction test).
158. See United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 911 F. Supp. 743, 750
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Kondrath v. Arum, 881 F. Supp. 925, 929 (D. Del. 1995); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Jerryco Footwear, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 578, 586 (C.D. Ill.
1994);
R.C.M. Executive Gallery Corp. v. ROLS Capital Co., No. 93-Civ.-8571 (LMM),
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11252, at *6-8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1994); Glen Eagle
Square Equity Assocs., Inc. v. First Natl Bank of Pasco, No. 93-2441, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14235, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 1993); Monarch Normandy Square
Partners v. Normandy Square Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 817 F. Supp. 899, 902 (D.
Kan. 1993); Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 786 F. Supp. 65, 70-71 (D.D.C.
1992); Bank of Crete, S.A. v. Koskotas, No. 88-Civ.-8412 (KMW), 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12169, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1991); University Sav. Ass'n v. Bank of
New Haven, 765 F. Supp. 35, 37 (D. Conn. 1991); Omni Video Games, Inc. v.
Wing Co., 754 F. Supp. 261, 263-64 (D.R.I. 1991); American Trade Partners, L.P.
v. A-1 Int'l Importing Enters., Ltd., 755 F. Supp. 1292, 1303 n.15 (E.D. Pa. 1990);
Deem v. Lockheed Corp., 749 F. Supp. 1230, 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Bridge v. Invest Am., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 948, 950-51 (D.R.I. 1990); Obee v. Teleshare, Inc., 725
F. Supp. 913, 915 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Murphy v. National Ceiling Cleaning, Inc.,
No. 88-C-10681, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7694, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 1989);
Selman v. American Sports Underwriters, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 225, 233-34 (W.D.
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contains a nationwide service provision.160 These courts also adopt
Va. 1988); Stetson Assocs. Inc. v. Bennington Iron Works, Inc., No. 86-3061-Y,
1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15346, at *6 (D. Mass. Aug. 20, 1987); Babst v. Morgan
Keegan & Co., No. 86-5614, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7165, at *16 (E.D. La. Aug. 6,
1987); DePietro v. Shoff, No. 87-0290-Y, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15344, at *5-6 (D.
Mass. July 31, 1987); Soltron Inc. v. McAngus, No. 86-CIV.-486 (PKL), 1987 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4905, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 1987); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins.
Corp. v. Provo Excelsior Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 1405, 1422 (D. Utah 1987); RollsRoyce Motors, Inc. v. Charles Schmitt & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1040, 1055 & n.10
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Novatel Communications, Inc. v. Cellular Tel. Supply, Inc.,
1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,412, at 67,431 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 1986); McIntyre's
Mini Computer Sales Group, Inc. v. Creative Synergy Corp., 644 F. Supp. 580,
585 (E.D. Mich. 1986); Barber-Colman Co. v. Trend Group, No. 85-C-4434 (N.D.
IMI.Feb. 7, 1986)(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett,
No. 84-C-1324 (N.D. IMI.Aug. 20, 1984)(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file); Clement v. Pehar, 575 F. Supp. 436, 438 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Medical Emergency Serv.
Assocs. v. Duplis, 558 F. Supp. 1312, 1314 n.1 (N.D. 111. 1983). See also
Headwear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Stange, No. 95-2438-GTV, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4088,
at *5-6 (D. Kan. Mar. 22, 1996)(noting that many courts have construed § 1965(d)
as a nationwide service of process provision); Boon Partners v. Advanced Fin.
Concepts, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 392, 397 (E.D.N.C. 1996)(citing § 1965(d) as allowing
nationwide service of process); Welch Foods, Inc. v. Packer, No. 93-CV-0811E(F),
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16974, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 1994)(indicating that defendants conceded to jurisdiction under § 1965(d)). But see NL Indus., Inc. v.
Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 650 F. Supp. 1115, 1137 (D. Kan. 1986)(explaining
that "it is not clearly established that § 1965(d) affords nationwide jurisdiction"
and noting that courts may still be obligated to apply "the traditional due process
analysis of examining the nature and quality of defendants' contacts with the
forum state").
159. For the language of § 1965(d), see supra text accompanying note 87.
160. See cases cited supra note 158. Section 1965(d) will not, however, support international service of process. See, e.g., Michelson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1279, 1285 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Soltex Polymer Corp. v.
Fortex Indus., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1453, 1460 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)(dismissing counterclaim against Belgian defendants), affd, 832 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1987). Instead, a
foreign party against whom a RICO claim is asserted must be served with process
in the United States. Gap, Inc. v. Stone Intl Trading, Inc., No. 93-Civ.-0638
(SWK), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16999, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1994); Shaw v.
RolexWatch U.S.A, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 982,987 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Contra Biofeedtrac, Inc. v. Kolinor Optical Enters. & Consultants, S.R.L., 817 F. Supp. 326, 33132 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Similarly, § 1965(b) cannot be used to gain jurisdiction over
foreign parties who are not present in the United States. See, e.g., Stauffacher v.
Bennett, 969 F.2d 455,460-61 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1034 (1992); North
Carolina ex rel. Long v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 746, 749
(E.D.N.C. 1988); Nordic Bank PLC v. Trend Group, Ltd., 619 F. Supp. 542, 564
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). See generallyKelly Christie, To Apply or Not to Apply: ExtraterritorialApplicationofFederalRICO Laws, 8 FLA. J. INWL L. 131 (1993); Robert F.
Ruyak, Venue and In PersonamJurisdictionInvolving Alien Corporations,50 ANm'ausT L.J. 599 (1982); Brian B. Frasch, Comment, National Contacts as a Basis
for In Personam Jurisditionover Aliens in Federal Questions Suits, 70 CAL. L.
REv. 686, 687 (1982)(analyzing nationwide service of process and national contacts and contending that "federal courts should be permitted to aggregate national contacts of alien defendants to determine in personam jurisdiction in
federal question suits").
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establishing

personal

jurisdiction.'

The case that explains this position most thoroughly is Bridge v.

Invest America, Inc.16 2 In Bridge, two defendants filed motions to dis-

miss the plaintiffs RICO claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(2).163 The plaintiffs contended that the court had jurisdiction
over these defendants under the nationwide service provision in
§ 1965(b) or under the Rhode Island long-arm statute.164 The court
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, but not on the grounds
urged by the plaintiffs.165 Instead of analyzing personal jurisdiction

under § 1965(b), the court stated that "plaintiffs' efforts to secure in
personam jurisdiction . . . under section 1965(b) of RICO is mis-

placed"166 and decided, sua sponte, to analyze the jurisdictional issue
under § 1965(d).167

Explaining first that a court may obtain personal jurisdiction over
a defendant through service of process,168 the court then declared that
the service language in § 1965(d) "controls the outcome here."'169 The
court continued its analysis by explaining why it believed § 1965(b)
did not apply:
to be the general
It is section 1965(d) not 1965(b) that has been17construed
0
nationwide service of process provision in RICO.
Section 1965(b) has been consistently construed to be "applicable only in a
case in which there is venue for the RICO claim for at least one defendant in
the forum but not as to others and there is no other district which would have
venue of all defendants named in the RICO count." 171 Thus, section 1965(b)
is a special venue provision, supplementing the basic RICO venue provision
found in subsection (a) of section 1965, as well as any other applicable venue
161. See cases cited supra note 158. See also supra section III.B.2 (describing the national contacts approach).
162. 748 F. Supp. 948 (D.R.I. 1990).
163. Id. at 949.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. See also id. at 952 (explaining that "a district court is empowered to make an
independent determination of its power to exercise personal jurisdiction").
168. Id. at 950.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 951 (citing Michelson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 709 F.
Supp. 1279, 1285 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388, 1402 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc. v.
Charles Schmitt & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1040, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); McIntyre's Mini
Computer Sales Group, Inc. v. Creative Synergy Corp., 644 F. Supp. 580, 585
(E.D. Mich. 1986); Hirt v. UM Leasing Corp., 614 F. Supp. 1066, 1069 (D. Neb.
1985); Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1453, 1458
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 832 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1987); Clement v. Pehar, 575 F.
Supp. 436, 438 (N.D. Ga. 1983)).
171. Id. (citing Abeloff v. Barth, 119 F.R.D. 315, 329 (D. Mass. 1988)(emphasis
added)).
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provision....
Section 1965(b) does contain a provision for nationwide service of process,
and thus authorizes personal jurisdiction as well as venue.... However, the
section 1965(b) service of process provision is only calculated to ensure that a
district court will have personal jurisdiction over any defendant brought
before it via the authority granted by the special venue provision. Without a
concurrent expansion of personal jurisdiction, Congress' expansion of venue in
section 1965(b) would be meaningless. 1 7 2

The court reasoned that because § 1965(b) can be reached only if
the court has venue over at least one RICO defendant under § 1965(a),
§ 1965(d) should be used as the service-of-process provision whenever
§ 1965(b) could not be used.'73 The Bridge court could not invoke
§ 1965(b), because no defendant was amenable to venue under
§ 1965(a); thus, it resorted to § 1965(d) and concluded that it could
properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the RICO defendants.'74
The logic of Bridge is flawed. By holding that § 1965(d) provides
nationwide venue over virtually all RICO defendants, the Bridge court
reads the limiting "ends of justice" language out of the statute. 7 5 If a
plaintiff can rely on § 1965(d) without any prerequisites, why would a
plaintiff ever rely on § 1965(b), when that section requires them to establish venue over at least one other RICO defendant under § 1965(a)
and to pass the "ends ofjustice" test? Accordingly, § 1965(d) should be
used not as a venue statute, but as a service statute for process other
than a summons, such as subpoenas issued by private parties.17 6
Therefore, the only RICO provision that can be used to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant is § 1965(b).177
IV.

WHEN AND HOW DO WE REACH THE "ENDS
OF JUSTICE"?

A.

An introduction to the "ends of justice"

By its express language, § 1965(b)-whether used as a venue or
jurisdictional provision-can be applied only when the "ends of justice" so require.'78 Although the "ends of justice" test was intended to
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
Id. at 952-53.
Id.
See supra note 144 (discussing rules of statutory construction).
See supra note 87 (concerning § 1965(c), which governs subpoenas issued by the
U.S. government).

177. See supra section III.B.2.
178. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b); Anchor Glass Container Corp. v. Stand Energy Corp., 711 F.
Supp. 325, 330 (S.D. Miss. 1989)(concluding that "section 1965(b) effectively oper-

ates as a waiver of the applicable venue requirements if the 'ends ofjustice' so
require"). See also United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa
Nostra, 695 F. Supp. 1426, 1431 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Goldwater v. Alston & Bird, 664
F. Supp. 403, 408 (S.D. Ill. 1986); Miller Brewing Co. v. Landau, 616 F. Supp.

1285, 1290 (E.D. Wis. 1985); Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1087-88
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limit nationwide venue and jurisdiction,17 9 as Professor Robert
BlakeylSO wrote in 1980:
Section 1965(b) is one of the most potentially far-reaching procedural devices of the RICO statute. It authorizes the court, if the interests of justice
require, to serve and join parties over whom the court would not ordinarily
have personal jurisdiction and where venue would normally be improper. The
suit need only be brought in a proper court for at least one defendant. Section
then authorizes "other parties" to be joined and brought before the
1965(b)
18 1
court.

82
Although some courts have adopted Blakey's broad reading,1
other courts have been more restrained,-s3 while still others attempt
to avoid the "ends of justice" analysis if at all possible. 8 4 Because
courtsl 8 5 have not agreed on a uniform standard about when the
"ends of justice" require or allow them to exercise venue and personal

179.
180.

181.
182.
183.
184.

185.

(D. Del. 1984).
As one court explained:
The venue provisions found in RICO balance two policy concerns. The
first concern is the traditional one that a defendant should not be unfairly inconvenienced by a plaintiffs choice of forum. The second concern
is that a RICO conspiracy should be tried as a whole, with all defendants
before one court, whenever possible. Section 1965(b) strikes a balance
between these two policy concerns by giving the court discretion to bring
all defendants into a single district when the "ends of justice" require
such action.
Southmark Prime Plus, L.P. v. Falzone, 768 F. Supp. 487, 490-91 (D. Del.
1991)(footnotes omitted). For a discussion about what the "ends of justice"
means-or should mean-see infra section IV.
See supra text accompanying notes 153 & 155.
See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 42, at 1009 (author's biographical note); Fred
Strasser, RICO and the Man: "Dr.Frankenstein"Tirelessly Pushes a Monster of a
Law, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 20, 1989, at 1 (tracing Prof. Blakey's career and involvement with and interest in the RICO statute and designating him as "RICO's chief
spokesman"). Dick Goldberg, Profile: G. Robert Blakey, LA. DAILY J., Aug. 28,
1989, at 1 (stating: "If RICO is Jaws, the Great White of anti-crime legislation,
then Blakey is Capt. Quint, who tracks the predator and keeps it in a state of
controlled fury"). In 1970, Blakey served as Chief Counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures. See id. This
was the subcommittee responsible for holding hearings on the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970. See 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4012 (tracing the history of
Senate Bill 30).
Blakey & Gettings, supra note 42, at 1039 (citations omitted and emphasis
added).
See supra note 130 and accompanying text. See also supra section III.B.2.a.
See supra note 131. See also supra section III.B.2.b.
The following courts seemingly attempted to avoid an "ends of justice" analysis.
See, e.g., R.C.M. Executive Gallery Corp. v. ROLS Capital Co., 93 Civ. 8571
(LMM), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11252 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1994); Goldwater v. Alston & Bird, 664 F. Supp. 403 (S.D. M1l.1986).
Although state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear federal RICO matters,
see Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 457 (1990), this Article is limited to federal
courts' interpretations of 18 U.S.C. § 1965.
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jurisdiction over RICO defendants,86 confusion has reigned and has
permitted plaintiffs' attorneys to manipulate and misuse the statute
by forum shopping and selecting forums with which some defendants
have no contacts.1 8 7 This problem is compounded by the fact that,
when attempting to attack the plaintiffs misuse of § 1965(b), the normal weapons-motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2)l8S or Rule
12(b)(3)1sg-are sometimes ineffective, because courts typically will
not analyze the substantive RICO allegations,190 which often reflect
that the one claim that caused the defendants to be haled into the
forum is deficient.
B. Current Status
As one court observed in 1985, "the standards for determining
whether an 'ends of justice' finding should be made have not been well
defined."191 Over a decade later, this statement still rings true.
Courts have not developed a uniform test for determining whether the
"ends of justice" require that venue or personal jurisdiction be exercised over a particular RICO defendant.
Two factors upon which many courts agree are that § 1965(b) cannot be triggered unless (1) at least one RICO defendantl92 is amenable
to venue under § 1965(a) or § 1391 and (2) no other federal district
See infra notes 191-214 and accompanying text and supra note 14.
See infra section III.
See infra note 374 and accompanying text.
See infra note 375 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 675 (4th Cir. 1989)(explaining that
lower court should have resolved Rule 12(b)(2) challenge without regard to
whether the RICO claim was sufficiently well pleaded); Cote v. Wadel, 796 F.2d
981, 983 (7th Cir. 1986)(indicating that "[j]urisdictional rules should be as simple
as possible" and that judges should not waste time deciding whether the case
should have been brought); Ealing Corp. v. Harrods Ltd., 790 F.2d 978, 982 (1st
Cir. 1986)(refusing to consider merits of claims under a Rule 12(b)(2) motion).
But see Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 128586 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1977)(stating that when the jurisdictional facts are "intertwined with the merits" of the action, determining the jurisdictional issue may
determine the merits of the action).
191. Miller Brewing Co. v. Landau, 616 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (E.D. Wis. 1985). Accord
Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 538-39 (9th Cir.
1986)(lamenting that "[tihe term 'ends of justice' does not have an ordinary and
unambiguous meaning"); S.D. Warren Co. v. Engelman, No. 87-8339, 1988 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10474, *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 1988)(also noting that the standards
"are not well-defined"). See also Preway Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., No. 85-C-645C (W.D. Wis. Feb. 27, 1986)(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file)(remarking that
"[tihe phrase 'ends of justice' is very broad and undefined").
192. If proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), where the enterprise cannot be a defendant, the court's ability to exercise jurisdiction and venue over the alleged RICO
enterprise should not be considered. Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc. v. Charles Schmitt
& Co., 657 F. Supp. 1040, 1043 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:476

court can exercise venue or jurisdiction over all RICO defendants.1 993
Courts use these factors to close a potential "jurisdictional gap"1 4
that would require the same RICO action to be tried piecemeal in several judicial districts. Likewise, courts use these factors to implement
Congress's intent that at least one federal district court have personal
jurisdiction over everyone connected with an alleged RICO enterprise
or conspiracy. 19 5
Some courts have rejected96 or ignoredL97 these two factors, while
193. See, e.g., Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 539 (9th
Cir. 1986); Magic Toyota, Inc. v. Southeast Toyota Distrib., Inc., 784 F. Supp. 306,
311-12 (D.S.C. 1992); Southmark Prime Plus, L.P. v. Falzone, 768 F. Supp. 487,
491 (D. Del. 1991); Shuman v. Computer Assocs. Intl, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 114, 118
(E.D. Pa. 1991); Johnson v. Investacorp, Inc., No. 3-89-2607-H, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2576, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 1990); Staff Builders of Philadelphia, Inc.
v. Koschitzki, No. 88-6103, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9837, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17,
1989); Lentz v. Woolley, No. 89-0805-JGD, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12651, at *14
(C.D. Cal. June 12, 1989); Anchor Glass Container Corp. v. Stand Energy Corp.,
711 F. Supp. 325, 331 (S.D. Miss. 1989); S.D. Warren Co. v. Engelman, No. 878339, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10474, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 1988); Marshall v.
Q-L Inv., Inc., No. 3-87-3068-H, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18537, at *5 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 4, 1988); Does v. Republic Health Corp., 669 F. Supp. 1511, 1517-18 (D. Nev.
1987); Rolls-Royce Motors, Inc. v. Charles Schmitt & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1040, 1058
n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Shulton, Inc. v. Optel Corp., No. 85-2925, 1986 WL 15617,
at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 1986); Ash v. Wallenmeyer, No. 85-C-8557 (N.D. IM.Sept.
17, 1986)(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file); Miller Brewing Co. v. Landau, 616
F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (E.D. Wis. 1985); Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc.,
590 F. Supp. 1453, 1459 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 832 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1987);
Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1088 (D. Del. 1984); Farmers Bank of
Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 577 F. Supp. 34, 35 (D. Del. 1978); Farmers Bank of
Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1282 n.8 (D. Del. 1978).
194. In Shulton, Inc. v. Optel Corp., No. 85-2925, 1986 WL 15617, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept.
29, 1986), the court explained:
The requirement that the "ends of justice" be satisfied as a pre-requisite
to nation-wide service of process has been variously construed. Generally, however, the ends of justice requirement is fulfilled when venue is
properly laid in the district in question under section 1965(a) at least as
to one defendant, and there exists no other district in which venue would
be appropriate as to all defendants. The rationale for allowing nationwide service of process in such circumstances is to avoid a 'jurisdictional
gap", in which no single court could obtain jurisdiction in personam over
all defendants. The "ends ofjustice" provision furthers the congressional
purpose of "eradicat[ing organized crime in this country" by enabling
plaintiffs "to bring all members of a nationwide RICO conspiracy before
a court in a single trial," without unnecessarily sacrificing any defendant's interest in having the action litigated in a forum convenient to it.
(Citations omitted.).
195. See, e.g., Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988); Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv.,
Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1986); Ginsburg v. Faragalli, 776 F. Supp. 806,
808 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
196. See, e.g., Monarch Normandy Square Partners v. Normandy Square Assocs. Ltd.
Partnership, 817 F. Supp. 899, 905 (D. Kan. 1993)(retaining venue "[dlespite the
fact that venue would appear to be proper in the Central District of California").
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others have added factors to the "ends of justice" inquiry.19 8 Among
the additional factors offered for consideration-either in addition to
or in place of the other two factors-are:
" Whether the defendants participated in a nationwide RICO conspiracy. 19 9
" How much time
has been expended in litigating the RICO claim in the cur20 0
rent forum.
" Whether dismissal or transfer would greatly
delay a resolution or would
20
cause extreme prejudice to the plaintiff.

2 02
* The defendant's contacts with the forum.

197. See, e.g., Northern Trust Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., No. 94-C-4045, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15730, at *11 (N.D. IMl. Oct. 28, 1994)(failing to consider whether all
RICO defendants could be sued in one forum); R.C.M. Executive Gallery Corp. v.
ROLS Capital Co., 93-Civ.-8571 (LAM), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11252, at *6-7
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1994)(same); American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Int'l Importing Enters., Ltd., 755 F. Supp. 1292, 1305 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Leavey v. Blinder,
Robinson & Co., No. 85-7018, 1986 WL10556, at *8 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 1986).
In addition, a few courts have exercised venue or jurisdiction under § 1965(b)
without disclosing their reasons for doing so. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Alston &
Bird, 664 F. Supp. 403, 408 (S.D. Ill. 1986).
198. See infra notes 199-214 and accompanying text.
199. See Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir.
1986).
200. See, e.g., Monarch Normandy Square Partners v. Normandy Square Assocs. Ltd.
Partnership, 817 F. Supp. 899, 905 (D. Kan. 1993); American Trade Partners,
L.P. v. A-1 Intl Importing Enters., Ltd., 757 F. Supp. 545, 556 n.16 (E.D. Pa.
1991); American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Int'l Importing Enters., Ltd., 755 F.
Supp. 1292, 1304-05 (E.D. Pa. 1990)(concluding that "section 1965(b) would permit this court to host this action against Santangelo because the 'ends of justice'
require it. This is so, despite the fact that the Southern District of New York
would also be an appropriateforum to hear this case. Were I to transfer this case,
already five months old and laboring with delay, to the New York court, further
delay would necessarily ensue. Moreover, the proceedings here have advanced
considerably and it would be an enormous waste of time and resources of both the
court and the parties to transfer this case to New York. Santangelo, and the
other defendants, have been well represented here and I do not see why that will
not continue. I recognize that New York is, perhaps, a more convenient forum for
Santangelo and his co-defendants, however, their gain pales in comparison to the
harm that would be suffered by ATP upon such a transfer." (footnote and citations omitted; emphasis added)); Leavey v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., No. 85-7018,
1986 WL10556, at *8 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 1986). See also Miller Brewing Co. v.
Landau, 616 F. Supp. 1285, 1290-91 (E.D. Wis. 1985)(noting that if § 1965(b)
were the only way to establish venue, the ends ofjustice would be met because of
the months of delay that would result from transferring the case).
201. See Miller Brewing Co. v. Landau, 616 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (E.D. Wis. 1985)(noting that it need not reach the § 1965(b) analysis because all RICO defendants
were subject to venue under 1965(a), but commenting that "[wihile this fact militates against making an 'ends ofjustice' finding under § 1965(b), the Court opines
that it should not be the sole consideration, especially where transferring the
case would result in extraordinary delay or some other extreme prejudice against
the plaintiffs interests"). Accord Preway Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., No. 85-C645-C (W.D. Wis. Feb. 26, 1986)(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file).
202. See Preway Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., No. 85-C-645-C (W.D. Wis. Feb. 26,
1986)(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file).
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o Actions of alleged co-conspirators that occurred within the forum.
o The number of RICO defendants amenable to venue and jurisdiction in the

district weighed against the number not amenable to venue and jurisdiction
in the district.204
o Whether the plaintiff has stated a valid RICO claim against the
20 5
defendants.
o The distance between the current forum and any proposed, alternative
forum.

20 6

o Which district has the greatest contacts with the RICO claim.

20 7

203. See American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Int'l Importing Enters., Ltd., 757 F.
Supp. 545, 556 n.16 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
204. See, e.g., Morin v. Trupin, 747 F. Supp. 1051, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Mylan Lab.,
Inc. v. Akzo, No. 89-1671, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3521, at *33-34 (D.D.C. Mar. 26,
1990); Anchor Glass Container Corp. v. Stand Energy Corp., 711 F. Supp. 325,
331 (S.D. Miss. 1989)(refusing to invoke § 1965(b) when only one of three defendants was amenable to venue and jurisdiction in the forum); Wood v. Barnette,
Inc., 648 F. Supp. 936, 939 (E.D. Va. 1986)(transferring case, even though one
defendant was subject to venue under § 1965(b), because three others lived in
another district); Payne v. Marketing Showcase, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 656, 659 (N.D.
Ill. 1985)(transferring case because only one of seven RICO defendants was amenable to venue under § 1965(a)). See also VMS/PCA Ltd. Partnership v. PCA
Partners Ltd. Partnership, 727 F. Supp. 1167, 1173 (N.D. Ill. 1989)(finding that
the "ends of justice" were met since venue was proper over four of the five
defendants).
205. See, e.g., FDIC v. Renda, No. 85-2216-0, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8305, at *24-25
(D. Kan. Aug. 6, 1987). Some courts have evaluated defendants' Rule 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss to avoid having to address the venue and jurisdictional issues.
The following courts were faced with motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and
Rule 12(b)(2) or Rule 12(b)(3) and dismissed the RICO claim under Rule 12(b)(6),
thus avoiding the jurisdictional and venue issues. See Ogilvie v. Beale, No. 93-C2934, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1123, at *6-15 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 1994). See also Mulhern v. West Coast Video Enters., Inc., Nos. 90-C-0471 & 91-C-0711, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8275, at *13 (N.D. Il. June 15, 1992)(addressing Rule 12(b)(6) motion first, but later addressing Rule 12(b)(2) motion because the RICO claim survived the Rule 12(b)(6) challenge); Smith v. Mark Twain Bancshares, No. 844282-S (D. Kan. Aug. 11, 1986)(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file).
206. See United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, 695 F.
Supp. 1426, 1431 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)(concluding that the ends ofjustice require the
court to exercise venue because venue as to the other defendants in the forum is
proper and it would not be overly inconvenient for the defendant, a New Jersey
resident, to try the case in New York). See also Abeloffv. Barth, 119 F.R.D. 315,
329-30 (D. Mass. 1988)(holding that "the requirements of the ends of justice
would, in certain circumstances, permit the assertion of venue over some of the
defendants in a RICO count pursuant to § 1965(b) even though venue as to all
defendants would lie in another district. However, the availability of a nearby
forum in which venue would exist for all defendants in the RICO count in the
instant case prevents the invocation of § 1965(b) in the absence of some countervailing extraordinary circumstances which are not present in the instant case."
(emphasis added)(citation omitted)).
207. See Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1088 (D. Del. 1984). Contra Shulton, Inc. v. Optel Corp., No. 85-2925, 1986 WL 15617, at *26 n.3 (D.N.J. Sept. 29,
1986)("[r]equiring a plaintiff to anticipate a court's view of the one, most convenient forum in which to pursue a RICO claim, particularly in the case of a complex, nationwide conspiracy, prior to any discovery of the defendant, will
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" Whether the defendants are
subject to venue on other causes of action al208
leged in the same lawsuit.

the allegedly improper conduct occurred. 20 9
21 0
" Where the majority of witnesses and evidence are located.
21
'
are
pending.
cases
related
or
similar
factually
" Where
" Which state's law will govern any supplemental claims. 2 12
" Whether the prejudice to the defendant in having to defend in the forum is
outweighed by
the prejudice to the plaintiff in having the case dismissed or
2 13
transferred.
2 14
" General concerns about judicial economy.
" Where

208.

209.

210.
211.

212.
213.
214.

invariably result in a number of wrong guesses and an uneconomical overuse of
the case transferring mechanism provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1404"); Farmers Bank of
Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 577 F. Supp. 34, 35 (D. Del. 1978).
See Southmark Prime Plus, L.P. v. Falzone, 768 F. Supp. 487, 491 (D. Del.
1991)(explaining that the RICO defendants would not be inconvenienced if the
court exercised jurisdiction under § 1965(b) because, among other things, venue
was proper under other counts in the same lawsuit; thus, defendants would have
to appear before the court anyway).
See Wood v. Barnette, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 936, 939 (E.D. Va. 1986)(noting, as one
factor in its ends of justice analysis, that the plaintiffs claims arose in another
district); Leavey v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., No. 85-7018, 1986 WL 10556, at *8
n.2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 1986)(stating "itihe fraudulent claim arose here and the
ends ofjustice so require venue in this district"). ContraBernstein v. IDT Corp.,
582 F. Supp. 1079, 1088 (D. Del. 1984)(indicating that where the plaintiffs claim
arose should not be part of the "ends of justice" analysis).
See Walters v. Beavers, No. 89-696-JJF, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1432, at *18 (D.
Del. Feb. 6, 1991); Wood v. Barnette, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 936, 939 (E.D. Va. 1986).
See Wood v. Barnette, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 936, 940 (E.D. Va. 1986). Cf Welch
Foods, Inc. v. Packer, No. 93-CV-0811E(F), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16974, at *11
(W.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 1994)(explaining that "[alithough related cases are currently
venued in this Court, such does not outweigh the fact that all of the defendants
and most of the witnesses are located in the Western District of Michigan").
See Walters v. Beavers, No. 89-696-JJF, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1432, at *18 (D.
Del. Feb. 6, 1991).
See Preway Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., No. 85-C-645-C (W.D. Wis. Feb. 26,
1986)(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file).
See Southmark Prime Plus, L.P. v. Falzone, 768 F. Supp. 487, 492 (D. Del.
1991)(indicating that one factor the court should consider when conducting an
"ends of justice" analysis under § 1965(b) is "judicial economy"; "judicial economy" would involve considerations such as whether the RICO claim was factually
intertwined with the other causes of action alleged, whether other defendants
have consented to venue in the forum with regard to the RICO claim, and
whether two courts will have to hear essentially the same case). See also Collins
v. Polk, 115 F.R.D. 326, 327 (M.D. La. 1987)(concluding that the ends of justice
required court to assert venue over all defendants because "[t]he facts pertaining
to this case are so interwoven that the Court believes that any attempt to try this
case in two districts would only cause piecemeal litigation and needless waste of
costs, expenses, and judicial resources" (from the unpublished portion of the opinion found at No. 85-1165-B, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3200, at *4 (M.D. La. Apr. 16,
1987)); Brooks v. Elliott, No. 85-2206-S (D. Kan. Oct. 15, 1985)(LEXIS, Genfed
library, Courts file)(exercising venue as to some defendants under § 1965(b) because venue was proper over some defendants and "[i]n the interests of judicial
economy and for the convenience of all parties involved, the action should be tried
in one court"); Farmers Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 577 F. Supp. 34, 35
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Unfortunately, because these factors have been applied by only a few
courts on an ad hoc basis, they have not been incorporated into the
"ends of justice" analysis conducted by most courts.
Finally, some courts have rejected certain factors advanced by
plaintiffs seeking to maintain venue or jurisdiction in their home forum. In one case, the court rejected the plaintiffs' four-part argument
that (1) the defendants would experience no substantial hardship in
defending the case in the forum, (2) the defendants would have to
come to the forum to testify anyway, (3) the defendants "were horrible
people who have committed horrible acts in violation of the RICO statute," and (4) the plaintiffs should not be forced to pursue their action
outside their home state.2 15 Labeling the plaintiffs' test "too broad,"
the court focused its attention on the availability of an alternative forum, and, finding that one did indeed exist, refused to exercise personal jurisdiction over the RICO defendants.216
In another case, the RICO defendants filed a motion to transfer
venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 from the federal district court in Delaware to the federal district court in North Dakota.217 The plaintiffs
encouraged the Delaware court to exercise venue over the RICO defendants under § 1965 and opposed the transfer because, in their opinion, "they would be unable to receive a fair trial in North Dakota
because of the popularity of some of the people who will necessarily be
implicated in this litigation." 218 The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments because they failed "to acknowledge the integrity of the federal system"2 19 and because plaintiffs did not show they could not
receive a fair trial in a North Dakota federal court. 220
The lack of commonly-accepted standards has resulted in factually
similar cases being decided differently22. and has only emboldened

plaintiffs to add RICO causes when they otherwise might not have.
Therefore, the time has come for courts to develop and consistently
apply new and separate "ends of justice" tests in the personal jurisdiction 2 22 and venue 22 3 contexts.
(D.Del. 1978).
215. Magic Toyota, Inc. v. Southeast Toyota Distrib., Inc., 784 F. Supp. 306, 311
(D.S.C. 1992).
216. Id. at 311-12.
217. Walters v. Beavers, No. 89-696-JJF, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1432, at *3 (D.Del.
Feb. 6, 1991).
218. Id. at *17.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Compare Leavey v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., No. 85-7018, 1986 WL 10556, at *8
n.2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 1986) with Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1088
(D.Del. 1984).
222. See infra section IV.C.I.b; infra App. 1.
223. See infra section IV.C.C; infra App. 2.
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C. Proposed Tests
1. Jurisdiction
Under RICO, the term "ends of justice" does not mean "the ends of
due process." If the statute is interpreted to mean that jurisdiction
under § 1965(b) extends to the ends of Fifth Amendment Due Process,
then the phrase "ends of justice" would be rendered mere surplusage.
Had Congress not included the "ends of justice" language, a case for

unfettered nationwide jurisdiction might be made. 224 However, Con-

gress did add the words-and since the concept of nationwide jurisdiction predates the RICO statute 22 5-it is reasonable to assume that
Congress intended to place some limits on when a federal court could
exercise personal jurisdiction over a RICO defendant.
At a minimum, therefore, federal courts must engage in a due process analysis that includes more than an examination of whether the
RICO defendant has contacts with the United States. 226 Due process
under the Fifth Amendment-just like due process under the Fourteenth Amendment-includes selecting a fair forum. On the other
hand, courts should not overlook Congress's intent that at least one
jurisdiction over all
federal district court should be able to exercise
22 7
alleged RICO defendants in a single case.
a. A survey of fairness tests
Given these competing interests-fairness and congressional intent-courts faced with a RICO jurisdiction problem should apply an
enhanced version of the "basic fairness standard." Under the basic
fairness standard, "mere contact with the nation as a whole may not
satisfy Fifth Amendment Due Process. On the other hand, contact
with the state in which the federal court sits is not required."2 28 This
224. See, e.g., Casad,supranote 134, at 1596 (arguing "nationwide jurisdiction should
be extended to all federal question cases in federal courts").
225. The concept was approved by the Supreme Court at least as early as 1946. See
supra note 140.
226. The Supreme Court has not determined whether or how the Fifth Amendment's
Due-Process Clause limits a federal court's exercise of personal jurisdiction in
federal-question cases. 4 WmiGHT & MILLER, supra note 23, § 1067.1, at 305-06
(1987). In dicta, the Supreme Court has noted that "Congress could provide for
service of process anywhere in the United States." Mississippi Publishing Corp.
v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946). This case, however, did not squarely address limitations on federal court's jurisdiction in the Fifth Amendment context.
Stephens, supra note 132, at 706-07. In two recent cases, the Court explicitly
declined to decide whether national contacts are adequate for the exercise of personal jurisdiction in federal-question cases. See Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf
Wolff& Co., 484 U.S. 97,102 n.5 (1987); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court
of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)(plurality opinion).
227. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
228. Casad,supra note 134, at 1601.
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standard, as its name implies, recognizes that a principal concern in
personal jurisdiction analysis should be fairness, not territorial sovereignty. 22 9 This view was espoused by the United States Supreme
Court23o when, in a diversity case, 23 1 it emphasized that fairness, not
sovereignty, is now the paramount concern in personal jurisdiction

analysis.232
The case most frequently associated with the basic fairness standard is Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp.233 In Oxford
First,individual and corporate defendants were served with process in
California by a Pennsylvania-based finance corporation in a suit concerning the 1934 Securities Exchange Act234 and related state-law
229. Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 200 (E.D. Pa.
1974).
230. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694 (1982).
231. This discussion of personal jurisdiction arose in the context of a diversity dispute
in a diversity-jurisdiction case. A Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in the Republic of Guinea filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania against many foreign insurance companies. Some insurers filed Rule 12(b)(2) motions to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. After the insurers repeatedly failed to submit discovery responses
concerning their Pennsylvania-based activities, the district court, using Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 37(b)(2)(A), ruled as a sanction that the insurers
were subject to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. Id. at 696-98. The
Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's action. Id. at 709.
232. The Court stated:
The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows ... from
the Due Process Clause. The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of
individual liberty. Thus, the test for personal jurisdiction requires that
"the maintenance of the suit... not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.'"
Id. at 702-03 (footnote omitted). Accord Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S.
770, 781 (1984)(Brennan, J., concurring)(reiterating the Court's position in Insurance Corp. of Ireland that the personal jurisdiction limitation on judicial power
exists to protect defendants' liberty interests, not state sovereignty). The
Supreme Court's rejection of the sovereignty test is significant because it formed
the basis for the national contacts test. Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 332
(7th Cir. 1979).
233. 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Other courts that have applied this or a similar
fairness test include Willingway Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio,
870 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (S.D. Ga. 1994); Nieves v. Houston Indus., Inc., 771 F.
Supp. 159, 160 (M.D. La. 1991); Duckworth v. Medical Electro-Therapeutics, Inc.,
768 F. Supp. 822, 830 (S.D. Ga. 1991)(applying a "new national contacts test"
that incorporates the Oxford Firstfactors); U.S. Telecom, Inc. v. Hubert, 678 F.
Supp. 1500, 1507-08 (D. Kan. 1987); Smith v. Pittsburg Nat'l Bank, 674 F. Supp.
542, 544-45 (W.D. Va. 1987); GRM v. Equine Inv. & Management Group, 596 F.
Supp. 307, 314 (S.D. Tex. 1984); Fulk v. Bagley, 88 F.R.D. 153, 167 (M.D.N.C.
1980). Accord Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816, 827 (6th Cir.
1981)(Keith, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982).
234. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994).
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tort claims.2 35 The defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of

personal jurisdiction. 2 36 Citing the Supreme Court's holding in InternationalShoe v. Washington,23 7 the defendants argued that the court
could not exercise personal jurisdiction over them because they did not
have the minimum contacts with the district needed to satisfy due
process. 2 38 The court then posed and tried to answer the following
question: "Are there due process limitations upon the congressional
grant of (nationwide) extra-territorial service of process under the Securities Acts?"239

After examining competing views concerning what constitutional
limits, if any, constrain personal jurisdiction in federal-question
cases, 2 40 the court explained why it was not satisfied with either prevailing perspective:
Even though we are not persuaded that federal service of process statutes
are constrained by constitutional due process strictures as defined by International Shoe, we believe that the federal extraterritorial service power is not
unlimited, and that some limitations thereon must be imposed. But we believe that it is better to include the traditional due process notions as a part of
a judicial fairness test, rather than impose the InternationalShoe mandate of
due process on federal nationwide service of process statutes. While the underlying elements of procedural due process still should be applied, they
should not outweigh all other elements of the fairness test, as they might
if
2 41
the only test for in personarnjurisdiction were a strict constitutional one.

The Oxford Firstcourt then articulated a "fairness test,"24 2 which

urged courts in nationwide service-of-process cases to examine the following elements, in the following order:
(1) 'iTihe extent 2of4 the
defendant's contacts with the place where the action
3
was brought."
235. Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 192-93 (E.D.Pa.
1974).
236. Id. at 192.
237. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
238. Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 196 (E.D. Pa.
1974). The defendants also challenged the plaintiffs' argument that "the 1934
Exchange Act, which provides that a combination of proper venue with extraterritorial service of process can fulfill the statutory requirements for in personam
jurisdiction." Id. (footnote omitted). The court concluded that "venue properly
lies in this court." Id. at 198.
239. Id. (initial capital letters omitted to enhance readability).
240. Id. at 198-203. For two competing views regarding personal jurisdiction in RICO
cases, see supra notes section III(B)(2).
241. Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 203 (E.D. Pa.
1974)(footnote omitted).
242. Id. at 203-04.
243. Id. at 203. The court referred to this element as "the InternationalShoe type
criteria." Id. In InternationalShoe, the Supreme Court held that due process
requires that a defendant "have certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). It is important to note that
Oxford Firstrejects the state contacts approach. 372 F. Supp. 191, 199-201 (E.D.
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(2) "[I]nconvenience to the defendant in having to defend in a jurisdiction
other than his residence
or place of business."244
2 45
(3) Judicial economy.

(4) "[T]he probable situs of the discovery proceedings in the case and the extent to which the discovery proceedings will... take place outside the
state of defendant's residence or place of business, thus muting the signifi2 46
cance of his claim that he is inconvenienced by the distant forum."
(5) "[Tlhe nature of the regulated activity in question and the extent of impact
have beyond the borders of his state of resithat defendant's activities
247
dence or business."

A more recent case applying the fairness test adopted the Oxford
2 48
Firstfactors as the second-prong of its two-prong jurisdictional test.
In Duckworth v. Medical Electro-Therapeutics,Inc.,249 Georgia residents sued Tennessee residents in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Georgia for allegedly violating section 10b of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and for related state-law tort
claims. 250 The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and, in the alternative, requested a transfer under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) to the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee.

2 51

The plaintiffs' complaint indicated that defendants were served
with process under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa,2 52 which provides for nationwide
service in civil actions to enforce the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934. Realizing that the Supreme Court in Insurance Corp. ofIreland
v. Compagnie des Bauxites2 53 had cast doubt on a strict national con-

244.

245.

246.

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Pa. 1974). See Smith v. Pittsburg Nat'l Bank, 674 F. Supp. 542, 545 (W.D. Va.
1987).
Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 203 (E.D. Pa.
1974). The court indicated that "[slubsidiary considerations" under this element
"might include the nature, extent, and interstate character of the defendant's
business, the defendant's access to counsel" in the forum, and the distance of the
forum from the defendant's residence or place of business. Id.
Id. "In particular, a court should gauge: (a) the potentiality and extent of any
adverse impact upon the litigation that may result from having a part of the action sheared off; and (b) the prospect of duplication of effort by counsel and the
courts in conducting two parts of the same lawsuit in different jurisdictions at the
same time." Id. In the enhanced fairness test proposed below, these two considerations would be addressed in an added prong. See infra text accompanying
note 303.
Id. at 203-04. Although not explicitly stated by the court, this element would
include an examination of where the witnesses, documents, and other potentially-relevant evidence might be located.
Id. at 247
Duckworth v. Medical Electro-Therapeutics, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 822 (S.D. Ga.
1991).
Id.
Id. at 825.
Id. at 825-26.
Id. at 826.
456 U.S. 694 (1982).

1996]

CIVL RICO

527

tacts test, the court developed its own test to determine whether it
could properly exercise personal jurisdiction.254 The test combined
the national contacts approach and the fairness test articulated in Ox5
ford First:2 5
First, the Court must determine whether the defendant "purposefully availed"
itself of the protection of the federal law. In other words, do the requisite
national contacts exist? This test will be easily met in most cases. Then, the
defendant will have the opportunity to establish a compelling case that exercisingjurisdiction would not offend "notions offair play or substantial justice."
To determine whether the defendant has met his burden under the second
prong of this test, the Court will consider those factors identified by the Oxford Firstcourt: the defendant's contacts with the forum, inconvenience to the
defendant, judicial economy, probable situs of discovery proceedings, and the
nature of the regulated activity. The Oxford Firststandard reflects
2 56 the underlying rationale of personal jurisdiction: fundamental fairness.

A third fairness-test case emphasized that the service-of-process
2 7
analysis should be separate from the personal jurisdiction analysis. 5
In Willingway Hospital,Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio,258 a
Georgia hospital sued an Ohio insurance company in a Georgia state
court. 2 59 The defendant removed the case to the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Southern District of Georgia, asserting federalquestion jurisdiction under the ERISA statute. 2 60 Acknowledging
that due process is a primary concern in the personal jurisdiction
analysis,261 the court asserted that its purpose was to create a modified analysis "so that the distinction between personal jurisdiction and
service of process is preserved and to ensure the due process require2 62
ments are met."
The court explained that "[c]orrectly characterizing 'nationwide
service of process' is at the heart of our inquiry."2 63 Elaborating, the
court observed:
This concept is open to a multitude of interpretations. On one extreme, nationwide service simply connotes a party's amenability to be served with the
judicial process or papers anywhere they might be found in the country. On
254. Duckworth v. Medical Electro-Therapeutics, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 822, 827-30 (S.D.
Ga. 1991). The court also noted that "it seems unfair in many instances to require someone to defend in a distant forum merely because he is a United States
citizen or corporation doing business in the United States." Id. at 830.
255. Id.
256. Id. (citations omitted).
257. Willingway Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio, 870 F. Supp. 1102,
1104 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1103.
260. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461).
261. Id. at 1104-05 (reviewing Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit, and Southern District of Georgia cases discussing limits on personal jurisdiction in federal-question cases).
262. Id. at 1106.
263. Id.
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the other extreme, this nationwide service of process incorporates personal
jurisdiction. Under this latter interpretation some courts have melded the
two concepts together.... If one is served under a nationwide service of process provision, under this interpretation of service of process, personal jurisdiction is automatically exercised.
This latter approach, which divorces due process from personal jurisdiction
inquiries, affords plaintiffs inordinate flexibility and does not provide enough
due process protection for the defendants. As the Supreme Court held in Ireland2 64 and reaffirmed in Omni,2 6 5 personal jurisdiction has its origins in
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. To allow Congress to dictate
personal jurisdiction through the enactment of nationwide service of process
provisions, unquestioned by the judiciary is nonsensical. "If due process is to
have any application at all in federal cases-and the Fifth Amendment requires that it does-it seems impossible that Congress could empower a plaintiff to force a defendant to litigate any claim, no matter how trifling, in
whatever forum
the plaintiff chooses, regardless of the burden on the
66
defendant."2

The Willingway Hospital court then proceeded to apply an analysis
similar to that applied in Duckworth.267
264. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694 (1982).
265. Omni Capital Intl, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987).
266. Willingway Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio, 870 F. Supp. 1102,
1106 (S.D. Ga. 1994)(citations omitted and emphasis added; quoting 4 WPUGHT &
MILLER, supra note 23, § 1067.1, at 328-29 (1987)).
267. Willingway Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio, 870 F. Supp. 1102,
1107 (S.D. Ga. 1994). The court then explained that although courts in federalquestion cases have most often conducted their due process inquiries under the
Fifth Amendment, as opposed to the Fourteenth Amendment, "there is little
agreement on the scope of the Fifth Amendment analysis that should be applied."
Id. at 1107. Rejecting one line of cases holding that if proper notice of the lawsuit
is given, due process for personal jurisdiction purposes is also established, the
court stated that the opposing line of "fairness test" cases, such as Oxford First,
offer "a far more palatable alternative" because they "acknowledge the full reach
of the Fifth Amendment's Due-Process Clause and require that certain minimum
contacts be present before personal jurisdiction is exercised." The court went on
to observe that other courts adopting the fairness test tend to apply the International Shoe minimum contacts analysis, but not as rigorously as they should. Id.
The Willingway Hospital court then unveiled its own fairness test. First, the
court should determine whether the governing statute authorizes nationwide service of process and, if so, whether the service provision also addresses personal
jurisdiction. Id. If the statute does not expressly authorize nationwide service,
then, under the Supreme Court's holding in Omni Capital,the court should apply
the long-arm statute of the state in which it sits. Id. at 1107-08. However, if the
statute does authorize nationwide service, then the court must next determine
whether the process provision mentions personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1108. If the
provision does address personal jurisdiction, then the provision should be followed. Id. If the service provision does not mention personal jurisdiction, then
the appropriate long-arm statute should be used because "[tihis is the only outcome that acknowledges the distinction between personal jurisdiction and service
of process." Id.
Finally, a fairness analysis, based in Fifth Amendment Due-Process principles, must be conducted. Id. This fairness test should comport with the International Shoe standards. Id. "This," explained the court, "adds one more layer to
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Leading commentators also support applying a fairness test in federal-question cases, even when the federal statute at issue includes a
nationwide service provision. 2 6s Professors Charles Alan Wright and
Arthur R. Miller, for example, concluded that "[t]he better view...
would require that the national contacts test be supplemented by
some assurances that the particular choice of forum will be one that is
fair to the defendant."269 Acknowledging concerns that imposing a
fairness test as part of the due-process inquiry when process is served
under a federal statute that authorizes nationwide service may undercut the effectiveness of such statutes, 2 70 they concluded that such concerns "may be an over-reaction."2 71 "The fairness test . . . takes
account of a broad range of factors-most notably federal social policies and the interests of the judicial system in the efficient resolution
of controversies-and thus can accommodate many, if not all, existing
federal statutes. 2 72 Moreover, they emphasized that "Congress cannot legislate away a defendant's due process rights.273 Professors
Wright and Miller described their fairness approach to the national
contacts test as follows:
[A] court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant served under a federal
nationwide service statute if the defendant has minimum contacts with the
United States and maintenance of the suit would not offend fair play and substantial justice. Thus, jurisdiction may be upheld whenever the combination
of the federal interest in furthering fundamental social policies, the judicial

system's interest in the efficient resolution of controversies, the particular fo-

rum's interest in adjudicating the dispute, and the plaintiffs interest in ob-

taining convenient
and effective relief outweigh the burden on the
2 74
defendant.

Professor Maryellen Fullerton, in her frequently-cited 1984 article
entitled ConstitutionalLimits on Nationwide PersonalJurisdictionin
the Federal Courts,275 constructed a thorough fairness test with two
primary parts. "First, the court should appraise the burden that the
location of litigation imposes on the individual defendant."276 This
first factor includes two inquiries: inconvenience to the defendant and
the subjective analysis that pervades any due process inquiry, but in doing so

ensures through this tailoring that defendants' due process rights are not unnecessarily trammeled." Id.

268. See, e.g., 4 WIGHr & AI=R, supra note 23, § 1067.1, at 327-28 (1987); Fullerton, supra note 132; Lusardi, supra note 132; Stephens, supra note 132; Gregoire, supra note 129.
269. 4 WIGHr & MlE=R, supra note 23, § 1067.1, at 325 (1987).
270. Id. § 1067.1, at 327.
271. Id. § 1067.1, at 327-28.
272. Id. § 1067.1, at 328.
273. Id. § 1067.1, at 331.

274. Id. (footnote omitted).
275. 79 N.W. U. L. REv. 1 (1984).
276. Id. at 39.
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the defendant's reasonable anticipation of litigation in the forum. 2 77
According to Professor Fullerton, the following, nonexhaustive list
of factors should be considered in determining inconvenience to the
defendant:
" Distance between the defendant's home or business and
the forum. 2 78
9
27
" Place where most of the discovery is likely to occur.
" Financial costs associated with long-distance litigation, including travel by
parties, witnesses, attorneys, and staff to and from the forum for court appearances, discovery, and other trial preparation; lodging and meals for
persons who must travel in connection with the litigation; transporting documents and witnesses; time the defendant and its staff must spend away
from work due to time consumed by travel;
missed business opportunities
28 0
at home; and retaining local counsel.
" Nonfinancial factors, such as witnesses outside of subpoena range who are
not willing to travel to the forum to testify at trial and potential third-party
defendants who are not subject to process in the forum. 28 1
" Subjective factors, such as difficulty selecting attorneys in a distant community, emotional stress caused 2by
travel, and the necessity of spending ex82

tended time away from home.

"

The defendant's financial resources. (However, "[tihe defendant's ability to
shoulder the added costs of distant
litigation should not be the sole criterion
283
...in determining fairness.")

In her discussion of reasonable anticipation of litigation in the fo-

rum, Fullerton rejected the national contacts test because "examining
a defendant's connection with the United States would be too lax a
measure for determining whether that defendant reasonably should
have anticipated litigation anywhere in the country."284 Instead, she
2 85
district contacts, 28 6
suggested three alternatives: state contacts,

and regional contacts, 28 7 and concluded that the regional contacts
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 41-42.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 44-49. This analysis focuses on the defendant's contacts within the state in
which the forum is based. Id. at 44.
286. Id. at 49-51. This analysis focuses on the defendant's contacts within the boundaries of the judicial district in which the action is filed. Id. at 49.
287. Id. at 51-55. Fullerton explained:
Under this approach, which takes a common sense view of the realities
of contemporary society and recognizes the increase in widespread commercial activity and in personal mobility, courts would evaluate the extent of the defendant's activity in the general region where the federal
court is located. Relying on public perception and economic and social
realities to define the pertinent region, courts could decide on a case-bycase basis whether the nature and quality of the defendant's activity in a
particular region make it reasonable to require a defendant to litigate
there. A regional approach would allow federal courts situated in a megalopolis to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants from the near-
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analysis "may be the most satisfactory approach" because it ignores
the amount of contem"artificial boundaries," but "accurately reflects
2 88
porary interstate commerce and travel."
Under Fullerton's second prong, "the court should consider the federal interests served by placing the suit at the site chosen by the
plaintiff."28 9 Agreeing with the position taken by Professors Wright
and Miller,290 Professor Fullerton acknowledged that "[diespite the
great inconvenience to a particular defendant and the fact that he
could not have anticipated being sued in the place chosen by the plaintiff, significant government interests may be furthered by allowing the
suit at the challenged location."2 9 ' The government's interest might
include:
a forum for suits beyond the reach of any state or
• The desire to 2provide
92
federal forum.

concerns, such as avoiding duplicative or piecemeal
" Judicial economy
293

litigation.
29 4
" Relations with other nations.
by Congress in connection with specific
articulated
" Other interests
2 95

legislation.
Although these previously-constructed fairness tests provide a
good foundation, they do not go far enough to be used "as is" in the
RICO context. Instead, the various fairness tests must be enhanced
before they can help solve the § 1965(b) "ends of justice" dilemma in
the personal jurisdiction context.
b.

Constructinga RICO fairness test

In RICO cases, a four-prong fairness test should be adopted to analyze whether a particular court can exercise personal jurisdiction over
a particular defendant. The first prong of this new RICO fairness test
is the first prong of the Duckworth test, the defendant's contacts with
the United States. 2 96 "[W]hen Congress has undertaken to enact a
nationwide service statute applicable to a certain class of disputes,
that statute should be afforded substantial weight as a legislative arest two or three states. In addition, it might yield rare situations in
which a federal court could not exercise jurisdiction over a defendant

located in the hinterlands of the state in which the court is located.
Id. at 52 (footnotes omitted).

288. Id. at 53.
289. Id. at 39.
290. See supra notes 269-74 and accompanying text.
291. Fullerton, supra note 132, at 56.

292.
293.
294.
295.

Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 59.
Id.

296. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
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ticulation of federal social policy." 29 7 Therefore, Duckworth's first
prong-an examination of the defendant's national contactsalthough easily met in most cases, should be part of the analytical
2 98
framework.
The second prong of the RICO jurisdictional test is to apply the five
Oxford Firstfactors, 29 9 as augmented by Professor Fullerton.3OO Due
process and fairness concerns are extremely important. Therefore, examining factors such as the defendant's contacts with the forum, inconvenience to the defendant, judicial economy, and probable situs of
discovery proceedings is crucial.
The third prong involves a review of the RICO allegations in the
complaint. Are the allegations sufficient to state a claim for relief
under Rule 12(b)(6)? Is RICO the primary claim, or merely an "add
on" designed to obtain jurisdiction in a forum inconvenient for the defendant? If a defendant contemporaneously files a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim and a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction, the court should at least examine the
assertions in the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and supporting papers. 30 1 Even
if a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not filed, the court may want to examine
the RICO allegations. 30 2 If an essential element of a RICO claim is
not pleaded, then the court should refuse to exercise jurisdiction if the
only basis for jurisdiction in that federal forum is § 1965(b).303 Examining the substantive RICO allegations during the personal jurisdiction analysis should not be deemed improper, because if jurisdiction
can be conferred under § 1965(b) only when a RICO claim is included,
the question of whether a RICO claim has actually been alleged is a
pertinent inquiry.
297. 4 WRIGHT & MHI R, supra note 23, § 1067.1, at 331 (1987).
298. This step also comports with Willingway Hospital because it separates jurisdiction from service of process. See supra text accompanying note 266.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 243-47. This prong would also be the second
prong of the Duckworth test. See supra text accompanying note 266.
300. See supra notes 278-83 and accompanying text.

301. Precedent exists for this action. See, e.g., Mulhern v. West Coast Video Enters.,
Inc., Nos. 90-C-0471 & 91-C-0711, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8275 (N.D. Ill. June 15,
1992); Ginsburg v. Faragalli, 776 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Smith v. Mark
Twain Bancshares, No. 84-4282-S (D. Kan. Aug. 11, 1986)(LEXIS, Genfed library,
Courts file)(all addressing the Rule 12(b)(6) motion before ruling on the Rule
12(b)(2) motion).

302. Surveys have shown that many RICO claims are dismissed early on because they
do not plead all required elements. See, e.g., ABA Ad Hoc Report, supra note 42,
at 57-58 (indicating that 52% of reported decisions dismiss the RICO claim);
Michael Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform: The Basis for Compromise, 71 MINN. L.
REv. 827, 837-40 (1987)(indicating that growing numbers of civil RICO claims are
resolved against claimants at the pleading stage).
303. As a practical matter, the court would not want to exercise jurisdiction, then be
faced with an early motion to dismiss the RICO claim, grant the motion, and then
be left without jurisdiction over other state-law claims.
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The final prong involves considering (a) whether an alternative forum exists in which all defendants would be subject to personal jurisdiction and (b) the number of other RICO defendants amenable to
jurisdiction in the forum. This prong is necessary to preserve Congress's intent that at least one federal district court should have the
ability to exercise jurisdiction over each defendant in a single RICO
action.3 0 4 If another court could exercise jurisdiction over all the
RICO defendants, the case should be transferred. If an alternative
forum does not exist, then the number of defendants amenable to
venue should be examined. The "ends of justice" may require the
court to exercise jurisdiction if most of the other RICO defendants are
amenable to jurisdiction in the forum. If, however, another forum
would have jurisdiction over more defendants, then the case should be
transferred to that forum.
This four-prong test is better than ones currently being used because it protects defendants' due process rights, gives credence to the
actual language of § 1965(b), adheres to Congress' intent when enacting RICO, brings some degree of uniformity and consistency to jurisdictional determinations under civil RICO, and should discourage
attorneys from adding RICO claims merely to gain a jurisdictional advantage. It balances all competing concerns and, if applied, will solve
the major problems currently associated with personal jurisdiction
under § 1965(b).
2.

Venue

If personal jurisdiction is not challenged by the defendant, or is
established under the preceding test, the court should then consider
any venue challenges.305 "Venue" concerns the place where the lawsuit should be heard.306 The keys to venue are that it is purely statutory3o 7 and is primarily a matter of "convenience of litigants and
witnesses." 30 Although occasionally confused with jurisdiction, the
two concepts are different. 30 9 As the United States Supreme Court
explained:
The jurisdiction of the federal courts-their power to adjudicate-is a grant of
304. See Shuton, Inc. v. Optel Corp. No. CIV.A. 85-2925, 1996 WL 15617, at *4 (D.N.J.
Sept. 29, 1986).
305. A court can choose to consider venue challenges before jurisdictional challenges

when that issue is "unambiguous and dispositive." See, e.g., Eastman v. Initial

Inv., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 336, 337-38 (E.D. Pa. 1993). See also infra note 385 and
accompanying text (discussing courts deciding Rule 12(b) motions out of the normal order).
306. See, e.g., Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1939).
307. See Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979).
308. 15 WRIGHT & M=n, supra note 23, § 3801, at 3-4 (1985)(quoting Denver &
R.G.W.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 560 (1967)).

309. Id.
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authority to them by Congress and thus beyond the scope of litigants to confer. But the locality of a law suit-the place where judicial authority may be
exercised-though defined by legislation relates to the convenience of litigants
and as such is subject to their disposition. This basic difference between the
court's power and the litigant's convenience is historic in the federal
courts. 3 1 0

Thus, even though the court may have jurisdiction over the defendants, if statutory venue rules are not followed and the defendant objects to venue, the action cannot be heard in that district.311 If a court

determines that venue in its district is improper, it may either dismiss

the action 312 or transfer the action to a district in which venue would
be proper.31 3
Venue in a civil RICO case is like venue in other cases. As explained in Section III(A), venue over a RICO defendant can be established under the general venue provision, § 1391,314 or under
§ 1965(a) in the place where the defendant is found, resides, transacts
her affairs, or has an agent. 31 5 Although some concerns exist about
courts' application of these two statutes, 31 6 the more significant problem lies with courts' inconsistent and incomplete inquiry when a
plaintiff attempts to establish venue under § 1965(b).337 In other
words, when do the "ends of justice" require a court to subject a defendant to its venue?
Courts faced with this question should employ a two-step test.
First, as has been acknowledged by many courts, § 1965(b) should not
be invoked as a venue statute unless at least one RICO defendant is
amenable to venue in the forum under § 1965(a) or § 1391.318 Thus,
this two-step test would be applied only in multiple-defendant cases.
If only one defendant is sued under RICO, venue must be proper
under § 1391 or § 1965(a); if it is not, the case should be dismissed or
transferred to another district.319
The second step is to engage in a balancing test that weighs the
following factors.32 0 First, could another federal district court exer310. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1939). Accord
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Western Conference of Teamsters, 722 F. Supp. 725, 727
(N.D. Ga. 1989)(explaining that "the fundamental and historical purpose of venue
... is that there is a particular court or courts in which an action 'should be
brought' for the convenience of the parties, particularly that of the defendant")(quoting 15 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 23, § 3802, at 7 (1985)).
311. See 15 WRIGrr & MILLER, supra note 23, § 3801, at 7 (1986).
312. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3).
313. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1994)(described in infra note 380).
314. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
317. See supra section IV.B.
318. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
320. Although some of these factors overlap with those included in the proposed juris-
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cise venue over all the RICO defendants?321 If no other federal district would have venue over all the defendants, then this factor weighs
heavily in favor of maintaining venue in the plaintiff's choice of forum.3 22 However, the analysis should not end there.

Next, how many other RICO defendants are subject to venue in the
forum under either § 1391 or § 1965(a)?3 2 3 As an example, assume
that six defendants are named in the RICO count. If one or two are
amenable to venue in the district under § 1391 or § 1965(a), and venue
must be obtained over all others under the "ends of justice" test in
§ 1965(b), then this factor weighs in favor of dismissing or transferring the case. On the other hand, if four or five are amenable to venue
in the district under § 1391 or § 1965(a), and only one or two defendants must be subjected to venue under § 1965(b), then this factor
weighs in favor of maintaining venue. 32 4 Although no bright-line exists to implement this factor, as a general rule, if another forum would
have venue over more than half the defendants under § 1391 or
§ 1965(a), dismissal or transfer should be seriously considered. But
again, the analysis should not end here; the remaining factors should
also be considered.
Has a RICO claim been stated sufficiently to survive a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)?325 Just as in the jurisdictional context, if
an essential element of a RICO claim is not pleaded, then the court
should not exercise venue if the only basis for venue is § 1965(b).
dictional test, they are relevant to both analyses.
321. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
322. As the court in Shulton, Inc. v. Optel Corp., No. CIV. 85-2925, 1986 WL 15617,
at *26 n.3 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 1986), explained:
[T]he interest of fairness to each defendant, which presumably most underlies the "ends of justice" requirement, is not furthered by requiring
the plaintiff to proceed in the single most convenient forum, where there
exists no single forum in which venue could be properly laid as to all
defendants. Each individual defendant's interest is to have the action
proceed in a forum most convenient to it, that is, where it "resides, is
found, has an agent or transacts its affairs." 28 U.S.C. § 1965(a). If
there is no forum in which this interest may be accommodated for every
defendant, then section 1965(b) authorizes the sacrificing of the individual defendant's interest in convenience in favor of the goal of dispensing
with related RICO claims in a single proceeding. Once the defendant's
interest in a forum convenient to it is thus necessarily sacrificed, the
defendant would ordinarily have little interest in which of two other, inconvenient forums is selected for prosecution of the action.
See also 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3) (1994)(now providing that, in a federal-question
case involving multiple defendants, if no district exists in which the action may
otherwise be brought, the suit may be placed in a district "in which any defendant
may be found").
323. See supra note 204.
324. See supra note 304.
325. See supra text accompanying note 205. See also text accompanying supra notes
301-03.
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Otherwise, a defendant may be subject to venue in a far-away forum
simply because the plaintiff lists § 1965(b) as a basis for venue but
does little else to plead, much less establish, a RICO claim. If the
court does not look at-and maybe even behind-the allegations,
plaintiffs will continue to seek a forum advantage with the § 1965(b)
"ends of justice" test.
Additionally, the court should also consider several "fairness factors," such as the distance between the current forum and any proposed alternative forum;3 2 6 where the majority of witnesses and

evidence are located; where discovery will be conducted;3 2 7 and
whether the prejudice to the defendant in having to defend in the forum is outweighed by the prejudice to the plaintiff in having the case
dismissed or transferred. 328 These are factors similar to those that
would be examined when the forum non conveniens 3 29 doctrine is invoked or 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is invoked.330
A landmark decision on forum non conveniens is Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert,33 1 in which the Court's statement of factors to be considered
is relevant to the "ends of justice" venue test being constructed in this
Article:
An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the
private interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease
of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance
of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses;...
and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious
and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforcibility [sic] of a
The court will weigh relative advantages and
judgment if one is obtained.
3 32
obstacles to fair trial.

This list of factors is not exclusive; the court may and should exercise
its discretion in determining which fairness factors to consider and
See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court may dismiss an action because the chosen forum, although a proper venue, is inconvenient. 15 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 23, § 3828, at 278 (1986). Forum non conveniens is rarely
used today because 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) permits a court to transfer the case to the
more convenient forum. 15 WIGrr & MILLER, supra note 23, § 3828, at 278-80.
330. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of the parties and witnesses,
in the interest ofjustice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(1994). See also 15 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 23, §§ 3847-54 (1986)(examining § 1404(a) and factors considered by courts when determining whether a
venue transfer is necessary and proper; the broad categories considered are
plaintiffs privilege in choosing the forum; convenience of the parties; convenience
of witnesses; expert witnesses; location of books and records; and "interest of
justice").
331. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
332. Id. at 508-09.
326.
327.
328.
329.
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how much weight they should be afforded.333
Finally, the court should consider additional factors relating to judicial economy,3 34 including whether the defendants are subject to
venue on other causes of action alleged in the same lawsuit;3 3 5 where
factually similar or related cases are pending;336 and which state's
law will govern any supplemental claims. 3 37 These factors, although
not the most critical, can be used to tip the balance in close cases.
Factors that should not be considered in the venue analysis include
those rejected by the courts in Magic Toyota, Inc. v. Southeast Toyota
Distributors, Inc.,338 and Walters v. Beavers.3 39 In addition, the
amount of time already spent litigating in the forum34O should not be

considered unless the court specifically finds that the delay is attributable to the defendant and was caused to avoid or postpone a ruling on
preliminary issues or on the merits. If the delay is attributable to the
plaintiff or the court, the defendant should not be forced to continue
litigating in an inconvenient forum merely because preliminary matters took weeks or months to resolve.
Moreover, the court need not worry about which district might
have the greatest contacts with the lawsuit.341 As one court ex-

plained, "Requiring a plaintiff to anticipate a court's view of the one,
most convenient forum in which to pursue a RICO claim, particularly
in the case of a complex, nationwide conspiracy, prior to any discovery
of the defendant, will inevitably result in a number of wrong guesses
and an uneconomical overuse of the case transferring mechanism pro333. Cf 15 WiGmwr & MixR, supranote 23, § 3847, at 368-70 (1986)(noting that few
cases have limited a court's discretion in determining whether venue should be
transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
334. Some factors listed under other prongs of this test could also be characterized as
"judicial economy" concerns. See supra text accompanying notes 208, 211-12.
335. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
336. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
337. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
338. 784 F. Supp. 306, 311 (D.S.C. 1992)(rejecting the plaintiffs' four-part argument
that (1) the defendants would experience no substantial hardship in defending
the case in the forum, (2) the defendants would have to come to the forum to
testify anyway, (3) the defendants were "horrible people who have committed horrible acts in violation of the RICO statute," and (4) the plaintiffs should not be
forced to pursue their action outside their home state). See supra text accompanying notes 215-16 (discussing Magic Toyota, Inc. v. Southeast Toyota Distrib.,
Inc., 784 F. Supp. 306 (D.S.C. 1992)).
339. No. 89-696-JJF, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1432 at *17 (D. Del. Feb. 6, 1991)(rejecting plaintiffs' argument that "they would be unable to receive a fair trial in
North Dakota because of the popularity of some of the people who will necessarily
be implicated by this litigation"). See text accompanying supranotes 217-20 (discussing Walters v. Beavers).
340. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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vided in 28 U.S.C. § 1404."342
Finally, considering where the allegedly improper conduct occurred; 3 43 whether alleged co-conspirators committed acts on behalf of
the defendant within the forum;344 and whether the defendant has
any general or specific contacts with the forum345 should not be considered under § 1965(b). These considerations are expressly made
part of the venue analysis either under § 1391 or § 1965(a). Thus, if
they exist, they should be considered well before a court reaches the
§ 1965(b) "ends of justice" test.
By adopting this two-part venue test, and by ignoring irrelevant
factors, courts will separate the venue analysis from the personal jurisdiction analysis under § 1965(b); ensure all parties a fair forum;
discourage plaintiffs from adding RICO claims merely to gain a forum
advantage; abide by the legislative intent; and bring some degree of
uniformity and consistency to venue determinations under civil RICO.
V. PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR ATTORNEYS
Attorneys can help courts reach just results concerning venue and
jurisdiction in civil RICO cases. When a plaintiff includes a RICO
cause of action in a lawsuit, the attorney should first ensure that all
34
essential elements of a RICO cause of action have been pleaded. 6
RICO claims designed merely to intimidate defendants or gain an advantage in forum should not be filed. Attorneys must not cave in to
pressure from clients to "throw in the kitchen sink" if the "kitchen

sink" does not fit.347
Even though all facts may not be readily available at the start of a
lawsuit, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) now allows the plaintiff
342. Shulton, Inc. v. Optel Corp., No. CIV. A. 85-2925, 1986 WL 15617, at *26 n.3
(D.N.J. Sept. 29, 1986).
343. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
345. Miller Brewing Co. v. Landau, 616 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (E.D. Wis. 1985)(noting
that it need not reach the § 1965(b) analysis because all RICO defendants were
subject to venue under 1965(a), but commenting that "[w]hile this fact militates
against making an 'ends of justice' finding under § 1965(b), the Court opines that
it should not be the sole consideration, especially where transferring the case
would result in extraordinary delay or some other extreme prejudice against the
plaintiffs interests"); accord Preway Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., No. 85-C-645-C
(W.D. Wis. Feb. 26, 1986)(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file).
346. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1962 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996)(listing the substantive
elements of a RICO claims). See generallyABRAMs, supra note 36, chs. 2-5; SmITH
& REED, supra note 102, 7.02 (both discussing pleadings in a RICO action).
347. See MODEL RULES OF PROFEssIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3.1 (1995)(providing that "[a]
lawyer shall not bring ...a proceeding... unless there is a basis for doing so that
is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law"). See also supra notes 74 & 83 (concerning Rule
11 sanctions in the RICO context).
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to include allegations that, "if specifically so identified, are likely to
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery"; however, the rule still requires attorneys
to certify that the claim "is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation."348 Regardless, plaintiffs counsel
should be ready to respond early on to a RICO case statement that
requires information on matters such as the identity of each RICO defendant and the role each defendant allegedly played in the RICO enterprise; the identity of the RICO enterprise; facts supporting each
predicate act alleged; acts constituting a "pattern of racketeering activity"; and evidence of any conspiracy, if conspiracy is alleged.349
In addition to properly pleading the substantive elements of a
RICO claim, the plaintiffs attorney should state the basis upon which
the court may exercise both personal jurisdiction and venue over each
RICO defendant. Not only should the statutory sections relied on be
cited, but some factual information should be included. In other
words, if venue is based on § 1965(b), the pleading should indicate
why the "ends of justice" require the court to exercise venue.
Even if a plaintiffs attorney elects not to expressly state the basis
for the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction and venue, 3 50 the attorney should, when the complaint is filed or shortly after it is filed, begin
to think about challenges that might be filed by the defendant. Section 1965(b) should not be invoked unless at least one RICO defendant
is subject to jurisdiction or venue in the district under another
provision.351

If a jurisdictional or venue fight is likely352-and it will be unless
suit is filed in the defendant's place of residence or business-the
plaintiffs attorney should begin gathering information35 3 that can be
348. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).

349.
350.
351.
352.

See supra note 78 (concerning RICO case statements).
See, e.g., Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 733 (9th Cir. 1963).
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
Attorneys should also explain to their clients the costs involved with litigating
jurisdiction and venue disputes. See DAVID HrvER, FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
BEFORE TRIAL 1 9:182.1 (5th Cir. ed. 1994)(warning that "[r]esearch and preparation of major motions is expensive" and "[ulnless you are likely to win the motion
or gain some distinct advantage, the large cost involved is likely to be wasted").
353. See, e.g., Paternostro v. Dow Furnace Co., 848 F. Supp. 706, 709-10 (S.D. Miss.
1994)(cautioning that bald allegations of personal jurisdiction are not sufficient
to discharge the plaintiff's burden in overcoming a Rule 12(b)(6) motion); Catrone
v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 850, 857 (D. Mass. 1986)(instructing

that in the context of a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must go
beyond the pleadings and make an affirmative showing by affidavits or other evidence that the court has jurisdiction); Replas, Inc. v. Wall, 516 F. Supp. 59, 62
(S.D. Ind. 1980)(explaining that when a Rule 12(b)(2) "motion to dismiss is supported by affidavit, the nonmoving party may not rest upon allegations in his
pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing that the court has
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used to counter affidavits submitted by a defendant354 to support mo-

tions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,355 venue,3 56 or suffi-

ciency of service.3 57 A plaintiffs attorney should try to determine the
defendant's contacts with their forum by talking to the client and
other friendly witnesses; 3 58 reviewing documents in the client's possession; researching public records 3 59 (such as SEC filings,360 Secretary of State filings, and property records); and locating articles, press
releases, and other public information361 about the defendant by running searches on LEXIS/NEXIS362 and WESTLAW363 databases, In354.
355.
356.
357.

358.
359.

360.

361.
362.

jurisdiction").
See infra notes 391-98 and accompanying text.
See infra note 374.
See infra note 375.
See supra note 376; 5A WmIGHT & MILLER, supra note 23, § 1353, at 284
(1990)(noting that "when defendant supports a motion to quash service with an
affidavit denying the validity of service, plaintiff may present counter-affidavits,
depositions, or oral testimony" (footnote omitted)).
See James W. McElhaney, Informal Investigation, LrrIG., Spring 1982, at 51.
In addition to obtaining records from a local recorder or clerk, some public
records information is also available electronically. For example, LEXIS and
WESTLAW each maintain databases containing individual state corporate and
limited partnership records; UCC filings, liens, and judgments; real property asset locators; real property asset transfer information; personal property locators;
name trackers; business finders; bankruptcy records; lawsuit filings for certain
states, cities, and counties; company relation information. See STEVEN L. EANUEL, LEXIS-NEXIS FOR LAw STUDENTS ch. 8 (2d ed. 1995-96); WESTLAW
DATABASE LIST 75-78 (Winter/Spring 1996). See also infra notes 362-63 (describing some materials available on the computer services).
To assure public availability of adequate information about companies with publicly-traded stocks, the SEC requires each publicly-traded company to file an annual report on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, and current reports
on Form 8-K for any month in which certain, specified events occur. See DAVID L.
RATNER, SEcuRrriEs REGULATION 96-97 (5th ed. 1996). See also infra notes 362
(describing the availability of SEC filings on LEXIS and WESTLAW).
See generally Teresa Pritchard & Susan Hutchens, Remote Access to Corporate
Public Records: Scanning the Field, DATABASE, Apr. 1991, at 24.
The LEXIS/NEXIS NEWS database contains over 3000 full-text publications, including about 130 newspapers such as the Atlanta Journal and Constitution,
ChristianScience Monitor,Newsday, New York Times, San FranciscoChronicle,
USA Today, and WashingtonPost; special-purpose newspapers such as Advertising Age, Financial Times, and Investors Business Daily; about 320 magazines
such as Business Week, Forbes,Money, Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World
Report; wire-service information from services such as the AP, Reuters, Gannett
News Services, TASS, and UPI; many newsletters and television transcripts; and
several abstract files. EMANUEL, supra note 359, ch. 8. Public documents, such as
property records, court docket sheets, state corporation, limited partnership, and
DBA filings, UCC filings, liens, judgments, and some verdicts and settlements
are available from the eight libraries in the LEXIS Public Records Online Service
database. Id. ch. 8; Jean A. Newland & Michael Halperin, The INCORP Files:
Extracting Company Informationfrom State Filings, 14 DATABASE, Apr. 1991, at
28 (discussing the INCORP database, which contains information about corporations incorporated in, or registered to business in over 40 states and the District
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formation America, 36 4 and the Internet, 3 65 and sources such as Dun &
Bradstreet 3 66 and Standard & Poor's 3 67 publications. 368 If informaof Columbia). In addition, company information is available in the COMPNY li_muL,
supra note 359, ch. 8, at 8-12 & 8-13.
brary in the NEXIS database. Er
This library includes reports by investment banks and brokerage houses about
whole industries and individual companies; filings by corporations and individuals with the SEC, including 10-K, 10-Q, Annual Reports to Shareholders, Proxy
Statements, Tender Offers, Acquisitions, and Registration Statements. Id. (also
indicating that the most inclusive files for SEC filings are EDGARP and SECOL).
In addition, the different court databases will permit a researcher to discover
some cases in which the other party was involved. Remember, however, that not
all cases are published and that not all cases proceed to trial. Some courts now
have computerized databases that permit a researcher to locate unpublished or
pending cases if the researcher knows the party's name. Of course, these
databases are not consolidated; thus, searches must be conducted on a court-bycourt, or worse yet, division-by-division basis.
363. WESTLAW's various news and factual information databases, including DIALOG
and the Dow Jones News/Retrieval, contain information from thousands of
sources including Dow Jones magazines, journals, and newsletters; major newspapers such as the Washington Post, Atlanta Journal and Constitution, Boston
Herald,PhiladelphiaInquirer,and New York Times; international news sources
such as the Wall Street JournalEurope, South China Morning Post, Financial
Times, and several Canadian newspapers; regional and local newspapers such as
the Baltimore Sun, Cincinnati Post, Fort Worth Star-Telegram, New Orleans
Times-Picayune, St. PetersburgTimes, Tucson Citizen, and Wichita Eagle; legal
newspapers such as the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Massachusetts Lawyer
Weekly, New Jersey Law Journal, New York Law Journal, and Texas Lawyer;
general interest magazines and journals such as Barron's,Business Week, Consumer Reports, Fortune,Inc., Money, Time, and U.S. News & World Report; trade
publications such as Advertising Age, Environment Business, Industry Week,
Shopper Report, Supermarket News, and Defense Daily; banking and financial
services publications such as ABA Banking Journal, Investor's Business Daily,
and United States Banker; business news sources such as Business America,
QuarterlyReview of Economics and Business, and many state and regional business journals; transcripts from programs such as Today and Technology Edge;
abstracts and indexes such as National Newspaper Index and Journal of Commerce Abstracts; newswires such as PR Newswire, AP News, Business Wire,
Reuters, and UPI News; and Marquis Who's Who. DISCOVERNG WESTLAW ch.
11 (5th ed. 1995); WESTLAW DATABASE LIST 69-116 (Winter/Spring 1996). See
also supra note 359 (indicating that the court databases also should be checked).
364. See Cary Griffith, InformationAmerica: Access to Public Records and a Whole Lot
More, hNo. TODAY, Dec. 1990, at 10.
365. See generally DoN MACLEOD, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR THE LEGAL RESEARCHER
(1995); G. Burgess Allison, A Bestiary ofInternet Services, L. PPAc. MGNrr., Mar.

1995, at 28; Genie Tyburski, In Search of the Gold:A Primerfor Mining the Net,
Mar. 1996, at 62.
366. See generally MICHAEL R. LAviN, BusinEss INFORmTION chs. 6, 8 (2d ed.
1992)(describing Dun's many publications about U.S. companies); Linda S. Begue
& Melissa B. Mickey, Dun's Legal Search: What Is It?, LEGAL INFo. ALERT, Mar.
1992, at 1 (describing DIA, Dun's "menu-driven method of accessing D&B's proprietary corporate information"); Melissa B. Mickey, Dun & Bradstreet:An Essential Source of Informationon U.S. Companies, Bus. INFo. ALERT, Jan. 1990, at
1. WESTLAW has a Dun & Bradstreet Business Records file.
367. See STANmAR & PooR's REGLSTER (continually published since 1928, the register
TRIAL,
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tion needed to establish jurisdiction, venue, and sufficiency of nationwide process is not available through these sources, the attorney
should consider requesting permission 36 9 to serve early discovery requests limited to the issues of jurisdiction,3 70 venue,3 71 and sufficiency of service.3 72
Counsel representing defendants sued under RICO should consider filing motions to dismiss373 under Rule 12(b)(2),374 (3),375 (4),376

368.

369.

370.

371.
372.
373.

contains listings on over 55,000 U.S. and Canadian companies; all publiclytraded companies are eligible for inclusion, as are private companies whose annual sales exceed one million dollars). See generally LAvIN, supra note 366, at
117-19 (also noting that an online version of the Register is available on
WESTLAW DIALOG and LEXIS/NEXIS).
Other useful publications might include U.S. Manufacturers Directory (listing
more than 120,000 manufacturers and containing information about headquarters and branch locations), Best's Insurance Reports (profiling virtually every insurance company doing business in the U.S.), state and local business directories,
and telephone directories. See LAviN, supra note 366, chs. 7-8.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d), as amended effective December 1,
1993, a plaintiff may no longer serve discovery requests with the complaint. Instead, "a party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have
met and conferred as required by subdivision (f)" unless authorized "by local rule,
order, or agreement of the parties." FED. R. Crv. P. 26(d).
See, e.g., Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285
n.1 (9th Cir. 1977)(indicating that the court has discretion to allow discovery limited to the jurisdictional issues and to prevent the plaintiff from conducting discovery on the substantive claims); Stratagem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l N.V., 153
F.R.D. 535, 547(S.D.N.Y. 1994)(holding that the court has discretion to order discovery on the jurisdictional issue, provided that the plaintiff makes a threshold
showing of jurisdiction and establishes that its position is not frivolous). But see
Collins v. New York Cent. Sys., 327 F.2d 880, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1963)(Miller, J.,
dissenting)(criticizing discovery on the jurisdictional issue because "[tihe interrogatories amounted to nothing more than a fishing expedition in which the appellants hoped to induce the appellee to contradict its own affidavits"). See
generally 5A WRiGst & MILLER, supranote 23, § 1351, at 256, 259 (1990)(noting
that "it may be desirable to hold in abeyance [under Rule 12(d)] a decision on a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction" because "[d]oing so will enable
the parties to employ discovery on the jurisdictional issue, which might lead to a
more accurate judgment than one made solely on the basis of affidavits"). If discovery is required, the request should be made as early as possible. See Empresa
Nacional Siderurgica, S.A. v. Glazer Steel Co., 503 F. Supp. 1064, 1066 (S.D.N.Y.
1980)(denying plaintiffs request for discovery on the jurisdictional issue when
plaintiff waited over seven weeks after defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction).
See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Thomas Indus., Inc., 896 F.2d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir.
1990); Hayashi v. Red Wing Peat Corp., 396 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1968). See
generally 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 23, § 1352, at 265 & n.9 (1990).
See, e.g., Collins v. New York Cent. Sys., 327 F.2d 880, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1963); General Indus. Co. v. Birmingham Sound Reproducers, Ltd., 26 F.R.D. 559, 560-61
(E.D.N.Y. 1961).
See, e.g., Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 674 (4th Cir. 1989)(noting that defendants in this RICO case "raised across-the board objections to the action, challenging the court's subject matter jurisdiction, venue, and jurisdiction over their
persons, the sufficiency of process and the service of process, the sufficiency of the
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and (6).378 They should also consider filing motions to transfer
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 379 or § 1406(a), 38 0 and possibly under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. 3 8 ' A Rule 12(b)(1)382 motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be filed, but results
have been mixed. Some courts hold that a failure to properly state a
particular federal cause of action is not equivalent to lack of federal
subject-matter jurisdiction. 38 3 However, some courts have dismissed
(5),377

374.
375.
376.

377.

378.
379.
380.

381.
382.
383.

complaint to state a claim, and the failure to join [a party]").
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)(providing the defense of "lack of jurisdiction over the person"). See generally 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supranote 23, § 1351 (discussing procedures for filing a Rule 12(b)(2) motion).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3)(allowing complaint to be dismissed for improper venue).
See generally 5A WIUGHT & MILLER, supra note 23, § 1352 (discussing procedures
for filing a Rule 12(b)(3) motion).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4)(listing "insufficiency of process" as one basis for dismissing a complaint). Since § 1965(b) is considered a service of process provision,
defendants would be wise to include this Rule 12(b) motion in their initial defensive arsenal. See generally 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 23, § 1353 (discussing procedures for filing a Rule 12(b)(4) motion).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5)(listing "insufficiency of service of process" as one basis for
dismissing a complaint). Since § 1965(b) is considered a service of process provision, defendants would be wise to include this Rule 12(b) motion in their initial
defensive arsenal. See generally 5A WRIGrr & MILLER, supra note 23, § 1353
(discussing procedures for filing a Rule 12(b)(5) motion). A Rule 12(b)(4) motion
is proper only to challenge noncompliance with the provisions of Rule 4 or any
provision incorporated by Rule 4 that deals specifically with the content of the
summons. Id. § 1353, at 276. A Rule 12(b)(5) motion is used to challenge the
delivery of the summons and complaint. Id.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)(allowing complaint to be dismissed for "failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted"). See generally 5A WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 23, § 1357 (discussing procedures for filing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).
See supra notes 115 & 330 (discussing § 1404(a)). See generally 5A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 23, § 1352 (discussing venue dismissals and transfers).
This statute provides that "[t]he district court... in which is filed a case laying
venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of
justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). See generally 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
23, § 1352 (discussing venue dismissals and transfers).
See supra notes 329-32 and accompanying text.
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)(permitting dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction). See generally 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 23, § 1350.
See, e.g., Brockv. Writers Guild of Am., W., Inc., 762 F.2d 1349, 1352 n.3 (9th Cir.
1985). See also Ridenour v. Andrews Fed. Credit Union, 897 F.2d 715, 719 (4th
Cir. 1990)(explaining that if federal subject-matter jurisdiction fails because no
federal claim exists, the proper disposition is to dismiss on the merits for failure
to state a claim, rather than for want of subject-matter jurisdiction); Lunderstadt
v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1989)(concluding that dismissal for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction is not appropriate merely because the legal theory alleged is probably false); Banco de Ponce v. Hinsdale Supermarket Corp., 663 F.
Supp. 813, 820 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)(cautioning that courts should be slow to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction when the claim is purportedly based on federal
law and suggesting that the wiser practice is to accept jurisdiction and dismiss
for failure to state a claim).
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actions under Rule 12(b)(1) when the federal claim was patently unsound and without merit.3 8 4
If the strongest argument is improper venue, defense counsel
should also consider requesting the court to decide the motions out of
the normal order 38 5 and address the venue question first.386 At a
minimum, defense attorneys should incorporate by reference any Rule
12(b)(6) motion and supporting papers into the Rule 12(b)(2) motion,
thus increasing the chances that the court will examine the sufficiency
of the RICO pleadings.387
Defense counsel must realize that when they file Rule 12(b) motions, courts may require each defendant to overcome the plaintiffs
384. See, e.g., Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir.
1990)(holding that claim alleging federal subject-matter jurisdiction may be dismissed if claim is patently without merit); Sassower v. Dosal, 744 F. Supp. 908,
909 (D. Minn. 1990)(explaining that subject-matter jurisdiction will not lie when

the federal question asserted is immaterial, insubstantial, or frivolous), affd, 930
F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1991); Jonak v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 629 F. Supp.
90, 92 (D. Neb. 1985)(ruling that claim may be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, rather than for failure to state a claim, when the allegations in
the complaint are frivolous and when the statute provides the basis for both subject-matter jurisdiction and the plaintiffs substantive claim); Roberts v. Clark,
615 F. Supp. 1554, 1556 (D. Colo. 1985)(noting that if a "claim is patently unsound and without merit, the court may be justified in dismissing the complaint
for want of [subject-matter] jurisdiction").

385. Jurisdiction is typically considered the threshold issue. See In re DES Cases, 789
F. Supp. 552, 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)(explaining that "[oin the theory that a court
ought to first determine whether a party is properly present before considering
substantive issues, the normal practice is to consider 12(b)(2) motions prior to
12(b)(6) motions"); 5A WRGrr & MILLER, supranote 23, § 1351, at 244. If a court
does not have jurisdiction, it typically can do no more than dismiss or transfer the
action. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press Intl, 320 F.2d 219, 221 (2d Cir.
1963).
386. See, e.g., Eastman v. Initial Inv., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 336, 337-38 (E.D. Pa.
1993)(indicating that "[because the venue issue is unambiguous and dispositive,
I shall reverse the 'normal order' of consideration and address venue first"). See
also In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552, 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)(allowing order of
motions to be inverted and agreeing to address a Rule 12(b)(6) motion before a
Rule 12(b)(2) motion when the jurisdictional problem "cannot be appreciated except against the backdrop of substantive... law").
387. Challenges to personal jurisdiction, venue, and process can be waived by the defendant. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(h)(indicating that "[a] defense of lack of jurisdiction
over the person, improper venue, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process is waived (A) if omitted from a motion in the circumstances described in subdivision (g) [consolidation of defenses], or (B) if it is neither made by
motion under this rule nor included in a responsive pleading or an amendment
thereof permitted by Rule 15(a) to be made as a matter of course"). See also 28
U.S.C. § 1406(b)(warning that "[niothing in this chapter shall impair the jurisdiction of a district court of any matter involving a party who does not interpose
timely and sufficient objections to the venue"). Therefore, defendants must take
care not to inadvertently waive venue and jurisdictional challenges. See infra
notes 399-407 and accompanying text.
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prima facie showing that venue,3 88 personal jurisdiction,389 and service 390 are proper. Therefore, defense counsel should be prepared to
submit affidavits that both rebut the venue and jurisdictional statements in the complaint and that show each defendant's lack of contacts with the forum.391 Because affidavits are evidence,3 9 2 counsel
should take care to abide by the Federal Rules of Evidence, especially
those rules concerning opinion evidence,393 hearsay,3 94 and authentication. 3 95 In addition, affidavits must be based on the affiant's per388. Compare Preway Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., No. 85-C-645-C, at *21 (W.D. Wis.
Feb. 26, 1986)(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file)(stating that "when the issue is
presented by motion under Rule 12(b)(3) it would appear to be the better practice
to place the burden on the moving party to show that some such jurisdiction does,
in fact, exist. Otherwise, plaintiffs will be left with the unenviable, if not impossible, task of proving a negative proposition. Since any rule will have to be applied
with equal force to cases with many defendants and cases with only a few, a
plaintiff in a complex, multiple-defendant RICO case may expend as much energy
and effort in disproving venue elsewhere as in proving the merits of its case. I
adopt that allocation of the burden of proof and conclude that venue also exists
under the alternative forum test.") with Southmark Prime Plus, L.P. v. Falzone,
768 F. Supp. 487, 490 (D. Del. 1991)(indicating that although defendants moving
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) bear the burden ofproof, under the RICO statute,
the plaintiff must show that the ends of justice require the court to invoke
1965(b)). See generally 5A WRiGITr & MILLER, supra note 23, § 1352, at 263-65
(observing that "[a] number of courts have concluded that the burden [of proving
improper venue] is on defendant, since venue is a 'personal privilege' and a lack
of venue should be established by the party asserting it," but that "several courts
have imposed the burden on plaintiff in keeping with the rule applied in the context of jurisdiction defenses," and concluding that "[tihe latter view seems correct' (footnotes omitted)).
389. See 5A WRIGm & MILLER, supra note 23, § 1351, at 101 (Supp. 1996)(explaining
that "[the most common formulation is that the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating that personal jurisdiction over the defendant exists by a
preponderance of the evidence, but need only make a prima facie showing when
the court restricts its review of the Rule 12(b)(2) motion solely to affidavits and
other written evidence and without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing").
390. See 5A WmiGirr & MILLER, supranote 23, § 1353, at 283-84 (explaining that "[tihe
party on whose behalf service is made has the burden of establishing its validity"
and that "[n]ormally the process server's return will provide a prima facie case as
to the facts of service but if defendant introduces uncontroverted affidavits in
support of a motion to quash service, the content of those affidavits will be
deemed admitted for purposes of the motion" (footnotes omitted)).
391. See, e.g., Thompson Trading Ltd. v. Allied Lyons PLC, 123 F.R.D. 417, 421-22
(D.R.I. 1989)(indicating that the court may examine affidavits and other extrapleading materials that contradict the complaint). For types of information to
include in the affidavits, see supra notes 278-83 and accompanying text.
392. See, e.g., Wagner v. Department of Agric., 28 F.3d 279, 282-83 (3d Cir. 1994).
393. FED. R. Evm. 701 (providing that "[i]f the witness is not testifying as an expert,
the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those
opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and Nb)helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue").
394. FED. R. Evm. 801-806.
395. FED. R. Evm. 901-903.
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sonal knowledge and should not include rumors, speculation, and
unsupported conclusions.39 6 The affidavits will be important because,
although the court may hold an evidentiary hearing, 39 7 these hearings
are rare in some districts.398
A defendant who wishes to challenge venue, jurisdiction, or sufficiency of process or service of process must be careful not to waive
these defenses.399 These defenses can be waived when the defendant
files a Rule 12 motion raising some other matter, the defense was
available at the time the other Rule 12 motion was filed, and the deof the Rule 12
fendant fails to assert the available defenses as part
40 0
motion or in a simultaneously filed Rule 12 motion.
396. See, e.g., Boyle v. Turnage, 798 F.2d 549, 551 n.4 (1st Cir. 1986)(ruling affidavits

397.

398.

399.
400.

were admissible because affiant was a person with personal knowledge of the
matters included therein); Fredericks v. Shapiro, 160 F.R.D. 26, 28 (S.D.N.Y.
1995)(concluding that statements in a reply affidavit that many of a potential
party's affidavits were "bogus, improper, and false," were not factual but were
conclusory statements that the affiant could not certify under oath); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 894 F. Supp. 1436, 1439 n.4 (E.D. Wash.
1995)(indicating that legal argument and conclusion are not proper matters for
affidavit testimony); Malek v. Martin Marrietta Corp., 859 F. Supp. 458, 460 (D.
Kan. 1994)(holding that it is the affiant's personal knowledge, and not his beliefs,
opinions, rumors, or speculation, that is admissible at trial and the proper subject
of any affidavit); Mid-State Elec., Inc. v. H.L. Libby Corp., 787 F. Supp. 494, 498
(W.D. Pa. 1992)(rejecting affidavit that set forth opinions and conclusions rather
than facts).
See, e.g., Bruce v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 413 F. Supp. 914, 916 (W.D. Okla.
1975)(indicating that because disputed facts were at issue, the court could properly hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the Rule 12(b)(2) motion to
dismiss).
See generally 27 FED. PROC. L. ED. Pleadings and Motions § 62:370 (1984)(explaining that "[iun the judicial administration of the heavy dockets of the federal
courts, litigants are not entitled as a matter of right to an oral hearing on every
motion" and that "courts vary in their willingness to grant oral argument on a
motion"). If a hearing is ordered, the matter may well be referred to a U.S. Magistrate Judge, who will prepare a Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B)(1994).
See HrlmNER, supra note 352, %9:26 (indicating that all four defenses can be
waived if not timely raised).
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h); Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp. v. Mendes, Inc.,
No. 1:94-CV-868, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13175, at *3-4 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 14,
1995); HrrrNER, supra note 352, $ 9:28. In Brunswick, the defendant filed a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim but did not file a Rule
12(b)(2) motion for lack of personal jurisdiction. 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *3-4.
The plaintiff claimed the defendant waived its right to challenge jurisdiction by
filing one Rule 12(b) motion but failing to file a Rule 12(b)(2) motion. Id. at *4.
The defendant claimed it had not intended to waive its jurisdictional challenge
and requested the court to construe its Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a Rule 12(b)(2)
motion. Id. The court agreed to do so, explaining that "[tihe court is required to
construe all pleadings so as to do substantial justice. The substance of [the defendant's] motion clearly challenges the lack of personal jurisdiction. Although it
should technically have been brought under Rule 12(b)(2) rather than Rule
12(b)(6), the erroneous designation has not prejudiced [pilaintiff." Id. (citation

1996]

CIVIL RICO

The defenses can also be impliedly waived if the defendant acknowledges the court's power.40 1 Implied waiver can occur if the defendant moves for summary judgment without raising the
defenses 4 02 stipulates to a preliminary injunction that restrains both
parties; 4 03 or joins in a motion for change of venue based on forum non
conveniens without first asserting improper venue. 4 04 In some instances, filing a counterclaim may also impliedly waive the
defenses. 4 05
4 06
Finally, the defenses can be waived if not asserted "seasonably."
In determining whether threshold defenses have been seasonably asserted, courts consider factors such as whether the opposing party had
notice of the defendant's intent to assert the defense, whether the defendant acted with due diligence to pursue discovery related to the
defense, and the prejudice, if any, to the opposing party as a result of
the delay. 40 7
Once defense counsel files Rule 12(b) motions to dismiss, the plaintiffs attorney must be poised to respond with affidavits that rebut the
allegations in the evidence submitted by the defendants. 4 08 As noted
earlier, plaintiffs counsel may have to request leave to serve discovery
on the venue and jurisdiction issues, 4 0 9 because frequently information concerning these two matters lie largely, if not exclusively, within
the defendants' control. The plaintiffs affidavit should also conform to
the Federal Rules of Evidence and any other materials, such as documents, should be properly authenticated.410 If necessary, plaintiffs
counsel should file written objections to the defendants' evidence. 4 11
omitted).
401. See, e.g., Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939).
402. See, e.g., Thompson v. United States, 312 F.2d 516, 519-20 (10th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 912 (1963).
403. See, e.g., Marquest Medical Prods., Inc. v. EMDE Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242, 1246
(D. Colo. 1980).
404. See, e.g., Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., 322 F. Supp. 377, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
405. Compare Reliable Tire Distrib., Inc. v. Kelly Springfield Tire Co., 623 F. Supp.
153, 155 (E.D. Pa. 1985)(finding waiver) with Media Duplication Servs., Ltd. v.
HDG Software, Inc., 928 F.2d 1228, 1233 n.2 (1st Cir. 1991)(finding no waiver).
406. See, e.g., Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Stone Co., 278 U.S. 177, 17980 (1929)(venue); Marcial UCIN, SAL v. SS Galicia, 723 F.2d 994, 997 (1st Cir.
1983)(jurisdiction).
407. See HrrrNER,supra note 352, T 9:40.
408. See, e.g., Zecco v. Solaris Hotel & Resorts, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 962, 963 (E.D. Pa.
1993)(dismissing complaint when plaintiff did not counter affidavits submitted by
defendant, but merely rested on allegations in the complaint). See generally 5A
WRIGIrr & MIR,
supra note 23, § 1351, 248-50 & nn.27-31.
409. See supra notes 352-57 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 392-96 and accompanying text.
411. See Yamashita v. Guam, 59 F.3d 114, 117 (9th Cir. 1995)(indicating that in the
absence of a motion to strike affidavits that accompanied brief, any issue as to
their admissibility was waived).
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After the plaintiffs responses and evidence have been submitted, defense counsel should, if permitted by local rule, file2 a reply brief and, if
necessary, objections to the plaintiffs evidence.41
VI. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs must not be permitted to use civil RICO's broad venue
and jurisdictional provisions to forum shop and violate defendants'
Fifth Amendment Due-Process rights. If courts adopt the jurisdictional and venue tests outlined in this Article, not only will they weed
out "garden variety" commercial claims disguised as RICO claims, but
they will also bring some degree of uniformity, consistency, and certainty to jurisdictional and venue analyses in civil RICO actions. In
other words, civil RICO's long reach will be shortened just a bit.

412. See supra note 411 and accompanying text.
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VII. APPENDIX 1: TEST FOR DETERMINING PERSONAL
JURISDICTION UNDER CIVIL RICO
STEP ONE:
Determine whether the defendant has contacts
with the United States as a whole.
STEP TWO:
Consider fairness factors, including the defendant's
contacts with the forum, the inconvenience to the
defendant, the location of witnesses and evidence,
the probable situs of discovery proceedings, and judicial economy.
STEP THREE:
Review sufficiency of RICO allegations to determine whether a claim has been stated.
STEP FOUR:
Consider (a) whether an alternative forum exists in
which all defendants would be subject to personal
jurisdiction and (b) the number of other RICO defendants amenable to jurisdiction in the forum.
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VIII. APPENDIX 2: TEST FOR DETERMINING VENUE UNDER
CIVIL RICO
STEP ONE:
Determine whether at least one RICO defendant is
amenable to venue in the forum under § 1965(a) or
§ 1391.
STEP TWO:
Conduct a balancing test that weighs the following
factors:
o Whether another federal district court may exercise
venue over all the RICO defendants.
* Whether more than half the RICO defendants are
amenable to venue in the forum under § 1391 or
§ 1965(a).
o Whether a RICO claim has been stated sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
* Whether the plaintiff has selected a fair forum,
which would be determined by examining matters
such as the distance between the current forum and
any proposed alternative forum; where the majority
of witnesses and evidence are located; where discovery will be conducted; and whether the prejudice
to the defendant in having to defend in the forum is
outweighed by the prejudice to the plaintiff in having the case dismissed or transferred.
* Whether judicial economy requires the court to exercise venue, which determination would be made
by examining matters such as whether the defendants are subject to venue on other causes of action
alleged in the same lawsuit; where factually similar
or related cases are pending; and which state's law
will govern any supplemental claims.

